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CHAPTER 1: Introduction
“Race is relevant today […] The different voting patterns of many people of color give
politicians the motive to suppress their votes, and the unique physical and socioeconomic traits that characterize people of color make them particularly vulnerable”
(Overton 2006, p. 81).
Background of Study
Researchers debate the relationship between voting restrictions and political participation
identifying a range of potential explanations. Classic institutional approaches, pointing to a long
tradition of selective demobilization, suspected that rules changes and restrictions on the
franchise were essential to understanding American voting patterns (Burnham 1970, p. 81;
Burnham 1987, p. 109). This literature detailed various efforts to make voting more difficult, or
impossible, for targeted groups (Keyssar 2000, 2012). The Voting Rights Act of 1965, along
with subsequent bi-partisan reauthorizations of the historic law, convinced many that our nation
had overcome its exclusionary past (Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995, p. 11). Contemporary
voter suppression laws challenge this assumption. Researchers identify four competing theories
to explain the impact of targeted demobilization in recent elections. This study examines two
cases, Florida and North Carolina, to assess the plausibility of these explanations.
Although contemporary voter suppression laws pale in comparison to prior suppression
of the franchise, researchers disagree on their specific effects. Several scholars argue that voter
suppression methods target African American citizens, but conflicting evidence exists indicating
precisely how they work (Minnite 2010, p. 153; Overton 2006, p. 148; Piven et al 2009, p. 9;
Bassetti 2012, p. 174). This study employs careful process tracing to explain this mechanism.
Keyssar (2012) argues that voter suppression, ―differs conceptually from outright
disfranchisement because it does not involve formally disqualifying entire groups of people from
the polls; instead, policies or acts of ‗suppression‘ seek to prevent, or deter, eligible citizens from
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exercising their right to vote. Historically, voter suppression seems to arise when organized
political forces aim to restrain the political participation of particular groups but cannot,
politically or constitutionally, disfranchise them outright‖ (Keyssar 2012, p. 30).
Voter suppression advocates integrate socio-psychological and economic theories of
participation by targeting individual voters via group markers (Verba et al 1995, p. 269; Downs
1957, p. 260). Much of what we know about political behavior is segmented by sub groups.
These identities provide powerful predictors of voting behavior.

They also allow for

sophisticated targeting and gerrymandering. One efficient mechanism employed for shaping the
electorate is raising the participatory costs for groups who most often vote for the opposing
party. However, this strategy creates a perverse cycle. Most simply stated, targeting minority
voters becomes more attractive as minorities increasingly vote en bloc.

Likewise, as one

political party suppresses minority voters, these voters are then even more likely to vote against
that party.

Statement of Problem
Albeit with many fits and starts, America achieved near-universal adult access to the
franchise. The exclusion of any adult citizen without cause violates the basic premises necessary
for democratic self-governance. Yet, some discriminatory exceptions to the franchise are more
easily justified than others. For example, restrictions on children, those mentally incapacitated,
and prison inmates are generally accepted; while those targeting race, gender, or seniority are
widely shunned (Manza, Brooks & Uggen 2004, p. 277). During the first years of this nation;
property, gender, and other qualifications allowed only a quarter of adults the franchise (Keyssar
2000, p. 4). Expansions of this fundamental right are celebrated as proof of American progress.
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Recent legal and political trends indicate that targeted demobilization is on the rise, thus
increasing the need for political scientists to measure the phenomena.

Several key

developments contributed to the reemerging salience of voter suppression. First, the turnout of
African American and Hispanic voters spiked. For example, in the two most recent presidential
elections minority voters increased their share of the American electorate (Lopez 2009, p. ii).
Second, these citizens voted overwhelmingly for one political party. Third, the historic election
and reelection of the nation‘s first African American president, along with increasing partisan
polarization, provoked an intensification of attempts to tighten electoral regulations.
Many state legislatures responded to these electorally ominous demographic and social
changes by instituting voter suppression laws. Overall, the Brennan Center for Justice counted
180 pieces of state legislation aimed at making it harder to register or vote introduced between
the beginning of 2011 and August of 2012 (Election 2012: Voting Laws Roundup). Between
2010 and 2011 upwards of thirty-four states introduced voter identification laws; nine states
passed them via referendum. Seventeen states enacted ―proof of citizenship‖ laws requiring an
official birth certificate for registration (Weiser & Norden 2012, p. 2). Other states restricted
registration drives, reversed previous reforms like early voting, and adopted other forms of
targeted demobilization. This study‘s findings reveal that these contemporary voter suppression
mechanisms depressed African American participation in Florida.

Theoretical Framework
This dissertation adopts a historical-institutional approach to analyze state voting systems
and voter suppression. I build in the broader tradition of institutionalism, and more specifically,
realignment theory that has produced many meaningful insights into American political

4

development. This study explores several implications raised by the evolutionary realignment
hypothesis advanced by Carmines and Stimson (1989, chps. 8 and 9). In their seminal work
Issue Evolution (1989) they found that political change was dynamic and evolved over time. In
short, they contended that the 1980‘s partisan realignment was a product of the integration of
racial and ideological issues in the late 1960‘s. This period was marked by white backlash to the
civil rights and social justice agenda identified with previous alignments. Dated to roughly the
late 1960‘s (scholars offer competing dates), the ―Reagan realignment‖ witnessed the regression
of many civil rights movement, New Deal, and Great Society initiatives (Black & Black 2002, p.
24). Along with retractions of liberal economic and social policies, the new realignment was
also associated with inconsistent support for voting rights. Despite a national push to make
voting more convenient, this study identifies a range of measures adopted that were intended to
discourage or suppress participation.
The central finding of this dissertation is that contemporary voter suppression measures
negatively impact African American participation. This study traces the origin and evolution of
these laws to the broader partisan realignment of each state. I contend that the prior alignment,
built partially on appeals to white racial resentment, is being replaced by a majority coalition
comprised of more non-white American voters.

Although voter suppression attempts are

intensifying, these techniques are becoming increasingly risky. As U.S. politics transition to
much more racially diverse electorates, voter suppression measures create a perverse incentive.
This electoral approach requires more intensive demobilization at a time when racial appeals are
increasingly subject to backlash.
Voter suppression measures may provoke push back among those targeted. Additionally,
partisan and cynical attempts to suppress voters may inspire counter demobilization from interest
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groups, elites, and the media (Hasen 2012, p. 6). Civil rights and voting advocates often
publicize voter suppression laws to spur get-out-the-vote efforts and media coverage of these
measures presents a public relations problem for their proponents. Most importantly, racially
based voter suppression runs contrary to widely held democratic beliefs and values (Gerken
2009, p. 30).
This process was not, however, automatic or pre-determined. This study contends that
Republican Party elites actively chose to institute voter suppression laws, and that this pattern
was consistent with prior decisions to pursue the ―southern strategy‖ and write off the black
electorate. However, unlike past versions of the approach, the electoral consequences of this
strategy may be changing. In an increasingly diverse society, Republican elites are faced with
two choices. The first would be expanding the electoral base of the Republican Party to include
minority citizens. The second would be finding new and creative ways to suppress the vote. For
the cases, and period under review, the GOP adopted the latter approach.

Purpose of Study
The purpose of this dissertation is to assess competing explanations of the relationship
between voter suppression and participation within and across two cases studies, Florida and
North Carolina from 1988 to 2012. During this time period, government officials across cases
adopted starkly differing levels of voter suppression allowing for a rough natural experiment.
This study employed qualitative process tracing to chart the development of contemporary voter
suppression measures in each state. To gain an accurate description of voter participation, I
scrutinized quantitative registration, demographics, and turnout data. As a result, quantitative
methods and reasoning are utilized in conjunction with the analytic narrative presented.
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The literature divides into four general explanations by which voter suppression efforts
might affect elections:

H1: Discouraging Voter Hypothesis - The first, termed by Lott (2006)1 as the
discouraging voter hypothesis, suggested that actual voter fraud was rare, and thus
regulations served to discourage eligible voters. Many scholars argued strongly that voter
suppression measures negatively impacted participation and specifically targeted African
American citizens (Overton 2006, p. 148; Piven et al 2009, p. 9; Bassetti 2012, p. 174).
Despite strong face validity and theoretical support for this view, empirical studies
returned contradictory findings.

H2: Ensuring Integrity Hypothesis - The second, ensuring integrity hypothesis, argued
that reform efforts promoted trust and confidence in the electoral system which produced
increased participation (Lott 2006, p. 12).

This model, albeit somewhat counter-

intuitively, predicted that states with stricter election rules would show higher levels of
participation than those with more navigable voting systems.

H3: Minimal Effects Hypothesis - Berinsky (2005) added a third, contending minimal
effects hypothesizing that citizens who were most likely to vote would overcome minor
restrictions and technical hurdles (Berinsky 2005, p. 482).

1

The first two hypotheses were identified and termed by (Lott 2006, p. 5). Another Lott hypothesis ―eliminating fraud‖ was subsumed under the voter integrity hypothesis. The widespread occurrence of
voter fraud was disproven by the literature and refuted by the data presented in this study.
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H4: Voter Suppression Backlash Hypothesis - Finally, another plausible and related
explanation might be that voter suppression opponents were able to inspire additional
voters by publicizing voter suppression efforts.

I term this the voter suppression

backlash hypothesis; perhaps suppression angered targeted voters providing increased
incentive to vote.

Significance of Study
Access to the ballot box is an essential requirement for a healthy democracy. Questions
of low turnout and voting rights are particularly salient in contemporary American politics.
Partisan de-alignment, polarization, and low participation all place increased emphasis on
selective mobilization and demobilization of voters.
Building on a rich body of research that detailed racially inspired demobilization; this
study focuses on the impact of contemporary voter suppression efforts on African American
participation.

I argue that targeted demobilization exacerbated the naturally occurring

inequalities inherent to participatory government and states with active voter suppression
efforts should display lower levels of black participation.
However, contemporary voter suppression differed from past occurrences on several
important counts. First, public opinion on race evolved to where blatant appeals to racism were
no longer socially acceptable. Without strictly enforced racial norms and the threat of violence,
today‘s demobilization methods were much more subtle.

Second, historical suppression

depended on overwhelming one-party political control; in both cases studied two-party
competition was the norm in recent elections. Most southern states transitioned from one-party
Democratic control to two-party competition or Republican dominance; Florida in the early

8

1990‘s and North Carolina in 2012. Third, the American electorate is becoming much more
diverse further increasing the potential risks of provoking counter-demobilization and backlash.
This study adds much needed empirical evidence to the growing subfield of voting
studies that assess voter suppression. My results contribute to the existing debate over the
significance of targeted demobilization. I fill crucial gaps in the literature by compiling a
comprehensive look at demobilizing electoral reforms. This study finds that voter suppression
was more intense in Florida than in North Carolina for the period under review. Consequently,
African American participation in North Carolina surpassed the same in Florida, spiking
noticeably across multiple measures for the 2008 and 2012 elections.
Additionally, this study finds that Census-derived data over-estimated African American
participation. I construct a new, more reliable, measure of voter registration which revealed
interesting findings. First, from 1988 to 2012, African American participation increased more
modestly in Florida than in North Carolina. However, gains in African American participation
were not as large as popular accounts suggest. Second, due to high levels of excitement among
black Americans for the 2008 and 2012 elections, black registration in Florida increased, but
still trailed behind whites in the state. Third, high levels of African American registration and
turnout in North Carolina reveal that under the right conditions; racial disparities in
participation can be mitigated, or even eliminated.

Organization of Dissertation
This study is divided into seven chapters.
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Chapter One, the Introduction, outlines the scope and boundaries of the project
establishing the problem; purpose, and significance of the study.

The chapter introduces

important concepts and then outlines the organization of the dissertation.
Chapter Two, the Literature Review, summarizes previous scholarship with a focus on
voter suppression, racial disfranchisement, and electoral participation.

A small but active

research line has developed to chart contemporary demobilization techniques. Prior research has
reached conflicting results on the impact of individual voter suppression mechanisms. This
study contributes to the scholarly debate by explicating the development of voter suppression
across two cases.
Chapter Three specifies and defends the methodological approaches and data sources
chosen to assess alternative explanations of the relationship between voter suppression and
political participation. This study adopts a historical-institutional approach to place these and
other related issues into a broader context. Historical attempts to suppress voter turnout are welldocumented; the impact of progressive reforms on lower class and ethnic participation, and the
one-party Jim Crow South‘s tight racial restrictions on access to the ballot have received
considerable attention (Keyssar 2000, p. 91-93; Walton 2001, p. 22; Kousser 1974, p. 62). This
study situates more recent voter suppression attempts in this tradition. Although the methods
evolved with the times, contemporary voter suppression shares much in common with historical
attempts to restrict access to the franchise. Most notably, these methods target African American
citizens.
Finally, the Methodology chapter explains the strengths and weaknesses of my approach.
This study combines qualitative process tracing bolstered by quantitative evidence of voter
registration and turnout across and within the cases.
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Chapters Four and Five detail the development of state voting law and levels of voter
suppression within the two cases; first North Carolina and then Florida. These sections begin by
detailing the partisan transition of important political offices in each state. Next, I trace the
development of state and national voting reforms, including mobilizing and demobilizing
measures, to establish the level of voter suppression present. Although most states incorporated
mobilizing reforms like early voting and same-day registration; some state executives and/or
legislatures adopted targeted demobilization. Florida represents a case of high voter suppression;
state officials practiced strict felon disenfranchisement, purged registration lists, and witnessed
long lines at the polls in recent elections. North Carolina leaders, under the period in question,
developed a much less restrictive voting system with longer early voting periods, milder
restrictions on former felons, and eased registration policies.
Chapter Six, African American Participation, reports quantitative turnout and registration
data across the two cases comparing them to each other, national, and regional averages. This
chapter utilizes three measures of political participation to assess competing theories of voter
suppression. Next, county level registration, population, and demographics data are employed to
address competing alternative explanations.
Chapter Seven, Conclusions and Recommendations, summarizes the studies main
discoveries, limitations, and implications for future research.
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CHAPTER 2: Review of the Literature
“The American party system, in sum, was fundamentally transformed during the mid1960s. The progressive racial tradition in the Republican Party gave way to racial
conservatism, and the Democratic Party firmly embraced racial liberalism. These
changes unleashed political forces that permanently reshaped the contours of American
politics” (Carmines and Stimson 1989, p. 58).
Introduction
A variety of approaches are deployed to measure the impact of contemporary voter
suppression laws.

These research efforts produced conflicting results.

To clarify these

differences, I focus here on the following subjects: institutional models of demobilization, racial
disfranchisement, partisan realignment or issue evolution, and contemporary voter suppression.
First, this chapter highlights traditional institutional explanations for U.S. turnout. Then, I
discuss the scholarly debate between realignment theory and the issue evolution model. Next,
the literature review explains and connects my thesis to the relevant theoretical frameworks.
Finally, I explore the most recent research on contemporary voter suppression measures.

Institutional Model: Theories of Demobilization
There is a rich tradition which investigates electoral rules, institutions, procedures, and
other structural determinants of voting behavior. Institutional explanations long posited that
registration rules and electoral administration influenced political participation. Some
emphasized the strategic nature of voter suppression stressing the importance of partisan control
in shaping patterns of demobilization (Burnham 1970, p. 81; 1987, p. 109).

Although

historically the Democratic Party restricted access to the franchise for partisan gain,
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contemporary demobilization was largely promulgated by the Republican Party.2 The partisan
tilt of more recent attempts to restrict the franchise suggest that the Democratic Party supported
greater inclusiveness, while the Republican Party sought to make voting more secure, and hence
more difficult (Hasen 2012; p. 8). As evidence, researchers studying roll call voting records
found that between 2005 and 2007 Republican legislators overwhelmingly supported photo
identification requirements. When it came to voting on these laws during this period, 95 percent
of Republican legislators voted in favor, while Democrats were 98 percent opposed (Minnite
2010, p. 153).
Wang (2012) dated modern voter suppression by the GOP to 1964. In that year, under a
program titled Operation Eagle Eye, future Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist, then
a low level party worker in Arizona, challenged minority voters utilizing caging lists (Wang
2012; p. 58). Caging was a voter suppression tactic that involved sending mailings to minority
or Democratic-leaning communities.

These mailings often included incorrect elections

information or requested a reply. Citizens who did not respond to the mailings would then have
their residency or eligibility challenged.
Classic institutional explanations suggested turnout should increase when motivation was
high and demobilization was low; while also assuming citizens were engaged by the political
process – a condition that was not often met in contemporary U.S. elections (Avery 1989, p. 15).
These frameworks offered three mechanisms by which demobilization efforts might suppress
participation:

1. The decline of party-based mass mobilization.

2

This study does not contend that Democratic elites did not participate in voter suppression or targeted
demobilization. However, this study confirms Wang‘s (2012) finding that the Republican Party engaged
in a widespread and concerted effort to pass a wave of recent voter suppression legislation.
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2. High burdens imposed on citizens due to administrative and registration hurdles.
3. Racially-based disfranchisement.

The first research line stressed the decline in partisan competition and mobilization;
pointing to the ―party system of 1896‖ and subsequent declines in turnout (Burnham 1970, p. 71;
1987, p. 113). Many of these original works argued that electoral reforms and rule changes were
essential to understanding participation. Consistent with this view, American voter turnout
exhibited clear patterns of mobilization and demobilization with corresponding swings in
participation (Keyssar 2000, xxv-xxvi).

Both mobilization and demobilization diminished

overall, making the two difficult to parse. As Avery (1989) explained ―locations with high
turnout tend to have both high mobilization and low demobilization while those with low turnout
have both low mobilization and high demobilization‖ (Avery 1989, p. 37).
The second research tradition blamed cumbersome registration rules and elections
administration (Burnham 1989, p. 108). The research and activism of Piven and Cloward (1989)
was an integral part of the push for the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 or ―motor-voter‖
reforms that produced noticeable gains in registration. Although total registration increased, the
effect of these reforms on turnout was less clear (Knack 1995, p. 25; Wang 2012; p. 69). Piven
and Cloward (2000) concluded that the political parties had not incorporated the issue-concerns
of potentially new voters, nor embraced mobilizing their potential interests (Piven & Cloward
2000, p. 265). However, the increased participation of previously less active voting groups
suggests we take into account the long term and unintentional consequences of electoral reforms,
especially the potential for backlash.
The third approach examined voter suppression and active demobilization of voters by
race (Piven et al 2009, p. 9; Overton 2006, p. 153; Alexander 2010, p. 187).

Efforts to target
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African Americans have a protracted history in American politics (Keyssar 2000, p. 45; 2012, p.
30). The Voting Rights Act of 1965, along with subsequent court and federal actions, curbed the
worst abuses. Despite the success of the VRA‘s provisions, many state officials developed more
subtle methods geared toward diluting the power of African American voters using redistricting.
These methods included ―cracking, stacking, and packing‖ minority voters into districts tailored
to weaken their voting strength (Parker 1990, p. 51; Grofman et al 1992, p. 23.) Both voter
dilution and voter suppression measures targeted African American voters. The former did so by
gerrymandering districts so that blacks may vote, but were seldom able to elect representatives of
their choosing (Lublin, Brunell, Grofman & Handley 2009, p. 3). The latter methods attempted
to discourage or suppress voting by raising the price of participation or otherwise restricting
access to the ballot. The 2013 Supreme Court reversal of the Voting Rights Act‘s preclearance
provision in Shelby County v. Holder may provide additional opportunities for the adoption of
both.

Realignment and Critical Elections
Realignment theory in its classical construction suggested that cyclical patterns play a
decisive role in American politics. Proponents argued that partisan realignments were marked by
watershed elections, usually the result of partisan switchers, an influx of new voters, or political
and economic cleavages (Key 1955, p. 4; Sundquist 1983; p. 35-36). Critical elections theorists
described a dramatic event or new issue cleavage that signaled sharp, significant, and durable
shifts in partisan attachments and electoral fortunes (Nardulli 1995, p. 11). Under this model,
majority parties enjoyed long periods of stability until the environment changed producing crisis.
Realignments occur when one critical election arises that abruptly transferred power to a new
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majority (Key 1955, p. 3). This realignment could produce transformation across candidates,
issues, and at times even entire political parties.
Burnham (1970) concluded that realignment patterns were the result of larger class
cleavages (p. 71).

In response to populist and socialist pressure, political elites instituted

electoral reforms to weaken the voting power of lower class ethnic groups in U.S. northern cities
while also disfranchising all African Americans, and many poor whites, in the South. These
reforms and restrictions resulted in significant declines in American turnout (Burnham 1970, p.
84).
Despite disagreements, many scholars agreed that the elections of 1860, 1896, and 1932
were prime examples of the theory (Sundquist 1983, p. 13; Key 1955, p. 11). A smaller group
included the period from the late 1960‘s through the 1980‘s as a separate, partial, or regional
realignment termed as the post civil rights, post New Deal, or ―Reagan‖ realignment (Black &
Black 2002, p. 24). Under this model, the 1980 election marked the dissolution of the New
Deal/Great Society coalition that dominated U.S. electoral politics since the 1930‘s. That this
alignment fractured in great part due to the partisan incorporation of racial issues is of great
importance to this current study. As Edsall and Edsall (1992) argue, the tumultuous events of the
1960‘s ―set the stage for the Democratic and Republican parties to diverge sharply on the issue
of civil rights. 1964 marked the beginning of a fundamentally new partisan configuration, based
in large part on the politics of race‖ (Edsall & Edsall 1992, p. 35).
This dissertation frames voter suppression in this context. More simply formulated, I
argue that cyclical recurrences of racial demobilization were closely connected to broader
partisan realignments. Just as the New Deal/Great Society alignment held the seeds for its own
downfall, the contemporary push for stricter voting laws exhibited evidence of a similar feedback
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process. By appealing to racial conservatives, even if not exclusively, the southern strategy
incorporated racial and anti-democratic attitudes that persisted and took expression in today‘s
voter suppression laws.

Issue Evolution
Critical elections and realignment theorists faced many criticisms, most notably for their
inability to predict de-alignment and the weakening of partisan attachments (Phillips 1983, p.
220-223). Scholars disagreed over the duration, causes, intensity, and terminology associated
with the theory. Sundquist (1983) argued that alignments were uneven, rough, and messy. Even
with dramatic realignments, large sections of the electorate remain uninvolved and many citizens
retained their prior ideological allegiances (Sundquist 1983, p. 17). Others found the theory
insufficient because it failed to measure more subtle shifts and focused too heavily on critical
elections which were infrequent and unusual events (Carmines and Stimson 1989, p. 12).
Finally, the approach may also be challenged for over emphasizing turning point elections and
ignoring longer term developments.
Despite these criticisms and the at times vagueness of the realignment concept,
reiterations of the theory have proven very useful, if imperfect, at explaining American political
and partisan shifts. Researchers are working to better define this phenomena.

Several revise

realignment theory to include processes that were not so sudden. Key argued that ―secular‖
shifts may occur over longer periods of time and occur due to slow-moving mechanisms like
population change (Key 1959, p. 198). Realignments may also be partial or regional, impacted
by political events, or delayed (Black & Black 2002; p. 24).
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Carmines and Stimson (1989) offered an alternative construct describing ―issue
evolution‖ as a fluid process where critical elections punctuated longer processes (p. 157).
Unlike the dramatic and abrupt changes associated with critical turning points, realignments may
be brought about via long term mechanisms like generational replacement. The issue evolution
framework expanded upon the standard realignment model, specifically on the role new issues
play in generating movement. Early realignment models emphasized how new issues disrupted
equilibrium, compelling political parties to choose sides and upsetting alliances. In contrast, the
issue evolution model stressed demographic change, which reversed the focus. Old and new
issues interact. At times, new issues emerge that generate crisis. At others, old issues evolve
because the electorate or circumstances have changed.

This model suggested a broader

perspective was required to capture these dynamic processes.
Carmines and Stimson (1989) postulated that racial cleavages generated by the civil
rights era fractured the New Deal coalition beginning a new realignment. In their example,
traditional realignment theory assumed that racial integration represented an emergent new issue
that caused conflict leading to realignment. On the issue of racial cleavage, standard models
suggested that ―racial changes were crucially important for a few years in the 1960‘s, not very
much before or since, and that the issue mattered then, not before and not after‖ (Carmines &
Stimson 1989, p. 196).
This description failed to account for developments outside of the narrow time frame
assumed by critical elections theory. With an evolutionary approach, careful attention is paid to
changes in issues and the environment. The 1960‘s post civil rights realignment reveals an
evolving process. Racial issues were not new, even if the dramatic events of the civil rights
movement made them seem to be. Instead, racial politics gradually developed and merged with
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partisan politics (Edsall & Edsall 1992, p. 3). That political elites in the Republican Party made
calculated decisions to exploit racial cleavages is a vital point. As Phillips (1969) argued, the
new political alignment allowed Republicans to disregard African American voters. However, it
also meant that ―maintenance of Negro voting rights [would then be] essential to the GOP‖
(Phillips 1969, p. 287). In 1969, Phillip‘s ―maintenance‖ meant that the GOP should encourage
African American voting rights in the South to quicken the flight of whites from the Democratic
Party. By 2012, with the racial realignment complete, the GOP was less enthusiastic about
encouraging African American participation.

Finally, this process revealed that political

decisions were made in the context of, and interacted with, past decisions.
Issue Evolution (1989) contends:
As recently as 1960 it is arguably the case that issues of race were not partisan issues.
Advocates of racial liberalism were to be found almost equally among northern
Democrats and Republicans. Hostility to the aspirations of black Americans was almost
exclusively the province of the southern wing of the Democratic Party. For the mass
electorate, race was a regional concern; on this question the union halls and country clubs
were in easy agreement. Neither party found it advantageous to stake out distinctive
activist positions on this potentially volatile issue, and citizens responded accordingly.
Except for the Dixiecrats, race was an irrelevant cue for the development of party
attachment […]
All of this has now changed. […] Racial attitudes are now linked to prevailing political
ideology. Once separable, it is now all but inconceivable to be a liberal and not a racial
liberal or to be a conservative and not oppose activist racial policies (Carmines &
Stimson 1989, p. 185).

Many scholars identify this shift with the failed 1964 presidential campaign of Barry
Goldwater, which featured a state‘s rights message that resonated in the South and with working
class white Democrats across the country. This campaign attempted to tap into the major shift
that was emerging in American voting patterns. Goldwater‘s ―southern strategy‖ of catering to
disaffected median white voters, was pivotal in helping to facilitate this transition and make race
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a partisan issue. The logic behind the strategy was simple math. The campaign reasoned that the
electoral gain in white votes far outweighed the risk of offending blacks (Goldfield 1997, p. 248249; Fauntroy 2007, p. 131-132). Additionally, subsequent conservative presidential campaigns
like that of George Wallace in 1968 would employ the technique with considerable electoral
success (Phillips 1968, p. 466). Although Wallace ran originally as a Democrat and later
independent, his vocal appeals to white working class voters foreshadowed the transitioning of
conservative Democrats to the GOP.
Appeals to racial prejudice were not novel to American politics. Historians note the
longstanding tactic of exploiting racial attitudes to win elections. The term ―southern strategy‖ is
employed to reference any appeal to whites that employs race as a wedge issue. Some scholars
dated usage of the term back to the Reconstruction period (Fauntroy 2007, p. 129). Others traced
the tactic of exploiting racial division even earlier to the colonial era (Morgan 2003, p. 130).
However far back you date the origins of the phenomenon, scholars argue that race is essential to
understanding American political development (Goldfield 1997, p. 13).
Goldwater rejected federal government involvement in desegregation, without directly
appealing to race. This in turn allowed many of the pro-segregation politicians and voters, to
ultimately shift allegiances or be replaced by southern Republicans who were now more
conservative than liberal Democrats. Generational replacement was a major contributor to the
issue evolution or realignment (Carmines & Stimson 1989, p. 71-72).
Similar to Burnham‘s argument that class was integrated into two-party politics with the
―system of 1896‖; Carmines and Stimson argued that race was incorporated via the political
parties in the late 1960‘s through the 1980‘s. Ultimately, racial and social policy fractured the
New Deal coalition that comprised the Democratic Party. Many southerners, including both
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those that favored the party‘s racially discriminatory policies and those that did so for ideological
or class-based reasons, fled the Democratic Party becoming independents or Republicans.
African American voters integrated the electorate, gravitating to the new and now more diverse
Democratic Party further entrenching race inside of the partisan framework. Not only did the
Democrats redefine themselves as a party open to ethnic and racial minorities, Republican elites
adopted a platform that actively, but discreetly, cultivated white racial resentment and
discouraged African American participation.
One direct consequence of realignment was a shifting of partisan attitudes on a range of
issues. Most importantly for this study, the two parties swapped positions on the issue of racial
disfranchisement. Before the 1960‘s, the Democratic Party was more closely associated with
efforts to prevent blacks from voting. As the Republican Party courted white racial resentment,
they also feared the potential consequences of high black turnout. As a result, Republican elites
began supporting elections integrity measures; many of which placed increasing burdens on
African American voters (Davidson, Chandler, Dunlap & Wise 2004, p. 5).
Goldwater‘s candidacy helped to define racial conservatism as a new strand of American
political thought.

Traditional racial conservatism was defined as, ―an ideological philosophy

held by whites that seeks to shape the racial status quo to their benefit and resist any changes in
the social, political, and economic status quo that benefit minorities. Racial conservatives
oppose policy changes that would result in an enhanced position for African Americans or a
perceived diminution of status for whites, or both‖ (Fauntroy 2007, p. 49).
This new configuration of conservatism pushed by Goldwater, and later by a string of
conservatives including president‘s Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, avoided racially
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offensive language, instead appealing to more subtle racial cues (Craig and Austin 2008, p. 56;
Edsall and Edsall 1992, p. 198). As Carmines and Stimson (1989) contended:
Although racial conservatism had considerable appeal to outright racists, its origins in
western Republican conservative doctrine was altogether different in situation, culture,
and ideology from southern white racism […] Although it would and did appeal to
bigots, the new conservative position was advocated without open bigotry and espousal
of segregationists goals‖ (Carmines & Stimson 1989, p. 190-191).

This modified strand of conservatism hastened realignment, and marked the rise of the
―new right‖ culminating in the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 (Sundquist 1983, p. 425;
Black & Black 2002, p. 25; Phillips 1982, p. 224). Scholars disagree about the role of race in
shaping this transformation. Abramowitz (1994) placed more emphasis on ideology and class,
arguing that race played an ancillary role (Abramowitz 1993, p. 23). Carmines and Stimson
(1989) gave race more weight. This dissertation is agnostic between these two interpretations;
both class and race played important roles in shaping American political development.
Moreover, access to the franchise continues to be restricted along both dimensions. A number of
scholars chart the complicated relationship between U.S. racial and class politics (Goldfield
1997, p. 13-16; Edsall & Edsall 1992, p. 7). However, this study focuses on racial effects
because

of

the

documented

connections

between

political

realignment

and

racial

disfranchisement.
Classical realignment theory suggested that realignments should occur every 40 years or
so. As new cohorts of voters come of age, they bring with them new issues and political
alliances that disrupt the old order and alter party fortunes (Burnham 1970, p. 8-10; Sundquist
1983, p. 35). I argue that the 1968 – 2008 alignment, in part founded on the politics of white
resentment and opposition to the civil rights platform, is being challenged by a new multi-racial
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configuration. The increasing number and intensity of voter suppression laws were attempts to
forestall these threatening political and demographic changes.
Although realignment theory attributed shifts to critical elections, this study adopts the
issue evolution model which accounted for issue displacement. Rather than positing clearly
demarcated absolute changes in one direction, an evolutionary model suggested pitched battles
that are historically connected. Social and economic upheaval, immigration, migration, and a
range of demographic factors impact partisan attitudes by introducing new issue cleavages.
However, new issues are not written onto a clean slate (Sundquist 1983, p. 304). Old issues,
alliances, and cleavages shape the incorporation of new issues. To the point, context matters.
This dissertation claims that contemporary voter suppression measures are the product of
the secular realignment or issue evolution described by Carmines and Stimson (1989). The
conjunction of race and partisan identification produced several interesting dynamics. First, it
resulted in dramatic partisan realignment in the South.

Second, it played a major role in

conservative electoral victories and the ascendance of contemporary post-racial politics. Third,
the merger of conservatism and racism, even if under the banner of race neutrality, created a
perverse incentive to disfranchise racial minorities. Under a partisan alignment that thoroughly
incorporates race, the suppression of voters by strictly partisan metrics will produce racial
effects. As partisan polarization and voter suppression increase, so too should minority bloc
voting. As minorities gravitate to one-party, this further tempts members of the opposition party
to restrict the franchise. Proponents of voter suppression find themselves in a self re-enforcing
cycle.
As Lublin (2004) warned, ―The African-American and Latino share of the southern
electorate continues to rise at a rapid pace. […] Unless Republicans can capture a greater share
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of the minority vote, Democrats will need a smaller and smaller share of the region‘s relatively
shrinking white vote to win southern elections‖ (Lublin 2004, xviii).
What Lublin (2004) avoids was the potential for a third option: reducing the size of the
minority electorate.

If this construction seems implausible, I point to the ―redeemer‖

governments following Reconstruction; the segregationist movements of the early 1900‘s that
resorted to strict disfranchisement to displace the electoral power of biracial Republican and
Fusionists coalitions; and later efforts to uphold Jim Crow (Keyssar 2000, p. 206-207; Kousser
1974, p. 187; Luebke 2000, p. 6-7). American history more generally is replete with examples
of elites instituting racial disfranchisement in the face of threatening demographic or political
changes. The same was true for both cases.

Contemporary Demobilization
Recent voter suppression efforts are best viewed in this context.

The language,

techniques, and motivations are rooted in the history described. Today‘s restrictions are not as
effective as the near total disfranchisement of previous eras. However, battles over access to the
franchise displayed similar processes and patterns of action. The literature identified three
primary contemporary voter suppression techniques; photo-ID laws, felon disfranchisement, and
administrative maneuvering (elimination of same-day and early voting, caging, purging, unequal
distribution of election resources, and long lines).

Voter Identification
Researchers are developing a sizeable body of empirical data on the impact of voter
photo-identification laws. A 2006 study estimated that around 13 million or seven percent of

24

U.S. citizens reported lacking ―ready access‖ to proof of citizenship documentation (Citizens
Without Proof 2006, p. 3).

In Indiana, which adopted the toughest photo identification

requirements, Barreto, Nuno, and Sanchez (2009) estimated that among voting age adults around
72% of blacks reported meeting the state requirement, compared to 83% for whites (p. 20). This
study verified prior research that showed that access to photo identification was unevenly
distributed. African Americans, Latinos, elderly citizens, the less educated, and the less wealthy
were the least likely groups to possess a photo-ID (Hood & Bullock 2008, p. 19; Hershey 2009,
p. 89; Barreto et al. 2009, p. 5; Mack 2012, p. 55).
Despite convincing evidence that minority, along with other groups of, citizens
disproportionately lacked photo-ID; studies measuring the law‘s impact on turnout produced
contradictory findings. For example, some aggregate-level studies revealed a modest effect
(Alvarez, Bailey, & Katz 2008, p. 2). However, individual-level research was mixed.

One

school of thought found that strict photo-ID laws displayed a small but significant negative
impact on turnout (Hershey 2009, p. 90; Hood & Bullock 2008, p. 17). A second grouping of
scholars found no statistically significant negative relationship (Lott 2006, p. 11; Mycoff,
Wagner, & Wilson 2007, p. 18). A third argued that the effects varied across cases (Alvarez et al
2008, p. 2; Vercelotti and Anderson 2006, p. 13). Finally a fourth suggested voter suppression
increased turnout (Milyo 2007, p. 5; Lott 2006, p. 12).
Researchers attempted several approaches to square these competing findings. A number
argued for identifying legal differences across states. Some states, like North Carolina, adopted
moderate photo-ID statutes where voters could prove their identity using school-ID, employee
badges, paychecks, bank statements, and other documentation.

Other states passed more

stringent regulations requiring official government-issued photo-ID without exception. Alvarez,
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Bailey, and Katz (2008) found that strict-ID regulations depressed voting among registered
voters (p. 3). Erikson and Minnite (2009) challenged these findings arguing for a more cautious
approach. They warned that Census-based data analysis may yield results, but social scientists
should be careful in reaching broader conclusions on turnout. They stressed the need for
additional ―within and between state analysis‖ (Erikson & Minnite 2009; p. 98). The current
study builds on this recommendation.

Felon Disfranchisement
Although estimations of the impact of photo-ID offer mixed results, the raw numbers for
felon disfranchisement were easier to calculate. Felon disfranchisement represents the last
remaining significant restriction on the franchise.

With the exception of children and the

mentally insane, no other sizeable group of citizens faced an outright ban. In 2010, felon
disfranchisement laws excluded over three million U.S. citizens. Around an additional two and
half million citizens remained ineligible to vote while on parole and probation (McDonald 2012).
Felon disfranchisement laws were further complicated by America‘s racial legacy.
Historical efforts to conflate issues of crime, race, and voting are well documented (Keyssar
2000, p. 246-251). W.E.B. Dubois (1903) predicted, over a century ago, that the dual system of
justice established under Jim Crow to support racial dominance would be difficult to undo
(Dubois 1903, chp. 4). Contemporary studies point to the ―war on drugs‖ and its noticeable
racial disparities, which have a chilling effect on the electoral participation of young minority
males (Alexander 2010, p. 59; Mauer 2004, p. 17; Raskin 2005, p. 1). The disproportionate
incarceration rates of African Americans, Hispanics, and the poor; combined with felon
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disfranchisement laws, further exacerbate existing inequalities in resources that facilitate
political participation (Lippke 2001, p. 554).
Other studies found that attitudes toward crime and restrictions on voting continue to be
influenced by racial attitudes. Manza and Uggen (2008) explicated the relationship between
racial group threat and restrictions on the right to vote. They found that racial threat was a
significant predictor of restrictive attitudes, especially in the southern United States where the
association was the strongest (Manza & Uggen 2008, p. 64). A more recent study found that
racial imagery alone could evoke increased support for photo identification laws among whites
(Wilson, Brewer, & Rosenbluth 2014, p. 369).
Although proving how felons would vote was difficult, scholars conservatively estimated
that these laws produced a small, but at times important, advantage for Republican candidates
(Uggen & Manza 2002, p. 796). Others suggested that the impact was limited because felons
belong to low turnout demographic groups (Miles 2004, p. 85).

Administrative Maneuvering
A conspicuous feature of American elections is the partisan nature of their
administration.

The head of elections is often the Secretary of State, an elected partisan

position. Critics suggest that this creates a strong incentive for political operatives to bend the
rules for partisan advantage; and election administrators have devised creative ways for doing so
(Bassetti 2012, p. 147-148; Hasen 2012, p. 21). Administrative maneuvers include caging,
purging, rule changes, lines, ballot-design, reductions in early voting access, and restrictions on
interest group registration drives.
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One demobilization strategy was caging, and/or the deployment of poll watchers to
selectively challenge voters (Piven et al. 2009, p. 174-179). Caging involved sending out
mailings to minority or Democratic-leaning communities with confusing or incorrect elections
information. Often these mailings asked for a return reply. Citizens who failed to reply to these
mailings could have their eligibility challenged at the polls or were notified of a potential
challenge. This strategy operated by creating confusion or intimidating voters (Minnite et al
2009, p. 170). However, caging was a rough and inefficient mechanism prone to backlash.
Many voters angrily resented challenges and caging often inspired counter-mobilization (Piven
et al. 2009, p. 178). Although it was unclear how many votes were suppressed, caging has
largely been replaced by the more advanced and less confrontational technique of purging.
With this mechanism, election administrators purged voter rolls to disqualify targeted
voters. For example, in recent elections Florida officials attempted to remove thousands of
potential illegal aliens or former felons from the state‘s voter rolls (Bassetti 2012, p. 151-153).
Purging may be limited in scope because purged voters may appear at the registrar, re-register,
and then later vote (assuming they realize the error in time). Its impact was also likely negated
by the inefficiency of targeting citizens who were already unlikely to participate.
Along with caging and purging, political operatives often attempted to bend
administrative rules to make voting more arduous. Included among these maneuvers were the
uneven distribution of polling places, voting machines, and resources.

Combined with

reductions of early voting, these reforms resulted in long lines on election-day. A study of the
2012 Florida election estimated that reductions of early voting hours resulted in around 200,000
voters being discouraged from voting (Powers & Damron 2013).3 Another which examined the
state‘s elimination of early voting on the Sunday before the election, or the ―Souls to the Polls‖
3

Powers and Damron. Orlando Sentinel. Jan. 23, 2013.
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reduction, found that specific Democratic leaning groups were more likely to cast Sunday ballots
in 2008 (Herron & Smith 2012a, p. 30). Most notable among those targeted were African
American churches who initiated the high profile ―Souls‖ program to encourage their members
to vote upon leaving Sunday service.
Finally, many states placed burdens on outside party or interest group voter registration
drives. The resource model of voting, or civic voluntarism model, suggested that civic and
voluntary associations were essential for individuals in helping them overcome the natural
disparities created by inequalities of wealth and resources (Verba et al 1995; p. 384).. Lacking
natural resources and skills, low resource voters rely on religious and civic organizations to
handle the technical and informational aspects of voting. Transactional models of democratic
politics offer a similar assessment, allowing a role for interest groups and political entrepreneurs
in reducing the costs of collective action (Lowery & Brasher 2004, p. 30). These groups, along
with the political parties, attempted to bend institutional rules for partisan advantage. They also
challenged voter suppression laws with counter-mobilization and media campaigns.
Registration groups received considerable attention in recent years. In 2008, much of
that focus was on the controversial group the Association of Community Organizations for
Reform Now or ACORN. The organization, which was a prominent promoter of the 1992
NVRA, was the target of multiple congressional and legal investigations. Despite the media
uproar, which resulted in the demise of the group, little evidence of actual voter fraud was
uncovered (Bassetti 2012, p. 169). In addition to attacks on ACORN, some states, like Texas
and Florida targeted all voter registration groups. In these cases, bureaucratic rules discouraged
registration drives by imposing hefty fines for technical violations. Herron and Smith (2012)
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found that restrictions in Florida dramatically impacted registration rates in the state (Herron &
Smith 2012b, p. 30).

Discussion
Voter suppression efforts developed in conjunction with forces that compelled larger
political realignments. Periods of mobilization and demobilization produced expansions and
retractions of the franchise. Today‘s voter suppression is best understood in the context of
partisan realignment. These measures have evolved directly from how the two main political
parties chose to resolve the racial and ideological conflicts of the 1960‘s.

Although less

draconian than earlier occurrences, contemporary suppression represented a push back against
the successes of the Voting Rights Act and larger civil rights era.
Policy, class, and the standard model of voting explain much, if not most, of the factors
that shape partisan politics. However, race continues to play an important, but evolving, role in
American political life. High levels of African American partisanship reflected the mix of
historical and policy factors that influenced current voting patterns. Voter suppression, like
realignment, arises in waves. A review of American history reveals a broad but progressive
trend of expanding rights to a near complete franchise for all adults.

A more nuanced

examination reveals both a constant battle over voting procedures and distinct periods of
mobilization or demobilization (Keyssar 2000, p. 296-298; Avery 1989, p. 17). The most
egregious of these racially-based abridgements have been removed by Constitutional
amendments, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and other legislation.
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Despite the success of these efforts to build a more inclusive American democracy,
contemporary voter suppression and targeted demobilization continue to threaten the voting
rights of many citizens.
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CHAPTER 3: Methodology
Introduction
This chapter details the research approach and methods employed in this dissertation.
First, I summarize the systematic steps taken to assess rival explanatory theories of targeted
demobilization. Second, I explain my choice of historical institutionalism and its place in the
broader context of the qualitative method. Third, I describe the specifics of the case study and
process analysis techniques. Fourth, the chapter details various voter suppression hypotheses
and explains how this study assesses them. Next, I record and defend other methodological
choices including my selection of cases, time-period, and my focus on African American
electoral participation. Finally, this section reports my data sources and collection procedures.

Procedures
To conduct a thorough investigation of the selected cases, a number of critical steps were
taken. The process began with an in depth review of scholarly works on American voting, voter
suppression, southern politics, the history of racial disfranchisement, demobilization, and related
topics. This review included classic works by V.O. Key and Walter Dean Burnham, but also
incorporated more recent literature on American voting like those of Alexander Keyssar and
Bernard Grofman.

I surveyed literature on historical and contemporary Florida and North

Carolina politics, including Paul Luebke‘s extensive scholarship on North Carolina politics and
David Colburn‘s research in Florida.
I sought out, organized, and consolidated data from multiple sources for the time period
1988 to 2012. First, I examined state voting laws and changes with the potential for mobilization
or demobilization. Next, I gathered U.S. Census demographics and elections estimates of voter
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registration and turnout rates. Finally, I collected county level registration data reported by each
state‘s election administration to attain a more reliable measure of registration and test
alternative explanations for participation patterns.
This methodological approach provides two valuable contributions to the field. First, this
dissertation project conducts and reports in-depth process analysis of legislative activity with a
focus on election reforms. Process tracing involves the careful inspection of cases to assess
competing explanations of an outcome. Although voter suppression may be perpetuated by the
executive and judicial branches, legislative records were consistent, comparable across states,
and amenable to this method.

This study finds that the most egregious voter suppression

measures required high levels of political dominance to sustain. Second, this work develops a
new conservative measure of registration that provides a more sober assessment of the political
activity of African American voters. These data reveal that African American participation
increased since the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, with additional increases for the
2008 and 2012 elections. However, state reported registration data indicates that these gains
were uneven across states and likely smaller than popular accounts suggest. This is vitally
important because Census based participation data is often cited in prominent election law cases.

Historical Institutionalism
Historical-institutional analysis has a long and rich tradition in political science. Often
traced to preeminent figures like V.O. Key, the macro-level study of political institutions has
cultivated many productive research lines. This approach examines dimensions that are difficult
to assess via survey methods; permits political scientists to present data in geographical and
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historical context; and involves the use of precinct and county level data for comparative
purposes (Key 1966, p. 127).
Additionally, historical comparisons allow for the investigation of phenomena that do not
match the assumptions necessary for regression analysis including independence of causal
variables (Hall 2003, p. 382). In the case of voter suppression, the relationship with voter
participation is likely reciprocal, involves complex interaction effects, and/or requires an
understanding of path dependence effects. I do not argue against other traditions, but rather that
these methods should work in conjunction with careful process tracing of cases.
Rueschemeyer (2003) defends this methodological approach:
―In this confrontation of theoretical claims with empirical evidence, analytical history
enjoys two significant advantages compared to all but the most exceptional quantitative
research: it permits a much more direct and frequently repeated interplay between
theoretical development and data, and it allows for a closer matching of conceptual intent
and empirical evidence‖ (Rueschemeyer 2003, p. 318).

All research methods, paradigms, or traditions, feature strengths and weaknesses; further
encouraging social scientists to develop a diverse toolkit. Political science, as a discipline, has
fostered interdisciplinary, cross-fertilization, and mixed methods, approaches.

Skocpol (2003)

argues that historical-based methods avoid the push for over-specialization in favor of
―methodological and theoretical eclecticism‖ (Skocpol 2003, p. 411).
I incorporate the historical-institutional method by examining state level institutional
rules and legislation and their impact on African American participation. Time, or history, is an
essential component of the voting process. In a partisan system, voters must often rely on
political parties and their history of behavior. Voting rules, regulations, and administration are a
part of this record. Responsible party theory assumed that well defined political parties should
increase participation.
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Political ecology has its disadvantages. Most notably, researchers must contend with the
threat of ecological fallacy and difficulties interpreting aggregate level data. This type of fallacy
occurs when aggregate level data is employed to make inferences about relationships at the
individual level. This study avoids this fallacy by processing tracing state level electoral reforms
and their impact on county level turnout. This study finds that voter suppression proponents
targeted individual voters using group markers (i.e. minorities, African Americans, Hispanics,
etc.). This means that the aggregate mechanism can be directly tied to, and translated into,
individual level processes.
Small-n methods pose several challenges including threats of endogeneity, or omitted
causal variables leading to spurious results; too few cases matched with too many causal
variables; and problems establishing external validity. Although some argue that these threats
are insurmountable (Lieberson 1991, p. 318); I concur with a sizeable segment of the scientific
community involved in addressing these concerns (Goldfield 1989, p. 1260; Rueschemeyer and
Stephens 1997, p. 57; Mahoney 2002, p. 390).
Historical methods are being developed to mitigate some of these deficiencies.
Researchers introduced a range of methodological responses including ―combinations of withincase and across-case comparisons‖ (Rueschemeyer 2003, p. 324). Furthermore, these tools are
increasingly being applied to the study of American politics. Recent institutional approaches
were employed to assess the relationship between institutional rules and actor agency in the U.S.
House of Representatives (Sheingate 2009, p. 199); test the impact of network coverage on
turnout in Florida (Brady 2010, p. 237); and explain the longevity and stability of Social Security
(Jacobs 2009, p. 123-124).
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Qualitative Method - Case Studies
Qualitative researchers typically attempt to explain, describe, or understand ―why‖
political phenomena and processes occur as they do. A key strength of this approach is that it
stresses in-depth knowledge of a small number of cases over minimal information across many
cases, as is done with most quantitative methods. The case study approach involves closely
exploring a small number of cases to assess whether they match predictions; and comparisons
across cases are then employed for theory development and testing (Van Evera 1997, p. 29; p.
53). George and Bennett (2005) define the approach as the ―detailed examination of an aspect of
a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other
events‖ (p. 5).
Due to the underlying ontological assumptions of each, historical case studies are
differentiated from the other two major research traditions prominent in the discipline behavioral or statistical methods and formal modeling. Statistical models attempt to quantify
causal relationships between independent and dependent variables; these estimates then allow for
theory testing as statistical correlations are matched against theory and observation. With a
quantitative approach, often associated with regression techniques, researchers would examine
specific voter suppression variables across a large number of states, or cases. When successful,
this approach statistically estimates the general strength of competing causal variables, possible
interaction effects, and their impact on voter turnout.
Formal modeling methods, often associated with economics, develop abstract models of
social behavior which emphasize individual choice and causal mechanisms (George & Bennett
2005, p. 5). Frequently involving game theory, formal models examine the micro-foundations of
human behavior to test theory.

Both statistics and formal methods contribute significant
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discoveries to the discipline. However, each methodological approach suffers limitations. The
former requires statistical assumptions that are not often met in the social world, while the latter
can lack realism and discount processes at the macro-level.
Ultimately, this study argues that social and political phenomena should be described
from multiple vantage points. To do otherwise, would be to intentionally confine ourselves to a
limited, and thus incomplete, perspective. Competing paradigms and research traditions can
work collaboratively to produce scientific progress.
These, and the following, factors led me toward a historical-institutional approach:
First, states were not independent of each other.

Although each American state

determined its election‘s regulations, all must conform to national standards. Changing societal
attitudes, amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and judicial rulings, influenced how institutional
rules develop. Additionally, the relationship between voter suppression and participation was
reciprocal. Institutional rules impacted participation, but the reverse was likely true. When
successful, voter suppression laws excluded opposition voters with minimal publicity and
backlash resulting in electoral victory. The resulting electorate could then be more heavily
packed with supporters, allowing for more intensive voter suppression measures. However,
democratic politics enables the possibility for backlash. Targeted citizens, along with their
sympathizers, could mobilize against voter suppression on the state and national level. Most
importantly, backlash in one election could affect subsequent elections, and suppression in one
state could affect other states. More simply stated; institutional rules and voting behavior were
dynamic, not static, processes.
Second, political participation is influenced by many causal factors that may not operate
evenly or deterministically. As the realm of likely causal variables is indeterminable, ruling out
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potentially spurious relationships becomes difficult across all methods.

Political scientists

identify a diverse variety of factors thought to influence turnout ranging from the theoretical to
the incidental; including institutional rules, partisan mobilization, economic considerations, or
even weather or candidate personality. Individual voter participation is certainly contingent
upon some diverse mix of factors interacting with the specific local context of elections.
Goldstone (2003) argues that social scientists who use historical case methods:
[…] generally face a finite set of cases, chosen against a backdrop of theoretical interests,
and aim to determine the causal sequences and patterns producing outcomes of interest in
those specific cases. Generalization is certainly a goal, but that generalization is sought
by piecing together finite sets of cases, not by sampling and inference to a larger
universe. […] [This research] does not start out assuming the existence of, or by seeking,
universal causal or other patterns; rather, it assumes that the degree of generality of any
particular causal mechanism or pattern is variable and is part of what the investigation
needs to determine (Goldstone 2003, p. 43-44).
Third, the relationship was likely contingent within cases – meaning that voter
suppression measures were not universal. Each state developed its own political culture, history,
and norms. For example, an unmotivated electorate might be less likely to overcome minor
institutional barriers than a motivated electorate. The standard economic and socio-behavioral
models of voting both agreed that barriers to voting should, all else being equal, decrease
turnout. The former by increasing the cost of voting for individuals, the latter by frustrating
social organizations that assist disadvantaged groups.
The problem unfortunately, was that things were seldom equal. Institutions provide
context. This is especially important when analyzing the political behavior of individuals. Hero
and Tolbert (1996) argue that state political culture correlates with measures of demographic
diversity; and levels of minority inclusion shaped how political battles are fought (p. 867). Due
to the unique standing of African Americans as a minority group, researchers found that studies
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of African American political behavior required special attention to political context.
Historically, black political life has been highly dependent upon ―external stimuli‖ and
explanations should address the particular time period, setting, and circumstances (Fauntroy
2007, p. 24).
Finally, some postmodernists contend that these problems make concrete knowledge of
the social world impossible. I disagree, believing that we can achieve real scientific progress by
integrating careful process analysis with statistical and formal models. In-depth focus on a small
number of cases prioritizes explanatory detail over parsimony allowing for both thick description
and the examination of causal mechanisms.

Process Tracing
Process tracing appears in the discipline under a range of monikers including process
tracing, process analysis, pattern matching, and causal process observations – to name a few.
Despite the diversity of terms, the technique belongs to the much larger tradition of causal
narration, analytic narrative, or the comparison of chronological patterns of evidence (Mahoney
1999; p. 1164).

Akin to detective work, the researcher compares patterns of evidence to

distinguish between competing explanations of an event, or sequence of events. Outside cases,
theory, logic, and common sense are all available metrics with which to assess a current case, or
set of cases.
Like a detective, researchers identify and prioritize evidence to narrow down their search
to the most plausible of explanations (or suspects). The most promising leads are then pursued
until, under the best circumstances, all but one are eliminated. Unlike with police detectives, the
social world rarely provides smoking guns or outright confessions.

Instead, the good
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investigator must combine theory, past experience, and empirical evidence together; to choose
which explanations are most plausible. This approach adopts the recommendations of Goldfield
(1997) who argued that broad political theories may be evaluated via historical comparisons
(Goldfield 1997, p. 32).
Goldfield argues:
I would suggest the following criteria, which are in principle not dissimilar from the
approach taken by physical scientists when evaluating broad theories and hypotheses: (1)
Does the explanation present a reasonable model that accounts for the most important
out- comes and inputs, that is, does it fit the structure of the situation? (2) To what degree
does the explanation lead its adherents to gloss over, omit, or distort important aspects of
reality, that is, does it do violence to the facts? (3) How does it fare in regard to its
competitors? (Goldfield 1989; p. 1260)

Table 3.1 reveals the diversity of process analysis terminology, but also indicates a good
deal of agreement over the basic principles involved.
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Table 3.1 Process Analysis Terminology Comparison Table
Author –
Terminology
Daniels (current
study):
process tracing
Collier (2011):
process analysis,
diagnostic evidence
Campbell (1975):

Definition
―I conceive of process tracing as the close observation of political
phenomena across time with careful attention to sequence and events.
These observations are then employed to create or test specific research
questions and hypotheses.‖
―...the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and
analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the
investigator‖ (Collier 2011, p. 823).
―Pattern matching‖ (qtd. in Hall 2003, p. 391).

pattern matching
Bennett (2010):
detective work,
sleuthing
Brady, Collier, and
Seawright (2010):
causal process
observations
Goldstone (2003):
process tracing,
sequence analysis

Hall (2003):
systematic process
analysis
Mahoney (1999):
narrative analysis,
causal narration

―...the researcher looks for the observable implications of hypothesized
explanations, often examining evidence at a finer level of detail‖ (Bennett
2010, p. 208). Bennett argues it is akin to detective work which assesses
evidence, actors, and motives.
―causal-process observations‖ as ―observations about context, process, or
mechanism provide an alternative source of insight into the relationship
among the explanatory variables, and between these variables and the
dependent variable‖ (Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2010, p. 24).
―The study of a single case or small number of cases with the goal of
identifying causal relationships in those cases in order to test (and
potentially shake) strong prior beliefs‖ (Goldstone 2003, p. 46). ―Process
tracing consists of analyzing a case into a sequence (or several
concatenating sequences) of events and showing how these events are
plausibly linked given the interests and situations faced by groups or
individual actors‖ (Goldstone 2003, p. 47).
―...systematic process analysis examines the processes unfolding in the
cases at hand as well as the outcome in those cases. The causal theories to
be tested are interrogated for the predictions they contain about how
events will unfold. The point is to compare these predictions with
observations drawn from data about the world‖ (Hall 2003, p. 393-394).
―...that narrative can be a useful tool for assessing causality in situations
where temporal sequencing, particular events, and path dependence must
be taken into account‖ (Mahoney 1999, p. 1164).
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For this study, I conceive of process tracing as the close observation of political
phenomena across time with careful attention to sequence and events. These observations are
then employed to create or test specific research questions and hypotheses (Collier 2011, p. 823).
This approach concurs with Hall‘s (2003) formulation of the method:
―The systematic process analyst then draws observations from empirical cases, not only
about the value of the principal causal variables, but about the processes linking these
variables to the outcomes. Because each theory is being tested against others, the
investigator should focus on special attention on phenomena about which predictions of
the theory diverge […] The point is to see if the multiple actions and statements of the
actors at each stage of the causal process are consistent with the image of the world
implied by each theory‖ (Hall 2003, p. 394).

This dissertation utilizes process tracing to chart the development of electoral rules in
Florida and North Carolina to assess competing theories of voter suppression. I construct a
historical case comparison employing analytic narrative to offset some of the weaknesses of the
case study design (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer 2003, p. 47; George & Bennett 2005, 228;
Gerring 2007, p. 134). These include the following: (1) additional across-case and within-case
comparisons; (2) comparing voting processes and participation in both states; and (3) gathering
county level data.

I utilize matching procedures to compare analogous counties, voting

processes, and outcomes to increase observations (King, Keohane, & Verba‘s 1994, p. 127).
Although the overall approach is qualitative, this study employed quantitative empirical
data to measure voting turnout, demographics, and registration. This study adopted Van Evera‘s
(1997) recommendation to combine various case study techniques. This type of hybrid design
should ―provide decisive evidence in cases with sharp variance on the IV [independent variable]‖
(Van Evera, 1997, p. 63-66). This approach is also consistent with King, Keohane, and Verba‘s
(1994) recommendation to select cases based on extreme values of the explanatory variable
(King et al. 1994, p. 143). Placed in terms of variables, the independent variable is the presence
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of voter suppression mechanisms during the period under study. A voter suppression regime
was identified by a number of turnout depressing measures including photo ID laws, felon
disfranchisement, administrative maneuvering, the manipulation of registration rules, and
election-day impediments. All states adopted a combination of measures that could be classified
as mobilizing or demobilizing. Therefore, electoral reforms were best assessed by carefully
comparing these measures across states over time.

Case Selection
Comparative state politics takes advantage of the fifty laboratories of democracy that
comprise the United States. The federalist design provides excellent opportunities for social
scientists to evaluate general propositions about politics.

Variations between states allow

researchers to test whether ―different structures and institutional arrangements produce different
political outcomes‖ (Cooper & Knotts 2008, p. 3). Despite a general trend in the field away from
state-level analysis in the past half century, a number of researchers are returning to the states for
hypothesis and theory testing (Morehouse & Jewell 2004, p. 177; Cooper & Knotts 2008, p. 1;
Gray & Hanson 2008, p. 2).
Although all of the states shared a basic federal voting framework, each developed its
own locally administered elections system particular to its political circumstances. During the
time period under review, Florida and North Carolina employed vastly differing voter
suppression levels providing the opportunity for a loose but naturally occurring experiment.
Florida was included because of its restrictive voting system and traditionalistic political culture
(Gray & Hanson 2008, p. 21). As of 2012, the deadline for registration was 29 days before the
election, registration was the responsibility of the voter, and the state was recently the site of
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high profile partisan conflicts over voting (Rosenfeld 2008, p. 73). Florida featured the most
restrictive felon disenfranchisement statute effectively banning most felons for life. In 2010, the
state banned an estimated 250,000 Floridians due to imprisonment, parole, or other related
statutes (McDonald 2012). Totaling around five percent of total votes cast in 2008, the number
of felons easily surpassed the margin of victory in statewide and federal elections.
The pro-voting interest group Rock the Vote, sponsored by MTV, ranked Florida 34th out
of the 50 states on the effectiveness of its voting system in 2011 (Bassetti 2012, p. 189). Florida,
as an extreme case of a voter suppression regime, presents a crucial test of theory. More
succinctly formulated; if voter suppressions measures impacted black participation, we would
expect them to have done so in recent Florida elections.
Like Florida, North Carolina was also a southern state with a traditionalistic state political
culture. Typified by conservative politics and elitist notions of political participation, citizens
and elites who live in traditionalist state cultures often viewed politics as a means to uphold the
status quo (Gray and Hanson 2008, p. 21). However, unlike most other southern states which
transitioned to state-level Republican dominance during the 1990‘s; North Carolina remained
under divided partisan control until 2012. Even in the midst of the Jim Crow era, the state was
lauded as more ―progressive‖ than other southern states (Key 1949, p. 206). For example, North
Carolina was one of the first states to accept school desegregation following Brown v. Board of
Education; and the state had the highest turnout of African Americans among those states
originally covered by the Voting Rights Act (Davidson & Grofman 1994, chp. 6).
North Carolina was included for its lack of aggressive voter suppression efforts during
the period under review (Wang 2012, p. 91). In part due to violations by the Jesse Helms U.S.
senatorial campaign in 1990, the state Republican Party was under a consent decree not to
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institute elections integrity measures from 1992 to 1996. All ballot security programs in the state
were subject to court approval during this period (Wang 2012, p. 58). Most importantly, high
levels of partisan competition kept North Carolina state government divided until 2012.
Beginning in the 1980‘s, general and African American political participation rose
dramatically in the Tar Heel state. This was due in large part to state leader‘s efforts to make
voting and registration easier. As of 2012, the state‘s elections system ranked fifth on voting
advocate scorecards (Bassetti 2012, p. 189). North Carolina featured no excuse absentee and
―One Stop Early Voting.‖ Up to 19 days before the election, eligible citizens could register and
vote at the same time (Rosenfeld 2008, p. 97).

The state practiced a milder felon

disenfranchisement statute, allowing felons to vote upon the completion of their punishment.
Furthermore, in 2012 North Carolina allowed provisional ballots to be counted if cast at the
wrong polling place but same precinct; Florida did not.
From 2000 to 2012, Census reported black turnout in presidential elections spiked 21
percentage points in North Carolina (from 62 to 83 percent). In 2008, the Obama candidacy, or
other factors, inspired national African American turnout to rise to 64 percent; just behind whites
at 66 percent. By 2012, these numbers were reversed as black turnout estimates outpaced whites
for the first time in U.S. elections (C.P.S. 2014, p. 3). However, this study tempers findings
based on Census data concluding that African American participation in North Carolina
increased, but less dramatically than Census generated data suggested.
Both states recently emerged as swing states in presidential elections. Recent contests in
Florida were extremely close and rife with controversy. Most notably, the 2000 election was a
statistical tie that was ultimately broken by the U.S. Supreme Court. In 2012, Democratic
incumbent Barack Obama carried Florida by less than one percent. The past six presidential
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elections in the state were evenly divided between the two parties. North Carolina has been
similarly competitive. In 2004, North Carolina went for Republican George W. Bush. In 2008,
Democrat Barack Obama narrowly carried the state. In 2012, the state edged back into the
Republican column. Most importantly for this study, Republicans made historic gains on the
state level, achieving a sweep of North Carolina‘s legislative and executive branches in 2012.
Consistent with the argument presented in this study, this change in partisan control was swiftly
followed by the passage of voter suppression laws in 2013. Although outside the scope of this
study, this pattern of events was consistent with the general thesis presented in this dissertation.

Time Period 1988-2012
This study focuses on the post civil-rights (1950‘s - 1960‘s) and post backlash (1970‘s 1980‘s) era of 1988 to 2012. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and subsequent court rulings
brought about significant increases in African American registration and political power,
particularly in the South. The entire region underwent partisan realignment hastened by the
Act‘s passage as the once one-party South transitioned to two-party competition or Republican
dominance throughout the 1980‘s and 1990‘s. This process varied across the states depending
largely on contextual variables specific to each. This is important because Florida transitioned to
Republican dominance sooner, adopting voter suppression measures while North Carolina
developed a more open elections system. This sequence allowed for the evaluation of the impact
of targeted demobilization within and across states.
The time period also supplied several other important distinctions.

First, the 2013

Supreme Court decision in Shelby County v. Holder, which overturned the preclearance
provisions of the Voting Rights Act, marked a bookend for the post-civil rights or backlash
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period. Second, the election and reelection of the nation‘s first African American president in
2008 and 2012 provided a good test of the role of voter motivation versus institutional voter
suppression. This study assumes that African American motivation was high for the 2008 and
2012 elections. Third, minorities continue to make up an increasing share of the American
electorate and the U.S. is on a trajectory to become a majority nonwhite nation.

Fourth,

American politics are increasingly ideologically and racially polarized. For example, in the
United States Congress in 2013, minority and women representatives comprised a majority of
elected Democrats; while Republican representatives were nearly 90 percent white Christian
males (Jacobson 2014, p. 167). Moreover, in recent presidential elections minority citizens
voted overwhelmingly for the Democratic Party. In 2008, 95 percent of African Americans, 67
percent of Latinos, and 65 percent of Asian Americans voted for the Democratic presidential
candidate (Walton and Smith 2012, p. 194-195). If these trends persist, demographic changes
could significantly alter the political landscape.

Focus on African American Participation
American partisan elites exhibit a lengthy history of appealing to racial prejudice and
enacting racially predicated disfranchisement. These trends were most notable in the southern
United States which developed a racially segregated economic, political, and social system
dedicated to the near complete removal of African Americans from the electorate until the mid
1960‘s and later (Keyssar 2000, p. 211-215). This was true for both Florida and North Carolina
which disfranchised most of their African American citizenry. Although all southern states
moved considerably away from the strict racial disfranchisement regimes of the ―redeemer‖ and
Jim Crow periods, the region continues to grapple with its racial tradition. Additionally, the pace
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of black participation was inconsistent across states. Scholars attribute this uneven development,
in part, to voter dilution and voter suppression (Parker 1990, p. 195; Grofman et al 1992, p. 23.)
Although racial disfranchisement is the focus of this study, contemporary voter
suppression measures targeted a broad range of citizens. African American, student, young,
elderly, Hispanic, and poor voters are all believed to be impacted by various voter suppression
laws (Hasen 2012, p. 6-7). This study focuses on African American voters because of the
historical importance of race in motivating disfranchisement, the consistency of data records
across time, and the theoretical importance of race established by prior research (Goldfield 1997,
p. 9; Hero & Tolbert 1996, p. 851; Carmines & Stimson 1989, p. 13).
Contemporary voter suppression was not exclusive to the southern states, but the
literature suggests the region makes an obvious starting point for this study. The South, as a
region, consistently displayed lower levels of voter participation than other regions. Scholars
argue that three primary factors influenced historically low southern turnout; legal restrictions,
political culture, and lack of party competition (Woodard 2006, p. 216-217). For the cases
featured in this study, political culture and lack of party competition were less salient. The
former was similar across cases, while the latter was replaced by two-party competition across
the region. Differences in electoral law and administration remain at issue.

Rival Hypotheses
This dissertation project tests the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. ―Discouraging Voter Hypothesis‖ – Voter suppression laws target and impact the
participation levels of African American voters. Thus, black voter participation should be lower
in states with voter suppression regimes than those without.
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Rationale for Hypothesis 1:
Demobilization and voter suppression measures target groups least likely to vote for the
party who proposes them. The historical tradition of racial demobilization and the election of the
nation‘s first ―black‖ president, present an opportunity to test long held assumptions about the
impact of voter suppression.

African Americans overwhelmingly vote Democratic, thus

providing Republican Party elites with incentive to suppress black turnout. As states transitioned
to Republican control and enacted voter suppression laws, we should witness an accompanying
depression in the political participation levels of African Americans.

Operationalization for Hypothesis 1:
This study assesses turnout and registration for two racial groups (blacks and whites) by
employing two data sets. First, data reported by the U.S. Census is utilized to calculate selfreported turnout and registration rates during presidential elections for black and white voters in
Florida and North Carolina from 1988 to 2012. Second, I pair Census population estimates with
county-level registration reports to create a new measure of voter registration. These estimates
are more accurate than previous ones because they avoid a major source of error associated with
self-reported survey data.

Hypothesis 2. ―Ensuring Integrity Hypothesis‖ – Voter suppression laws only target illegitimate
voters and thus they increase confidence in elections resulting in increased participation. This
model also rejects race as a motivating factor behind voter suppression reforms. States with
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strong voter suppression regimes should display higher levels of participation among all citizens
than those without.

Rationale for Hypothesis 2:
Proponents of this approach argue that each fraudulent ballot counted neutralizes the
ballot of a legitimate voter. Therefore, voter suppression laws reduce fraudulent ballots and
strengthen legitimate ballots. Strong voter suppression regimes reflect a commitment to fair and
honest elections. This hypothesis assumes that more secure elections increase confidence, and
that participation increases as voters feel more assured only lawful votes will count.

Sub-Rationale for Hypothesis 2: Proponents of increased integrity measures often rely
on voter fraud and impersonation as a justification for these efforts.

Voter suppression

advocates, in an effort to win elections, charge that either political parties or individuals attempt
to vote, more than once or in the name of fictional or deceased voters.

Although voter

impersonation or repeat voting is not unheard of in the history of American politics,
contemporary U.S. elections provide scant evidence of its widespread occurrence. Voter fraud
was unlikely for several reasons. First, multiple voting and impersonation would be difficult to
execute in significant numbers during locally administered elections. Second, economic models
of voting suggest that the act of casting a ballot is itself irrational due to the low chance that one
vote will decide an election. Thus, stealing individual votes would likely be ineffective, except
for in the case of small local races decided by a handful of votes. Third, stiff penalties for voter
fraud serve as a strong deterrent. In sum, voter fraud presents little chance of success; a high
chance of getting caught; and severe penalties for perpetrators. Prior research strongly indicates
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that charges of voter fraud were deliberately publicized as a cover for voter suppression
(Minnite 2010, p. 153; Piven et al 2009, p. 202).

Operationalization for Hypothesis 2:
I examine the primary data sets to assess whether participation was higher in Florida
than North Carolina.

Both self reported turnout and registration rates, and state reported

registration reports are compared to assess the plausibility of this hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3. ―Minimal Effects Hypothesis‖ – assumes that voter suppression measures are
ineffective because they targeted voters who were the least likely to vote. This model predicts
that African American participation was not noticeably impacted by voter suppression.
Therefore black participation rates should be consistent across cases.

Rationale for Hypothesis 3:
This approach accepts the basic assumption that the primary causal factor for voting is
motivation. When voters are motivated and involved, they are likely to overcome all but the
strictest of voter suppression efforts.

This hypothesis assumes that contemporary voter

suppression laws have a modest impact on African American participation because their effects
are mitigated by inefficiency, the risk of provoking backlash or violating mass public attitudes,
and the targeting of citizens least likely to participate.

Operationalization for Hypothesis 3:
Again, turnout and registration data are employed to test this hypothesis.

51

Hypothesis 4. ―Voter Suppression Backlash Hypothesis‖ – suggests that African American
participation will be more robust under voter suppression regimes than those without.

Rationale for Hypothesis 4:
As states adopt more extreme restrictions, targeted voters increasingly reject
demobilization efforts resulting in increased participation among those groups. In this study,
African American participation should increase faster in Florida than North Carolina. This
hypothesis assumes that backlash effects are most pronounced inside of states, meaning that
backlash should be stronger in Florida than North Carolina.
If true, we would also expect to see signs of counter demobilization efforts. Backlash
effects would likely be produced by two sources. The first would occur among the general
population of African Americans in response to media reporting. The second would involve
increased activism by interest groups opposed to voter suppression.

Operationalization for Hypothesis 4:
To assess the possibility of backlash among the general African American population this
study relies on the primary data on turnout and registration.

Data Sources
This dissertation conducts process analysis on all election law changes occurring in
Florida and North Carolina from 1988 to 2012. Legislative records from the North Carolina
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Board of Elections, Florida Division of Elections, the National Council of State Legislatures, and
both states‘ congressional archives are employed to chart the development of voter suppression.
Although the main thrust of this project involves qualitative analysis, I also employ
quantitative measures to assess the impact of institutional reforms.
My primary quantitative data is derived from two sources. The first is constructed using
the U.S. Census Bureau‘s Current Population Survey and Statistical Abstract of the United
States. This data is utilized to calculate population and participation rates. Census survey data
records self reported turnout and registration rates, an issue that is discussed at length below.
The second source employs state elections and voter registration data from presidential election
years from 1996 to 2012. By dividing the number of registered voters of each race by the total
population of each race of a county, I calculate a more reliable measure of registration rates for
each state‘s white and black citizens.

Current Population Survey
The U.S. Census Bureau‘s Current Population Survey, or C.P.S., claimed to provide ―the
nation‘s most reliable information on the social and economic characteristics of voters and
nonvoters, as well as on the number of persons registered to vote‖ (C.P.S. 1988, p. 1). The
C.P.S. elections data was derived from surveys of non-institutionalized U.S. citizens over 18
years of age. This measure was commonly referred to in the literature as the VAP, or Voting
Age Population. The VAP measure did not include members of the military, citizens in nursing
homes, or those in prison or other institutional settings (C.P.S. 1988, p. 1). The survey asked one
household respondent to report the voting patterns of entire households as ―yes‖ or ―no‖.
Additionally, the C.P.S. asked and reported data on registration and demographic responses.
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Census data allowed for a preliminary estimate of American patterns of participation for
white and black voters. This study employed population estimates to calculate the population,
turnout, and demographics of Florida and North Carolina for presidential election years between
1988 and 2012. As data collection and aggregation procedures varied across Census reports, this
study adopted the ―Five racial categories‖ and ―one-race only‖ responses to retain consistency
across years. Numbers reported using ―mixed race‖ classifications were excluded. However, on
the county level the differences were slight and would not significantly affect the results. Due to
similar problems concerning inconsistencies with the way Hispanics were counted, this study
only utilizes white and black ―alone‖ population data.4
Census turnout data was limited by several factors.

Most importantly, respondents

tended to overstate their political participation. For example, respondents over-reported voting
in presidential election years by as much as 10 to 20 percent (C.P.S. 1988, p. 8). The Census
Bureau offered several explanations for these over estimates. First, Census data understates the
total votes cast by excluding respondents who fail to vote for the highest office. Many voters
choose or mistakenly do not cast a ballot for president. Second, some respondents misreported
participating. Third, survey questionnaires required a ―yes/no‖ response instead of allowing ―do
not know‖ as an option to avoid social desirability response bias. Fourth, Census coverage was
limited; including problems covering communities where nonvoting was high like those with
large populations of young adult African American males. Finally, the C.P.S. interviewed only
one household respondent, when interviewing each member individually would produce more
accurate estimates of voting behavior (C.P.S. 1988, p. 6-11).
C.P.S. estimates provided a rough estimate of population and voting patterns, but self
reported turnout and registration data were unreliable. To mitigate this serious threat to internal
4

See appendix A for details.
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validity, this dissertation employed additional registration data from each state‘s elections
administrators.

State Department of Elections Registration Data
This study compiled state election returns and registration data from Florida‘s Division of
Elections and North Carolina‘s State Board of Elections for presidential elections from 1996 to
2012. I employed county level registration data paired with population data to estimate racial
registration rates by county.5 This data was aggregated and employed to assess the plausibility
of competing voter suppression hypotheses.
The registration data, gathered for this study, were more reliable than Census estimates
because they avoided the problem of over-reporting. With self reported voting, respondents may
be socially pressured into reporting that they voted, when they had not. Voter registration data
was much more reliable because registration rolls more accurately reflected the entire population
of potential or eligible voters, barring fraud or registration errors. Of course, many who register
do not vote and some voter suppression measures specifically targeted the registration process.
Although the measure is imperfect, voter registration rates can tell us a great deal about
participation levels.
Finally, this study utilized several secondary data sources. These included presidential
election returns, gubernatorial results, state level SES measures, and data reflecting the partisan
control of important political offices in each state.

5

See Appendix B for details.
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CHAPTER 4: North Carolina
“He [the black man] regards the ballot as the one thing in life worth having above all
others. And now it is sad that he’s about to have it taken away […]. Take away from the
colored man this privilege, and he will never again consider you his friend.” Isaac Smith,
black Republican representative from Craven County, North Carolina arguing against the
1898 Suffrage Amendment (Christensen 2008, p. 28).
Introduction
This chapter serves several important purposes. First, the chapter introduces the political
culture of North Carolina. The state‘s political history reveals a deeply anti-democratic past
followed by a moderate-to-progressive approach to democratization in the modern era. Second,
to assess the role of realignment, partisan control of the state‘s legislative and executive branches
is reported along with the outcome of presidential elections. Finally, this section chronologically
traces major electoral rules changes, legislation, and reforms from 1988 to 2012. The record
indicates that North Carolina officials took several steps to promote higher voter participation.
Most importantly for this study, voter suppression efforts were muted in the state. This chapter
offers two chief explanations for this, including the Jesse Helms voter suppression incident in
1990 and delayed partisan realignment. Finally, I summarize the chapter‘s primary findings.

Background
North Carolina was described as a paradox or puzzle, a conservative southern state with a
resilient progressive streak. Key (1949) depicted the state as ―a progressive plutocracy‖ in his
classic review of southern state politics (p. 205). Other scholars touted North Carolina‘s record
of mixing business progressivism and social conservatism with minor fits of populism
(Christensen 2008, p. 2-3). Tar Heel politics traditionally involved a struggle between two
conservative minded groups, modernizers and traditionalists. Not strictly partisan by the 1990‘s,
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the groups roughly aligned with the former being conservative Democrats and the latter
conservative Republicans (Luebke 1998, p. 47). By 2012, these groups were more strongly
identified by party. The partisan realignment of the region, although slower developing in North
Carolina, strengthened the bonds between party identification and ideological issue orientations
(Prysby 2008, p. 70).
Modernizers preferred an activist government that promoted business interests and
growth, while traditionalists focused on social issues and defended the status quo. Both catered
to an elite-led political system with modernizers favoring banking, media, and commercial
interests. Traditionalists received support from the older business sectors of textiles and tobacco.
Both agreed on the importance of business dominance, finding disagreement largely over which
business leaders would control the public sector. Historically, elites from both camps have
aligned together against populist efforts to make state government more responsive to nonbusiness or egalitarian interests (Luebke 1998, p. 1-3).
State leaders have shown a strong commitment to pro-growth government policies
including transportation and education.

Despite this tradition, the state‘s commitment to

progressive and populist politics has often been contradictory. For example, some historians
questioned the strength of the state‘s commitment to progressive causes, pointing to a conflicting
record on racial issues. North Carolina voters ―will elect liberals who look like the average man‖
as long as they do not violate the racial order or transfer progressive principles across that do so
(Christensen 2008, p. 3).
This seemingly strange mix of political sub-cultures designated North Carolina a paradox
because it was one of few southern states with a strong tradition for progressive and populist
politics. The state was unique in that it was the only post-Reconstruction southern state to come
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under the control of a biracial coalition of black and poor white farmers, albeit briefly. The
Fusionists, a coalition of Republicans, African Americans, and white farmers, dominated state
politics for a very short period in the 1880‘s and 1890‘s.

Most notable among their

achievements were several laws that made it easier to vote (Kousser 1974, p. 187). Ultimately,
the fragile coalition was undone by the racially charged segregationist movements that emerged
across the region. In North Carolina, business elites teamed with segregationists to regain
control of the state government by restricting access to the franchise (Luebke 1998, p. 26).
The Tar Heel state exhibited a strong tradition of racially inspired demobilization and
disfranchisement. Beginning with the ―redeemer‖ governments following Reconstruction, later
with the turn of the century response to the success of the biracial Fusionists, and finally, again
during the modern civil rights movement; political elites employed racial appeals to defeat
egalitarian and populist appeals (Luebke 1998, p. 6). North Carolina, like the region, established
a one-party political system in concert with a racial caste system used to maintain political and
economic control.

The Democratic Party achieved this dominance by almost complete

disfranchisement of African Americans, but also most poor whites.
Luebke (1998) argues that elite Democrats placed restrictions on the franchise excluding
a large segment of the population and freezing political thought in North Carolina. This process
produced several profound effects. First, disfranchisement kept politics artificially conservative
in the state. Second, this ideologically-based voting system intentionally limited the political
power of African Americans and labor.

Third, the system designated these groups as

―illegitimate political actors‖ (Luebke 1998, p. 15). When combined with a system of white
supremacy, the configuration achieved one-party control for decades. Ultimately, any candidate

58

sympathetic to populism or racial liberalism was defeated via violent appeals to race reinforced
by electoral disfranchisement (Luebke 1998; p. 17).
Historical efforts to restrict the franchise were not unique to North Carolina. Widespread
racial disfranchisement could be found across the region. However, these efforts were very
successful in the Tar Heel state. In 1896, when Daniel Russell was elected governor on the
Fusionist ticket, turnout in the state was 87%. Following the Suffrage Amendment of 1900,
ratified by state wide vote, turnout cratered to only 50% (Luebke 1998, p. 8; Link 2009, p. 276).
The Suffrage Amendment included literacy tests, poll taxes, and a grandfather clause. These
measures passed federal constitutional muster because the statutes were race neutral on their
face. The poll tax was repealed in 1920 and then ultimately banned by the 24th Amendment in
1964. Literacy tests were not eliminated until passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965. As a
sign of the Suffrage Amendment‘s effectiveness, five members of the white supremacy
campaign to restrict black suffrage won the governorship starting with Charles Aycock in 1901
(Christensen 2008, p. 30).
Despite this record, North Carolina elites took considerable steps to eliminate active
racial disfranchisement following the modern civil rights movement. Compared to other states in
the region, observers agree that North Carolina modernizers moved swiftly away from blatant
racially-based voter disfranchisement beginning in the 1970‘s.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 ended the worst abuses and produced dramatic, but
uneven, increases in turnout across the South.6 The VRA outlawed literacy tests and
reestablished a basic standard for access to the franchise consistent with the Fifteenth
Amendment. It made illegal any elections requirements that denied ―the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color‖ (Grofman, Hanley, & Niemi 1992, p. 16).
6

For review of the VRA and its impact see (Grofman et al 1992; p. 15-23).
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The law also empowered the Department of Justice and the federal courts to monitor elections,
bypass local election officials, and take extraordinary measures to curb voting abuses. Equally
important, the law applied a triggering formula to counties suspected of disfranchising African
American voters. Any county with low black registration before passage of the VRA was
required to obtain ―pre-clearance‖ by the Justice Department before changing or passing new
election laws. In 1964, 40 of North Carolina‘s 100 counties fell under this provision (Luebke
1998, p. 143).
The Voting Rights Act produced immediate gains in African American participation.
Nationally, black registration rose nearly 30 percent from 1964 to 1969 (Woodard 2006, p. 157).
Despite dramatic gains across the country as a whole, progress was mixed in the South. The
region would continue to report lower turnout rates than the nation well into the 1990‘s. In
North Carolina, black registration rates continued to lag behind whites. From 1965 to 1971, self
reported black registration rates in the state actually declined from 47 percent to 44 percent
(Luebke 1998, p. 161; Christensen 2008, p. 264).
Although a range of factors delayed the overall impact of the Voting Rights Act,
Woodard (2006) argues that legal restrictions and the absence of party competition were the
primary causes of low political participation in the southern states. Both served to strengthen
each other as disfranchisement was employed to advance partisan control – and vice versa
(Woodard 2006, p. 159). As the Voting Rights Act dismantled the former, partisan competition
slowly emerged across the region. The same political conflicts that drove regional partisan
realignment are now central to understanding the recent push for anti-democratic voter
suppression measures.
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Partisan Realignment
Contemporary voter suppression retained a partisan character, as generally the
Democratic Party sought electoral reforms seeking broader participation while the Republican
Party sponsored measures to make voting more secure (Hasen 2012, p. 8). With the exception of
the basic rights protected by constitutional amendments and the courts, American federalism
vests most election administration power in the hands of state and local officials. Control of the
election machinery is achieved by securing the top offices in the state, most notably in the
executive and legislature. The current study finds that partisan realignment was an essential precursor to voter suppression. Since contemporary voter suppression measures were decided at the
state level and these processes were highly political; this chapter begins with an examination of
the partisan control of political offices in North Carolina.
Prysby (2010) detailed the regional realignment explaining that the Democratic Party
dominance of the 1960‘s was replaced by a competitive two party system via a rough and uneven
process. For decades prior, the ―solid South‖ consistently elected Democrats to all levels of
government (Prysby 2010, p. 157). In the wake of the Voting Rights Act, this began to change
in 1968 as North Carolinians cast a majority of votes for a Republican president. However,
Democrats would continue to remain competitive at the state level controlling the legislature and
often winning the governor‘s office into the 1990‘s.
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Table 4.1 Political Control of North Carolina State Legislature by Party (number of seats)

2012
2010
2008
2006
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988

House
Democrats Republicans

Senate
Democrats
Republicans

43
68
68
63
59
60
62
59
59
52
78
81
74

17
30
31
29
28
28
35
30
30
26
39
36
37

77
52
52
57
61
60
58
61
61
68
42
39
46

33
20
19
21
22
22
15
20
20
14
11
14
13

Source: 1988-2012. Statistical Abstract of the United States (Tables 395, 400, 418, 479), Bureau of the
Census.

Table 4.1 summarizes partisan control of the North Carolina state legislature from 1988
to 2012. It reveals the partisan realignment or transition described by researchers. In line with
most states in the southern United States, the Republican Party achieved huge gains on the local,
state, and federal levels. Starting in the mid to late 1990‘s, the GOP secured slim advantages in
the North Carolina House of Representatives achieving divided government.

In 1994

Republicans broke the long one-party rule of Democrats and gained control of the state House.
A shocking, albeit brief, reversal of fortunes for a party excluded for decades.

Although

Democrats regained control of the state House by 2000, GOP victories in the early 1990‘s
foreshadowed the eventual Republican breakthrough in 2012.
Despite significant gains by the Republican Party in North Carolina, the Democrats
remained competitive. From 1988 to 2012, the Democratic Party held the state Senate until
2012. By that year, the parties had swapped positions. In 2012, the GOP secured control of both
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chambers of the state legislature winning 110 seats (to Democrats 60). In the state House,
Republicans won 77 out of 120 seats – a swing of 15 seats. In the Senate, Democrats fell to only
18 seats, a loss of 13 seats. From 1988 to 2012, the Republican Party converted a 74 – 46 seat
deficit in the state House into a 77 – 43 seat advantage.
Despite short lived successes by the GOP in the 1990‘s with victories in the North
Carolina legislature, the Democratic Party was more difficult to displace in gubernatorial
contests.

Table 4.2 Votes cast for and North Carolina Governor elected by Party (in percentages)
Democrats
2012
2008
2004
2000
1996
1992
1988

43
50
56
52
56
53
45

Republicans
55
47
43
46
43
43
55

Party - Winner
R- P. McCrory
D- B. Perdue
D- M. Easley
D- M. Easley
D- J. Hunt
D- J. Hunt
R- J. Martin

Source: 1988-2012. Dave Leip's U.S. Election Atlas

Table 4.2 reflects the outcome of the last seven gubernatorial elections in the state. As
the GOP was making it first gains in the early 1990‘s, their victories in the state legislature were
offset by the election of Democrat Jim Hunt to the governor‘s office in 1992. Hunt‘s victory
began a string of five Democratic terms reinforcing the paradoxical designation noted by V.O.
Key.

Democratic governors; Hunt, Easley, and Perdue governed in line with the state‘s

conservative modernizer tradition, similar to the approach taken on the presidential level by Bill
Clinton.
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The election of Rory McCrory in 2012, along with GOP majorities in the state legislature,
marked the completion of a long contested realignment of the state. McCrory‘s 55 percent
winning share of the electorate was the highest showing of a Republican gubernatorial candidate
in North Carolina since the GOP last won the office in 1988. The switch from Democratic to
Republican control was hard fought.

However, the remaining high levels of political

competitiveness render the current equilibrium unstable.

It is currently unclear if the

Republican sweep of 2012 will be a lasting victory for the GOP or whether high levels of
partisan competition may continue between the two parties.
Similar to Democratic resilience on the state level, North Carolina‘s partisan
competitiveness was most clearly reflected in the state‘s presidential races.

Table 4.3 Votes cast for President and winner of North Carolina by Party (in percentages)
Democrats
2012
2008
2004
2000
1996
1992
1988

48.4
49.8
44
43
44
42.7
41.7

Republicans
50.4
49.5
56
56
49
43.4
58

Party - Winner
R- M. Romney
D- B. Obama
R- G. W. Bush
R- G. W. Bush
R- B. Dole
R- G. Bush
R- G. Bush

Source: 1988-2012. Dave Leip's U.S. Election Atlas

Table 4.3 displays the winner of the state‘s electoral votes in presidential contests since
1988. Stretching back to Reagan‘s victory in 1980, the GOP won North Carolina‘s presidential
electors in every election except 2008. With the exception of Bill Clinton‘s narrow 0.7 percent
loss in 1992 and Obama‘s razor thin victory in 2008, the Republican candidate carried the state
despite higher levels of political competition for state and local offices.
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Table 4.3 reveals that recent presidential contests were increasingly competitive. In 2008
and 2012, North Carolina‘s presidential electors were decided by a total of 2.3 percent.
Democrat Barack Obama won the state in 2008 by only 0.3 percent of the vote, with Republican
Mitt Romney carrying the state by two percent in 2012.
Two-party competition remained strong enough in North Carolina to delay the process of
partisan realignment typical of the region. By postponing the eventual transition to Republican
control, Democratic resistance prevented the GOP from building a more aggressive voter
suppression regime. Tables 4.1 - 4.3 reveal that Democrats did not cede undivided control of the
state political machine until 2012.
As further evidence of this claim, North Carolina state officials implemented a range of
voter suppression measures in 2013.7 These included a reduction of early voting hours, the
elimination of polling places on college campuses, and the end of pre-registration for under 18
year olds.

These voting system changes supported the contention that voter suppression

measures were directly tied to partisan realignment. As the partisan transition in North Carolina
developed more slowly than in Florida and other southern states, North Carolina officials
refrained from vigorous voter suppression efforts for the period under study.

State Voting System Development 1988-2012
This section begins by highlighting the 1990 Helms versus Gant race for one of North
Carolina‘s U.S. Senate seats. This race is included for two important reasons. First, the contest
provided perspective on the development of racial politics in the state. Second, allegations of
voter suppression and the subsequent legal settlement by the state GOP agreeing to forgo voter
7

North Carolina North Carolina HB 589: 2013. North Carolina Laws 2013, Chap. 163. Legislation
Search Database 2010-2012. General Assembly.
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suppression techniques were germane to the subject of this project. With this background
information established, I then trace major legislative election reforms in North Carolina with a
focus on demobilization.8

Helms vs. Gantt 1990
The 1990 contest for U.S. Senate between incumbent Republican Jesse Helms and
Democrat Harvey Gantt, the first black mayor of Charlotte, illustrates the evolution of racial
politics in the state. In a tightly contested race, Jesse Helms was able to eke out a close victory
by appealing to white racial resentment (Luebke 1998, p. 182; Prysby 2010, p. 164). The Helms
campaign, trailing in the polls in the final weeks of the campaign, aired the now infamous
―Hands‖ commercial. The ad featured a pair of white hands crumpling up a job application as a
narrator intoned, ―You needed that job, and you were the best qualified, but they had to give it to
a minority, because of a racial quota. Is that really fair? Harvey Gantt says it is‖ (Helms 1990).
Helms‘ direct appeals to race were reminiscent of an era that many assumed had passed.
Although Helms‘ race-baiting paid off with a close (52 – 47 percent) electoral victory, Gantt‘s
loss foreshadowed a potential winning coalition of white women, white liberals, and African
American voters (Luebke 1998, p. 187). This formula would yield some success in the state on
the presidential level, Clinton‘s close loss in 1992 and later for Obama‘s victory in 2008.
However, these Democratic victories would compete with the larger processes of realignment
that were typical of the region and state. Although the Democrat Party proved resilient in North
Carolina, as more of the state‘s voters shifted to the Republican Party, realignment could only be
delayed not halted.

8

See Appendix D for detailed listing and table of electoral reforms in North Carolina 1988 to 2012.
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Along with appealing to racial attitudes, the Helms campaign resorted to voter
suppression techniques including caging. During the race versus Gantt, the GOP mailed 125,000
post cards into black communities warning about the criminal penalties for voter fraud and
providing misleading voter registration information (Christensen 2008, p. 277). In response to
these violations, the North Carolina state Republican Party agreed to a four-year ban on voter
integrity or voter suppression measures. From 1992 to 1996, all ballot security or election
integrity programs required court approval (Wang 2012, p. 58). Although the ban did not apply
to outside groups or the national parties, it further contributed to low levels of voter suppression
in North Carolina – a trend not broken until 2013.

Election Law Reform Act of 1991
Perhaps in response to the Helms incident, the North Carolina legislature enacted broad
legislative reforms in 1991 with both mobilizing and security enhancing features.9 A reform bill
passed that year which updated the state‘s criminal penalties for voter fraud, intimidation of
election administration, administrative electoral fraud, and violations of registration rules. The
bill also protected voters from intimidation and made it illegal, ―for any person, directly or
indirectly, to misrepresent the law to the public through mass mailing or any other means of
communication where the effect intimidates, harasses, or discourages potential voters from
exercising their lawful right to vote."
The omnibus elections reform legislation required polls to be open from 6:30 a.m. to 7:30
p.m. for all primaries, elections, and referenda held in North Carolina. Additionally, the law
provided for the extension of polling hours to 9:30 p.m. under the following circumstances:
9

North Carolina SB 485: 1991. North Carolina Laws 1991, Chap. 163. Legislation Search Database
1989-2012. North Carolina General Assembly.
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1.

Insufficient ballots or polling books.

2. Multiple voting equipment breakdowns.
3. Poll openings are delayed.
4. In the case of ―other irregularities.‖

In the above examples, any registered voter could request an extension of the polling period
by appealing to their local county Board of Elections. If denied, citizens could then appeal to the
state Board of Elections or the local superior court where appeals were mandated to be heard ―de
novo‖ or considered as new cases.
The extension of polling hours as a remedy for irregularities presented a clear rejection of
voter suppression mechanisms. In effect, this provision allowed local and state officials to
correct for potential disfranchising complications with the local judiciary as an additional
safeguard. In addition to these protections, the law proscribed strict guidelines for poll watchers.
The reform act designated clear roles for partisan observers. Poll watchers, two per political
party, must be provided voting lists. Poll watchers could observe and take notes, but they were
not permitted to electioneer, impede, interfere, communicate with voters, or observe the casting
of ballots. Partisan observers could only quietly take notes and were removed at the discretion of
local election officials for misconduct.
Along with these provisions, the law offered a generous interpretation of residency. In North
Carolina an eligible residence was defined as any fixed habitation that a citizen intended to
return to. For example, voters who worked in D.C. were allowed state residency unless they had
voted in D.C. or otherwise established permanent residence. Most importantly, North Carolina
allowed college students to claim their school residence if they had no intention of returning to
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their state of origin. Since this designation was left up to the student, it effectively enfranchised
any college student that desired to participate in the state.
Finally, the legislation offered an early version of what would become the state‘s ―one-stop‖
voting law. Under a provision titled ―Absentee Voting Made Easier‖, the Election Reform Act
of 1991 enabled voters who cast absentee ballots to do so at the same time as registering. This
form of ―one-stop‖ voting was the precursor for the state‘s voting laws that expanded into early
voting in 2008. Both ―one-stop‖ and early voting developed out of the absentee ballot program.
In effect, absentee voters could submit or mail their ballots before Election Day. Since these
ballots can be mailed or picked up in person, absentee voters could register, request a ballot, and
submit the ballot all in one visit. Once no-excuse absentee ballots were adopted, any voter could
choose to vote absentee. Same day registration and early voting periods extended this
convenience to all voters.

National Voter Registration Act of 1993
According to Fleer (1994), by the 1990‘s North Carolina shed its restrictive past and
adopted voting rules consistent with national norms.

Federal laws and court decisions

eliminated many of the state‘s regressive voting laws including lengthy residence requirements
and literacy tests. Although registration was the responsibility of the voter, The National Voter
Registration Act of 1993 expanded registration to a range of governmental offices including
libraries, schools, motor vehicle offices, and other convenient locations. Progress enough ―so
that this simple but significant administrative requirement is not a barrier to participation for
most people‖ (Fleer 1994, p. 153).
The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), or ―Motor Voter‖ law, was perhaps the
most significant alteration of national election and registration rules since passage of the Voting
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Rights Act. The NVRA‘s major provisions included active registration at motor vehicle and
public agency offices, universal standards for registrations by mail, and a prohibition against
purges of nonvoters for inactivity. Although implemented unevenly across states, the NVRA
removed significant impediments to registration (Bassetti 2012, p. 118-119). More importantly,
the law eliminated some of the ambiguities surrounding registration thereby removing one
avenue for election administrators to suppress turnout.
The NVRA‘s final impact on voter turnout was less clear. In some states, registration
increased but turnout did not. One study found that citizens who registered under the NVRA‘s
provisions were much less likely to vote than traditional registrants (Knack 1995, p. 25). Despite
some disagreement over the law‘s effect on turnout rates, the NVRA‘s provisions were
consistent with establishing a more convenient voting process.
To comply with the NVRA, North Carolina legislators rewrote the state‘s registration
rules in 1993.10 Consistent with the national legislation, North Carolina expanded registration to
a broad range of state offices. These included the department of motor vehicles, but also all
public assistance, military, and other state agencies. The law prohibited these officials from
displaying preference for political parties, verbally discouraging participation, or attaching
delivery of services to a citizen‘s voter registration status.
Other provisions included the establishment of a statewide registrar, rules for removing
voters, and procedures for ballot challenges. The state‘s Voter Registration Rewrite Act of 1993
reaffirmed the right of qualified voters to participate in ―one-stop‖ voting and clarified rules for
voters who moved between precincts. In the former case, the law allowed citizens to resolve

10

North Carolina HB 1776: 1993. North Carolina Laws 1993, Chap. 769. Legislation Search Database
1989-2012. North Carolina General Assembly.
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registration disputes by ―oral or written affirmation before a precinct official at that voting
place.‖
This seemingly minor adjustment of administrative rules was important because in some
states (like Florida), citizens who moved between precincts were required to cast a provisional
ballot in 2012.
In addition to implementing the NVRA‘s main provisions, two other election measures
were enacted in the wake of the federal reforms. First, in 1993 the North Carolina legislature
passed a bill waiving electioneering rules for the Kids Voting Project. This program allowed
under-age participants to participate in mock polls during live elections. These ―simulated‖
elections were designed to promote participation and educate future voters.11 These programs,
along with subsequent reforms like pre-registration, demonstrated the state‘s commitment to
voter education. Second, the Voter Testimony Act of 1995, prohibited ineligible voters from
testifying at elections hearings, and proscribed conditions for overturning elections when the
number of ineligible voters surpassed the margin of victory.12 This measure, although intended
to increase security, stands in stark comparison to subsequent proposals like provisional ballots.
This law provided the ultimate protection against electoral fraud without placing additional
upfront or post-election burdens on voters. A remedy would only be applied in cases where
fraud jeopardized democratic intent. However, the overturning of elections remains an extreme
and unattractive alternative. In 2004, the North Carolina legislature exercised this option in a
race for agricultural commissioner when over 4,000 ballots were lost due to computer error

11

North Carolina SB 684: 1993. North Carolina Laws 1993, Chap. 163. Legislation Search Database
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(Keyssar 2000, p. 271). In that case, the Republican candidate who led the original election
results went on to win again in the re-vote (Fund 2008, p. 138).

Minor Provisions of 1996-2000 Sessions
In the immediate years leading up to the election controversies of 2000, the North
Carolina state legislature was less active in the area of electoral reform. A number of campaign
finance and other technical issues were debated, but electoral rule changes were less prominent.
In 1997, the legislature passed a provision banning family members of candidates from serving
as election administrators.13 Immediate relatives were prohibited from serving on county boards
of elections.
A number of legislative proposals during this (1996 to 2000) lull in activity were sent
back to the Committee on Election Law and Campaign Finance Reform. These included a bill
requiring a voter registration or photo identification requirement, another rewriting the rules for
absentee ballots, and one proposal to restrict access to the ballot by minor or expired parties.14
In 1999, the Election Law Changes Act designated it a misdemeanor for election officials
to alter a voter registration record without the written permission of the voter. Additionally, the
law tightened restrictions on independent registration groups requiring that voter registration
forms be delivered to the Board of Elections within five days.15 The law prohibited payment for
the collection of registrations forms, making this act a felony.

13
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Although restrictions on independent registration groups were often associated with voter
suppression attempts, an important distinction must be made. Not all election security measures
were forwarded in bad faith. The regulation of the collection of registration forms can be
justified on efficiency, as well as security, grounds.

A potential arbiter might be found by

examining the law‘s effect on interest group registration drives. For example, following the
passage of registration collection regulations in Florida many leading registration groups
suspended activity in the state.

No such controversy was reported in North Carolina.

Additionally, compare North Carolina‘s five day rule to the ―48 hour‖ rule passed, but ultimately
blocked in the courts, in Florida.
Perhaps the most important measure promoting turnout might be North Carolina‘s ―onestop‖ voting program.

By 1999, the legislature expanded ―one-stop‖ voting statewide by

mandating that each county Board of Elections provided at least one location for ―one-stop‖
voting.16 This expansion, and support for ―one-stop‖ voting in general, represented a clear
commitment to easier voting. However, convenience and security are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. The ideal voting system would make voting both easier and more secure.
One potential alternative might be to focus security measures on electoral, instead of
voter, fraud.

In 2000, North Carolina legislators again passed restrictions on election

administrators. Along with banning the family members of candidates from serving as officials,
new rules were passed limiting the political activity of Board of Elections members. 17 Election
administrators were prohibited from making public statements supporting or opposing political
candidates or referendum proposals; and were no longer allowed to solicit political contributions.

16

North Carolina SB 568: 1999. North Carolina Laws 1999, Chap. 163. Legislation Search Database
1989-2012. North Carolina General Assembly.
17
North Carolina SB 1290: 2000. North Carolina Laws 1999, Chap. 163. Legislation Search Database
1989-2012. North Carolina General Assembly.

73

The Elections Law Revision Commission of 2001
In 2001, North Carolina legislators passed a range of election reforms intended to avoid
the controversies that occurred in other states in 2000. With an eye toward events in Florida,
they banned butterfly ballots and punch card machines. They also set new standards for the
certification of election results.18 State officials established a four week training program for
election supervisors including an examination and strengthened their ability to remove
supervisors for misconduct.19 The state adopted the recommendations of the Elections Law
Revision Commission; rewriting procedures for ballot design, counting, challenges, and the
announcement of results.20 These reforms addressed controversial sticking points from 2000,
including issues of voter intent, citizen protests, and rules for recounts and canvassing.21
Along with addressing administrative problems, the legislature sought to ease voter
access. First, state officials mandated Spanish language ballots in all counties with over a six
percent Hispanic population covering 19 of the state‘s 100 counties. 22 Next, they affirmed that
military voters should receive the ―utmost consideration and cooperation‖, allowing them to
make one yearly request for absentee ballots, as opposed to requiring multiple requests per
year.23

18

State officials even strengthened their own voting rights.

They eliminated the
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requirement that representatives who moved to the state capital change their residency, allowing
them to vote in their home county.24
Next, state leaders passed legislation which implemented registration by fax, expanded
the once yearly absentee request provision to cover ill and disabled voters, removed excuse
requirements establishing no-excuse absentee ballots, and allowed voter‘s to vote by mail for any
reason.25 This package of provisions reflected the thorough commitment to more convenient
elections in North Carolina. Each measure alone was minor, but together they revealed a
concerted effort to lower the costs associated with voting.
Further strengthening efforts to foster voter education, officials allowed children under 18
years old to enter the polling booth with their parents.26
In 2001, North Carolina amended its early voting period. The legislature passed a bill
shortening the then 22-day early voting period by three days, but also extending early voting to
the Saturday before the election.27 Although the law actually shortened the total early voting
period, the extension of voting to Saturdays indicated that voter suppression was unlikely the
primary motivation.

Help America Vote Act of 2002
The 2000 election controversy in Florida exposed the weakness and inconsistencies of
local voting systems and provided the impetus for a larger federal role in locally-administered
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elections. The Help America Vote Act, or HAVA, passed by the U.S. Congress in 2002 as the
culmination of efforts to fix problems exposed in 2000. HAVA included provisions for updating
voting machines, registration lists, and established a modest role for the federal government in
standardizing divergent state voting systems.
The six main provisions of HAVA were:
1. Statewide voter registration system and lists.
2. Polling machine standards.
3. Guidelines for provisional ballots.
4. Voter identification for first-time voters.
5. Detailed processes for complaints and challenges.
6. Standardized rules for military, overseas, and uniformed absentee ballots.
Although results were mixed, some of HAVA‘s provisions promoted mobilization, while
others did not (Minnite 2010, p. 135; Overton 2006, p. 49). HAVA funded the switch to
electronic voting machines and alleviated some of the concern over punch card ballots.
Moreover, the legislation included ballot design standards to prevent confusing ballots.
However, several provisions come under scrutiny. For example, HAVA exposed new
avenues for voter suppression by mandating the creation of statewide voting lists. Florida
officials utilized these lists to purge voters or otherwise challenge their eligibility; and many
states exploited them to implement voter identification laws. Statewide lists were not inherently
suppressive or demobilizing, much like other state records they were benign on their face. This
presented several challenges. First, it created room for disagreement over specific measures.
Second, it indicated that voter suppression was not deterministic but instead contingent. Third, it
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explains why empirical findings were scattered. Only through careful process analysis can
investigators distinguish how some elements of contemporary voter suppression operated.
In 2003, the North Carolina legislature passed several measures to bring the state‘s
elections code in compliance with HAVA.

The legislature started by establishing a special

election fund to implement the act‘s requirements.28 They then mandated that all North Carolina
elections, not just federal ones, complied with the main provisions of the law.29 Consistent with
previous citizen education efforts, state officials adopted pre-registration of 17 year olds and
allowed high school students to serve as election administration assistants.30

Election Administration Amendments Act of 2005
In 2005, the legislature followed with several amendments to soften some of the Help
America Vote Act‘s requirements. First, they established a forgiving standard for provisional
ballots and provided protections against voter purges. This law continued the HAVA policy of
removing voters from registration lists when they move from a county. However, it allowed
those citizens to confirm their new residency via personal affirmation. The law also allowed for
the correction of minor errors on registration forms, and extended the period for recasting
provisional ballots up to two weeks after the election.31

28
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North Carolina HB 842: 2003. North Carolina Laws 2003, Chap. 226. Elections Reform Database
2000-2010. National Conference of State Legislatures.
30
North Carolina HB 1120: 2003. North Carolina Laws 2003, Chap. 278. Elections Reform Database
2000-2010. National Conference of State Legislatures.
31
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Almost without exception, when confronted with a choice between making voting more
convenient or more challenging, North Carolina officials adopted the more lenient approach to
electoral reform.
Another bill, originating out of the state Senate, explicitly reaffirmed the right of innocent
voters to be protected from minor and administrative errors.32 The bill, which required that
provisional ballots be fairly counted, also established a legislative committee to study the issue
of ballots cast out-of-precinct. This bill quoted North Carolina Supreme Court Justice Samuel J.
Ervin Jr. remarking on an elections case from 1948:
We can conceive of no principle which permits the disfranchisement of innocent voters
for the mistake, or even the willful misconduct, of election officials in performing the
duty cast upon them. The object of elections is to ascertain the popular will, and not to
thwart it. The object of election laws is to secure the rights of duly-qualified electors, and
not to defeat them.

In addition to these protections, two more pieces of legislation were advanced in 2005.
First, the Public Confidence in Elections Act or PCEA sought to allay public concerns
surrounding the use of electronic voting machines. The legislation mandated paper receipts,
verifiable by voters immediately prior to casting their ballot and available for usage in recounts.
Moreover, electronic voting machines were required to undergo regular testing including
examination of the voting software and source code. Machines were also mandated to guard
against over votes by providing warning prompts to voters who failed to mark a ballot selection
or made extra selections. The State Board of Elections was empowered to reject or discontinue
using voting machines that failed to meet the PCEA‘s requirements.33
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Second, the Orange County Super Precinct Act or ―One-Stop‖ Voting Act established a
voting center pilot program in Orange County to assess the effectiveness of ―one-stop‖ voting
super centers.34 At these polling locations, citizens could register and vote at ―one-stop‖ voting
sites during the state‘s early voting period. Super precinct voting centers maintained an online
connection to the state registrar allowing for real time updates and confirmation of registration
status.

Election Administration Amendments of 2007
In 2007, the state followed with additional amendments to the elections code. These
measures again included balanced efforts to make voting easier and more secure.35 First, the
reforms allowed former felons to vote upon completion of their sentences.

Second, the

legislature strengthened one-stop voting by allowing citizens to cast ballots in their home county
at a one-stop voting center. To take advantage of one-stop voting, voters were required to
provide proof and attestation of residence.36
On the security side, election officials were required to verify identification and double
check for duplicate ballots across the state. Additionally, the law proscribed criminal penalties
for breaching ballot secrecy, violating voter registration procedures, and instructing or
facilitating non-citizen voting. The legislation strengthened voter identification requirements by
applying the rule to voters whose registration information did not match the computer database.
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Additionally, the law expanded the buffer zone rule, prohibiting campaign speech near polling
locations, to cover ―one-stop‖ voting centers.
Again applying the rules to themselves, lawmakers instituted a former felon policy for
political candidates. When they file for elections, candidates in North Carolina were required to
disclose past felony convictions including the name, date, and location of offense. Although
former felons were not precluded from holding office, these records were open to public.37

Election Administration Amendments of 2009
In 2009, the state legislature advanced a bill expanding ―pre-registration‖ to 16 year olds.
The legislation called on local high schools and election administrators to encourage student
registration and pre-registration. It clarified regulations for using public buildings as one-stop
voting sites; equalized rules for political and commercial advertising near polling locations; and
prohibited attorneys from profiting in cases brought against election administrators.38
The expansion of pre-registration to teenagers represented another important movement
toward increased democratization.

Ideally, pre-registration increases civic interest and

knowledge. These programs prepare future voters for entry into the polity and may perhaps one
day, even produce calls to further reduce the minimum voting age.

Military and Overseas Voting Empowerment Act of 2009
Building on the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) of
1986, which reinforced the franchise rights of overseas service members, the U.S. Congress
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passed the Uniformed Military and Overseas Voter Act or ―MOVE‖ Act in 2009.39 The law
sought to expand the UOCAVA‘s provisions and further assist military members and others
living overseas. The five main provisions of the MOVE Act were:
1. The removal of notarization and registration requirements.
2. Required registration and absentee ballot information to be available in electronic
form.
3.

Extended the re-registration requirement from every election cycle to every two
election cycles.

4. Obligated states to deliver requested absentee ballots within 45 days of a federal
election.
5. Military ballots were to be mailed without postage.
6. Established military and overseas voter outreach and information programs.
In 2011, North Carolina passed its own version of the Move Act.40 The state law allowed
military voters to use the federal postcard application or an electronic equivalent to apply for
registration. It also extended these rights to overseas ballots. Increasing military and overseas
participation were both consistent with other efforts to eliminate barriers to participation.

Summary
This chapter presented the historical development of voter suppression in North Carolina,
its relationship with partisan control, and traced major state level elections legislation from 1988
to 2012. An in-depth review of state voting legislation revealed a mixture of efforts to make
39
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voting easier and safer. North Carolina officials on the whole, adopted many reforms considered
to make voting easier, but they also instituted many others to make voting more secure. It is no
wonder that voter suppression was so difficult to measure. Its effects were likely lost in the
complex interaction between mobilizing and demobilizing institutional settings. However, a
nuanced inspection revealed that during the period under study, state officials leaned more
heavily toward the side of promoting, versus suppressing, participation.
For example, North Carolina‘s adoption of ―one-stop‖ voting significantly lessened the
burden placed on voters by registration. By merging registration and balloting, citizens made
only one physical trip to the polling location. The logic of voter suppression dictates that a
legislature seeking to depress the turnout of specific groups would not expand ―one stop‖ voting
or other programs like early voting that extended the voting period and removed barriers.
Compare this to the 2013 Voter Information Verification Act or VIVA, passed in the wake of the
Shelby County v. Holder Supreme Court decision which overturned section four of the Voting
Rights Act. Following the partisan transition of the state, one of the first agenda points for the
new Republican majority was omnibus legislation to curtail voting rights, entitled by the North
Carolina legislature as:
AN ACT to restore confidence in government by establishing the voter information
verification act to promote the electoral process through education and increased
registration of voters and by requiring voters to provide photo identification before voting
to protect the right of each registered voter to cast a secure vote with reasonable security
measures that confirm voter identity as accurately as possible without restriction.41

Although this bill did call for the ―education and increased registration of voters‖, the
shift in emphasis toward security was apparent. In addition to instituting a photo identification
41
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requirement for 2016, VIVA reversed many of the pro-democratic reforms examined in this
study. Included in the omnibus elections reform were measures that reduced the period of early
voting to one week; ended pre-registration for 16 and 17 year olds, and eliminated same day
registration during the early voting period. Other provisions removed the option of counting
provisional ballots cast outside of a voter‘s home precinct, and the ability to correct address
changes in person while voting. The statute increased the number of partisan poll observers and
allowed any citizen to challenge the status of other voters, reversing a prior rule requiring these
challenges to come from citizens who resided in the same county. To round out the sweeping
reform bill, legislators terminated straight ticket voting and required that polling location time
extensions be approved by state, rather than local, officials (Election Law Changes 2013, p. 1).
Finally, similar to election rule changes in Florida the law terminated early voting on the
Sunday before elections, limiting ―one-stop‖ voting centers to the hours of 1 p.m. to 5 p.m. the
Saturday before elections. These Sunday reductions of early voting in both states offer strong
supporting evidence for the case that voter suppression proponents targeted African Americans.
In summation, process tracing the development of election laws in North Carolina from
1988 to 2012 revealed a state voting framework that lacked aggressive voter suppression efforts.
Although reforms during this period were balanced between mobilization and security, the
overall assessment of this study is that government officials adopted institutional conditions
favorable to democratization. This is not to suggest that voter suppression was absent, the Helms
incident of 1990 clearly indicated that efforts to suppress the vote continued to play a role in
North Carolina politics. However, high levels of partisan competition and the subsequent delay
in partisan realignment kept voter suppression to a minimal.
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CHAPTER 5: Florida
“We conclude that Florida has failed to sustain its burden of proving that… [reductions
in early voting in 2012], would not impose a material burden on – and therefore a
retrogressive effect with respect to – African-American voters’ effective exercise of the
electoral franchise. […] This dramatic reduction in a form of voting disproportionately
used by African-Americans would be analogous to (although certainly not the same as)
closing polling places in disproportionately African-American precincts. Although such
an action would not bar African-Americans from voting, it would impose a sufficiently
material burden to cause some reasonable minority voters not to vote” (three judge panel
ruling on 2012 reductions in early voting, U.S. District Court D.D.C., p. 54-55).42
“ …what happened this weekend in Florida is simply unacceptable. According to a local
election official interviewed by CBS News' Phil Hirschkorn, the last "early voter" in line
for Saturday's truncated early voting in Palm Beach County finally got to cast a ballot at
2:30 a.m. Sunday morning, which means that voter waited in line for more than seven
hours” (Cohen 2012, The Atlantic).

Introduction
This chapter reports the development of Florida‘s state voting institutions and culture,
with a focus on demobilization. To do so, I chart several important processes. First, I defend the
selection of Florida as a contemporary voter suppression regime. Although political elites in the
state followed national trends which favored more convenient voting, this study identified a
strong counter current of targeted demobilization.

Second, I report the pace of partisan

realignment in the state. This study argues that changes in partisan control were a necessary
precondition for the development of a voter suppression regime. Third, this chapter traces
national and state election law changes from 1988 to 2012 and their implementation in Florida.
The data indicates that Florida officials took several steps consistent with a voter suppression
model like adopting new demobilizing regulations and retracting previously instituted pro-voting
reforms. Finally, I review important findings presented in this chapter.
42
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Background
Florida, like North Carolina, exhibited a history of strict racial disfranchisement followed
by a moderate approach to desegregation (Hill and Moreno 2008, p. 88). In the wake of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Florida officials moved away from blatant racial disfranchisement.
The 1970 elections marked a turning point for southern politics, as moderates won out over
segregationist candidates for governor as occurred in both Florida and North Carolina (Colburn
2007, p. 86).

As legal reforms dismantled black disfranchisement laws, changing societal

attitudes and norms opened up American society to African Americans. For the most part,
blatant racism and extreme racial attitudes were eliminated from ―polite‖ mainstream American
politics. This was also the case in Florida.
Despite these advances, the re-emergence of voter suppression in the state gives cause for
concern. Contemporary Florida politics presents a good test of voter suppression theory for
several reasons. First, as the South shifted away from one-party Democratic rule, various states
transitioned unevenly. The Florida Republican Party achieved parity throughout the 1980‘s,
culminating in huge statewide and federal gains in the 1990‘s. By 2000, voters in the state
preferred the GOP for most state-level offices including president, governor, and cabinet (Craig
and Austin 2008, p. 69).

They also elected Republican majorities to the U.S. and state

legislatures. The GOP secured control of Florida politics reversing the Democratic Party‘s long
reign. Despite these trends favoring the GOP, the Democratic Party remained competitive in
presidential and U.S. Senate races in the state.
Second, two-party competition in Florida was accompanied by acrimonious partisan
conflict including disputes over institutional voting rules. The 2000 Bush v. Gore election fiasco
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exposed our nation‘s disjointed elections system. Hanging chads, butterfly ballots, and the
outcome of the nation‘s highest political contest decided in the courts revealed the rough edges
of the democratic process. All of which placed Florida‘s elections administration system under
serious scrutiny. Additionally, these elections controversies prompted significant reforms on the
federal and state levels.
Tough competition combined with hyper-partisanship encouraged those who seek to
restrict the franchise or dampen turnout by increasing the payoff involved. As partisan
competition increased, each party attempted to mobilize the last of their potential supporters or
alternatively to demobilize their opponent‘s supporters.

More importantly, the framework

offered by Carmines and Stimson (1989) suggested that the initial decision to appeal to white
resentment was successful in triggering a regional realignment.

By blending racial and

ideological conservatism, the GOP was able to win, first in the South and then nationally.
However, embracing racial conservatism was not without risks in an increasingly diverse society.
This is not to argue that all American political contests were essentially racial conflicts,
instead it contends that racial issues were folded into the partisan framework so thoroughly that
we can predict liberal and conservative positions knowing racial content alone. This dynamic is
interesting in that it spanned public and elite opinion (Carmines and Stimson 1989, p. 184-185).
Additionally, researchers confirmed a similar linkage between support for voter suppression laws
and racial attitudes (Manza & Uggen 2008, p. 64).
Third, Florida owns a long history of racial disfranchisement. Although all southern
states moved away from the total disfranchisement reminiscent of Jim Crow, efforts to suppress
voting, continue to carry racial undertones, at times, explicitly expressed (Alexander 2010, p. 47;
Walton 2000, p. 23). This history, or tradition, is vital to understanding contemporary voter
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suppression. On an institutional level, we should be questioning why ethnic and racial exclusion
are such reoccurring themes in American politics. This current study, explores the potential for
conflict between this ascriptive tradition and demographic change.
Fourth, Florida experienced massive growth.

An influx of out-of-state newcomers,

foreign immigrants, and home grown population growth quickened the ethnic and racial
diversification of the state (Scicchitano & Scher 2010, p. 245). Again, as the state becomes more
diverse, racially motivated or executed voter suppression becomes a riskier electoral strategy.
However, diversification of the electorate may also increase the need for voter suppression.
Finally, from 1988 to 2012 Florida officials instituted a range of contemporary voter
suppression measures. These included felon disenfranchisement, photo identification, long lines
and administrative delays at the polls, purge lists, and restrictions on interest group and outside
party registration drives.

To justify these reductions in voting rights, lawmakers cited an

increased concern over voter fraud.
To explain why the push for voter suppression emerged in Florida before North Carolina,
this study again looks first to partisan realignment.

Partisan Realignment
Under a one-party system, Florida political culture was one of loose party affiliation.
Key (1949) described it as, ―every man for himself‖ (p. 82). Contemporary Florida politics are
now much more guided by partisan cohesion, although name recognition and money remain
important for state wide electoral success.
Like other states in the region, Florida developed a one-party political system dominated
by the Democratic Party. ―Rooted in native white resistance to Republican Reconstruction and
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to a biracial society, Floridians embraced the Democratic Party when federal troops were
removed from the state following the Compromise of 1877‖ (Colburn 2007, p. 12). For over one
hundred years, the Democratic Party dominated the region. The party flourished by appealing to
racial attitudes gaining support from ―Yellow Dog‖ Democrats, thusly named for their
commitment to racial segregation. The moniker derives from the saying that these voters would
rather vote for a ―yellow dog‖ than pull the lever for a Republican candidate, due to that party‘s
historical support for racial equality (Colburn 2007, p. 15).
Colburn (2007) described this transition:
―As in other states and particularly in neighboring states, Florida politics were influenced
significantly by developments at the federal level and by the policies of the two national
parties. Both Democratic and Republican parties in the state, for example, felt the effects
when the national Democratic Party opted to support civil rights reforms in the 1950s and
1960s, and later, in the 1980s and 1990s, when the national Republican Party championed
a rights, responsibilities, and values ideology. Significantly, both these political
developments were linked to one another, with Republicans capitalizing on public
concerns over integration, school busing, and the social discord of the 1960s to reach out
successfully to [white] middle class voters‖ (Colburn 2007, p. 8).43
Florida‘s contemporary realignment was most evident on the state level where the GOP
controlled both chambers of the Florida legislature since 1996.

43

Emphasis added.
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Table 5.1 Political Control of Florida State Legislature by Party (number of seats)
House
Democrats Republicans
2012
2010
2008
2006
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988

45
44
42
36
39
39
43
57
59
63
71
74
73

75
76
78
84
81
81
77
63
61
57
49
46
47

Senate
Democrats
Republicans
14
14
14
14
14
14
15
17
17
19
20
22
23

26
26
26
26
26
25
25
23
23
21
20
18
17

Source: 1988-2012. Statistical Abstract of the United States (Tables 395, 400, 418, 479), Bureau of the
Census.

Table 5.1 lists partisan control of the Florida state legislature from 1988 to 2012. This
data indicates that the rise of the contemporary Republican Party in Florida was swifter than in
North Carolina. Florida‘s GOP achieved a 20-20 deadlock in the state Senate as early as 1992,
winning the smaller chamber in the next election cycle in 1994. By 1996, Republicans secured
the state House of Representatives to go along with small advantages in the state Senate.
Although Democrats remained competitive, between 1996 and 2012 the Republican advantage
was evident in races for the state legislature. The GOP secured double digit leads in each
chamber beginning in 2000 (+ 10 seat leads in the Senate and +30 seats in the House).
Despite Republican dominance in the Florida legislature, the GOP ascendance was
tempered by Democratic resilience in statewide elections.
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Table 5.2 Votes cast for and Florida Governor elected by Party (in percentages)
Democrats
2010
2006
2002
1998
1994
1990
1986

48
45
43
45
51
57
45

Republicans
49
52
56
55
49
44
55

Party - Winner
R- R. Scott
R- C. Christ
R- J. Bush
R- J. Bush
D- L. Chiles
D- L. Chiles
R- B. Martinez

Source: 1986-2012. Florida Department of State – Division of Elections

Table 5.2 reflects the votes cast for Florida governor from 1986 to 2010. Similar to a
string of Democratic North Carolina chief executives in the mid 1990‘s, Lawton Chiles secured
Florida‘s top office for two consecutive terms. In 1990, Chiles a long serving and popular U.S.
Senator from the state, returned from retirement and unseated incumbent Republican Bob
Martinez by 13 points. By 1994, he narrowly defeated Jeb Bush by two points before passing
away in office from a heart attack in 1998 (Colburn 2007, p. 154-155). Jeb Bush would go on to
win the state‘s executives position that year beginning a line of four consecutive GOP victories.
Most importantly, the election of Bush in 1998 marked the GOP‘s undivided acquisition of state
government and control of its electoral machinery.
The GOP held the Governor‘s mansion for the next four terms, winning comfortably until
very close victories in 2010 and 2014. They effectively reversed Democratic dominance of state
politics. As Colburn (2007) described:
For the first time in state history, Floridians not only helped elect a Republican president,
they also voted in a Republican congressional majority, a Republican governor, a
Republican cabinet, and significant majorities in both houses of the state legislature.
Republicans, in fact, enjoyed such a huge majority in the House of Representatives that
Democrats had little voice in committee deliberations or in drafting legislation. The
Democratic Party had not experienced anything like it previously, and it was unclear
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when the party would be positioned to challenge the Republican Party again (Colburn
2007, p. 199).
Despite these electoral gains, the Republican Party‘s ascendance in Florida was frustrated
by increasingly close competition in recent presidential contests.

Table 5.3 Votes cast for President and winner of Florida by Party (in percentages)
Democrats
2012
2008
2004
2000
1996
1992
1988

49.9
51.0
47.0
48.8
48.0
39.0
38.5

Republicans

Party - Winner

49
48.0
52.0
48.8
42.0
41.0
60.9

D- B. Obama
D- B. Obama
R- G. W. Bush
R- G. W. Bush
D- B. Clinton
R- G. Bush
R- G. Bush

Source: 1988-2012. Dave Leip's U.S. Election Atlas

Table 5.3 displays state level outcomes for presidential elections from 1988 to 2012. In
Florida, presidential results indicate that realignment either ended, or generated a political
stalemate. Outside of George H. Bush‘s 22 point victory in 1988, the six subsequent presidential
contests were decided by an average of three percent. These include two statistical ties. First,
there was the controversial Bush versus Gore race in 2000; and then again, a razor tight contest
in 2012.
Although Democrats remained competitive in national and statewide contests in Florida,
the realignment to Republican control of the state‘s election machinery created conditions
conducive for voter suppression. Unlike North Carolina where state-level partisan competition
kept government divided, thus preventing the rise of intense targeted demobilization; Florida
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officials adopted a range of voter suppression mechanisms and retracted previously granted
conveniences beginning in the late 1990‘s.

State Voting System Development 1988-2012
Hasen (2012) argues that Florida‘s officials and institutions developed broad support for
the ―democracy canon‖ – a legal tradition that believes electoral rules should be interpreted in
favor of openness (Hasen 2012, p. 23). This approach is in contradiction to historical efforts to
disfranchise voters, and should promote increased participation. Along this line, many states
adopted measures intended to make voting easier including registration at government offices,
early voting, and voting-by-mail. Florida adopted many of these pro-voting reforms. However,
Florida officials began implementing a range of voter suppression measures following the
partisan transition of the state in 1998. Therefore, this chapter reports a tale of two stories. The
first half of this narrative reports a noticeable commitment to incorporate pro-voting reforms.
The second reveals retractions from this commitment consistent with a voter suppression
approach.
Two federal laws greatly influenced state elections systems, the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) and the Help American Vote Act of 2001 (HAVA). The
NVRA or ―motor-voter‖ reform of 1993 extended voter registration to public offices. HAVA,
passed in 2001 in the wake of the 2000 election controversy, provided funding for electronic
polling machines and established a number of electoral reforms including statewide registration
lists, provisional ballots, and voter identification. Additional federal reforms, like the Military
and Overseas Voting Empowerment Act of 2009 (MOVE) eliminated other barriers to voting.
These measures strongly indicated that the general trend in American politics supported
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increased democratization; or at least favored reducing technical and administrative barriers to
voting.

Open voting laws may not eliminate deeper structural inequalities inherent to

participatory democracy, but they are certainly a pre-requisite to optimal participation. As long
as significant voter suppression remains, existing inequalities will be much more difficult to
address.
Despite positive national sentiment, a review of the development of Florida elections
legislation from 1988 to 2012 revealed the fluid back-and-forth nature of electoral reform.44
This process involved constant partisan struggle over elections administration. Historically true
for both Florida and North Carolina, these contests have at times extended beyond the bounds of
legitimate partisan conflict including appeals to targeted and racial demobilization. Although it
is evident that contemporary voter suppression lacked the aggressive appeals to racial bigotry of
previous eras, questions remain as to whether blacks were disproportionately impacted by these
laws.
Process tracing in Florida revealed a variety of voter suppression measures. These
included felon disfranchisement, manipulation of early voting hours, an overemphasis on
security, and other suspicious reversals of pro-voting reforms. These efforts began to gain steam
following the partisan realignment of the state legislature in 1998. In that year, state officials
adopted photo identification and increased their focus on elections integrity measures.45

National Voter Registration Act of 1993
For review of NVRA of 1993 see Chapter 4.46
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Florida Voter Registration Act of 1995
To comply with the NVRA, Florida passed its own version of ―motor-voter‖ legislation
in 1995 titled the Florida Voter Registration Act (FVRA).47 This law instituted broad changes to
the state‘s registration procedures. The law allowed registration at many state agencies, public
assistance offices, and by mail. These offices included the Department of Motor Vehicles but
also a range of public assistance offices like those that served Medicaid and welfare recipients.
Other included agencies like libraries, senior assisted living centers, and military recruitment
offices were required to provide and handle registration applications. Citizens could update or
correct their registration status at any of these locations. In addition, public assistance agencies
which service people with disabilities at their residence were required to provide in-home
registration services.
Florida‘s ―motor-voter‖ law, in line with the federal legislation it was fashioned after,
represented movement toward easier and more convenient voting.

“No excuse” absentee balloting of 1996
In 1996 the state abandoned the requirement that voters casting absentee ballots must
show cause. Prior to this bill, voters were required to attest to several conditions including
medical illness, physical disability, or absence from the state. This reform allowed any eligible
voter who was unable to attend their normally scheduled polling location to participate via
absentee ballots.48 This move was also known as ―no excuse‖ absentee balloting. Convenienceaffirming absentee ballots allowed any voter to mail in their ballot for a period of time up until
the close of normal elections. Once restrictions were removed allowing for in-person registration
47

Florida Voter Registration Act of 1995. Florida Division of Elections.
Florida SB 270: 1998. Senate Staff Analysis. Committee on Ethics and Elections. Florida Senate
Archive. 1998-2014.
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and ballot casting, this program foreshadowed the early voting system later adopted in many
states.

Omnibus Elections Reform of 1998
Following the partisan transition of the Florida legislature in 1998, Florida officials began
moving toward a voter suppression model. In that year, the Florida legislature passed sweeping
electoral reforms.49 The Omnibus Elections Reform Bill of 1998 included a heightened focus on
elections security measures. For example, the bill mandated photo identification for all elections.
Voters in Florida were required to show a Florida driver‘s license, state ID card, U.S. passport,
credit card, or other forms of ID at the polls. Citizens who lacked the appropriate form of
identification could cast a provisional ballot. Next, the law required absentee or mail-in voters to
vote in person before mailing absentee ballots in future elections. A third provision mandated
the matching of social security card and registration identification numbers, and required election
administrators to verify voter registration data. For example, the state‘s supervisors of elections
were required to check the homestead status of all voters. Under this reform, minor errors were
enough to warrant rejection of registration.

A legislative summary described the law as

―designed to enhance voter registration information and identify incidents of voter fraud.‖50
To further stress the shift toward stricter election laws, Florida officials instituted a range
of criminal penalties for ―offenses related to absentee ballots and voting.‖ These included
increased criminal penalties for the corruption or disturbance of registration applications, voter

49

Florida Omnibus Elections Reform Act 1998, Florida SB 1402. Florida Laws 1998, Chp. 104. Florida
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50
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fraud or impersonation, duplicate voting, pressure on workers by their employees, and otherwise
interfering with a person‘s legal right to vote.
Additionally, legislators reversed the no-excuse absentee ballot re-instituting the ―for
cause‖ rules that were previously eliminated in 1996. The legislative staff analysis of a similar
bill argued that the reversal was done ―in an effort to combat voter fraud and abuses in the
absentee balloting process.‖51 The research suggests that a legislative shift in focus from voting
convenience to concerns over ―voter fraud‖ was consistent with a voter suppression approach.
The 1998 omnibus package did include an important pro-voting measure which allowed
for in-person absentee voting. As in North Carolina, in-person absentee voting represented a
strong commitment to democratization.

This was especially true as these procedures

subsequently developed into early voting in Florida and ―one-stop‖ voting in North Carolina.
Thus, expansions, and retractions, of early voting are a good way to assess legislative intent.
In addition to legislative electoral reforms, another noteworthy adjustment was made in
1998. Every twenty years, the Florida Constitution provides for a Constitutional Revision
Commission to review the state‘s laws.

In 1998, among the amendments adopted was a

reorganization of the cabinet system. Beginning in 2002, the Secretary of State, the head of the
state‘s elections system, would be appointed by the Governor. Prior to this amendment, the
office was decided by popular vote via statewide election.52

This change was even more

noteworthy due to Florida‘s unique cabinet system. The state constitution divides executive
power between the governor and six cabinet members.

Cabinet positions, including the

Secretary of State, wielded their own authority allowing for considerable independence. As this
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office is responsible for administering elections, it becomes an important prerequisite for the
advancement of voter suppression measures.
Removing the Secretary of State‘s office from direct popular control enabled voter
suppression in several ways. First, it shielded the office from public backlash and outcry.
Although the governor may suffer politically, individual Secretaries of State were protected from
the electorate. Second, some demobilizing measures (like purging) were directly carried out by
the Secretary of State‘s office. A pro-voting advocate could eliminate these voter suppression
measures altogether; or conduct them in an even-handed manner. Third, it prevented voters from
installing a new office holder in response to controversial decisions. If voters disapproved of a
voter suppression regime, they could largely disrupt the process by electing a proponent of more
open voting procedures. A secretary could not completely override the wishes of the governor or
state legislature, but they could mitigate the worst effects of voter suppression. At minimum,
they would be in a position to publicize unfair election practices. Voter suppression measures
were most effective when they were discreet.

Florida Election Reform Act of 2001
In response to the controversial 2000 election, Florida enacted another series of electoral
reforms the following year. The Elections Reform Act of 2001 addressed many of the problems
that plagued the state in 2000 like hanging chads, disparate recount procedures across counties,
and butterfly ballots. The legislation banned punch card machines and provided $24 million for
counties to switch to optical-scan or electronic voting systems. The law established a uniform
statewide ballot design and proposed a study to assess the feasibility of uniform polling hours.
The Secretary of State was required to distribute to election officials basic standards for:
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registration; in-person, overseas and absentee ballots; voter rights and responsibilities
procedures; poll worker training; and public announcements.53
Along with standardizing state election laws, the overhaul designated funding to educate
voters and election administrators. Although some elements like the establishment of a voter
registration database and rules on provisional ballots could be abused, overall the package made
a strong effort at addressing many of the problems that arose in Florida in 2000.
Once again, legislators modified the ―no excuse‖ absentee ballot rules. This law reversed
the ―for cause‖ revision of 1998 and re-instated ―no-excuse‖ absentee balloting. To summarize,
the state adopted ―no excuse‖ absentee ballots in 1996, went back to a ―show cause‖ system in
1998, and then restored the ―no excuse‖ system in 2001. Perhaps these vacillations reveal intraparty disagreements over the effectiveness or appropriateness of voter suppression laws.

Florida Reforms of 2002
Building on the larger reforms of 2001, Florida officials continued passing elections
revisions into 2002.

Legislation passed allowing for late registration at the Supervisor of

Elections office and elaborating provisional ballot procedures when voter records or the precinct
register were inaccurate. Most importantly, the bill affirmed voting rights by providing that
voters waiting in line at the close of polls must be allowed to vote.54 This reform took on
increased importance as Floridians faced long lines and delays in subsequent elections.
In addition to making voting more convenient, Florida officials sought to bolster the
security of elections. They strengthened protections covering criminal violations of election
regulations. In a law passed in 2002, the legislature designated that any person who ―conspires‖
53
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with, or assists, persons engaged in violations of election code were themselves guilty. The law
criminalized not only participation and planning of election crimes, but also attempts to cover up
the crime.55
Another statute clarified rules for purging ineligible voters from the statewide registry.
The supervisors of elections were empowered to remove citizens who passed away, moved to
another precinct, and those with felony convictions.

The latter provision was the most

controversial because state officials utilized inaccurate felon lists to conduct voter purges.56

Florida Help America Vote Act of 2003
The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 was the federal response to the 2000
elections controversy in Florida. HAVA provided $3 billion in federal funding for states to
update voting equipment and fulfill other technical specifications. In 2003, Florida received $83
million dollars to implement HAVA‘s requirements.
For a review of HAVA of 2002 see Chapter 4.57
In 2003, state leaders passed several pieces of legislation to complete implementation of
HAVA.58 The federal law mandated the state provide: provisional ballots, an opportunity for
voters to privately check ballot accuracy, and access for disabled voters. 59 The state legislation
modified the statewide registration database to comply with HAVA requirements.

Florida

maintained a digital list of every citizen legally registered to vote in the state.
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Along with including funds for voting equipment, training, and staff; the national
legislation included measures that could be employed to suppress the vote.

HAVA‘s

requirement that states compile a central voter registration list and its adoption of voter
identification for first time voters, were the subject of criticism from pro-voting advocates.
Again, state officials exploited registration databases to compile purge lists.
Although this study focuses on legislative changes, a brief review of recent voter purges
in Florida illustrates this process. Bassetti (2012) and Hasen (2012) recorded these various
efforts. In the last four presidential elections, the state‘s Republican Secretaries of State targeted
citizens with felony convictions and suspected non-citizens. In 2000, Kathleen Harris paid four
million dollars to a private firm to compile a felon purge list. State officials instructed the firm
to take a strict approach to name-matching. As a result, around 12,000 legally qualified voters
were placed on the list (Hasen 2012, p. 28-29). Harris‘s replacement in 2004, now appointed
directly by the Governor, Glenda Evans Hood created a purge list which incorrectly included
over 45,000 citizens.

In 2008, Kurt Browning adopted new rules requiring perfect name-

matching before a citizen could register to vote. The rule, called ―no match, no vote‖, resulted in
a list of 12,000. In 2012, Ken Detzner compiled a purge docket of 180,000 voters suspected of
being non-citizens (Bassetti 2012, p. 151-152).
Florida‘s HAVA legislation expanded provisional ballots to include, not only those
whose eligibility was in dispute, but also those counted as ―late‖ voters. In cases where polling
hours were extended by court orders, late voters were required to vote by provisional ballots that
must be kept separate from all other provisional ballots. This provision was vote-affirming in
that provisional ballots were available to be counted in close races. However, the consistency of
the provisional balloting system and the high rate of rejected ballots caused concern.
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Furthermore, the practice of segregating ―late‖ voters, particularly in cases where the delays are
caused by administrative error, was suspect.
Adjudicating these disputes is difficult. For example, the revised rules for provisional
balloting could be interpreted both ways. When provisional ballots are counted at high rates then
the system should empower voters. When these ballots are not counted, then the provisional
balloting system provides additional avenues for mischief.

Absentee and Early Voting of 2004
Early voting, perhaps the best indicator of the push toward more convenient access was
signed into law by Republican Governor Jeb Bush in 2004.60 The early voting measures were
passed with large bi-partisan support (100 yes to 12 no in the state House) in legislation that
allowed absentee ballots to be cast at early voting sites. For up to 15 days before the election,
absentee voters could take advantage of what has come to be known as early voting.
This study suggests that researchers investigate changes in early voting as an obvious
point of conflict in the struggle over voting laws. Generally, expansions were consistent with
increased mobilization while retractions should be investigated for demobilizing effects. So,
Florida officials should be credited with instituting early voting in 2004. However, subsequent
retractions of the early voting period beginning in 2006 call into question the depth of state
officials‘ commitment.

Felony Disenfranchisement Revisions of 2004
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Porter (2010) estimated that Florida‘s felon disenfranchisement laws impacted nearly
nine percent of the state‘s adult population. In 2004, this included nearly 1.2 million Floridians
who were incarcerated in prison, paroled, on probation, or otherwise discharged into a postsentencing program. Of this number, over 290,000 were African American (Porter 2010, p. 10).
Using the county level estimates compiled for this study, this means that around 10 percent of
the estimated 2.9 million potential black Floridians were disqualified due to felon
disfranchisement statutes in that year.
Florida‘s felon disfranchisement regulations vacillated in recent years.

The general

outlines of the policy required that convicted felons be stripped of many civil rights including the
right to vote, serve on a jury, and hold public office. These rights were suspended unless
restored by the executive branch. Florida‘s Constitution granted felons the right to appeal to the
state Clemency Board which consisted of the Governor and two cabinet members. Restoration
was solely up to this partisan committee.61
The Clemency Board has, at times, adopted rules allowing some felons to appeal for
restoration without a hearing, while others were required to appeal directly to the Board. As an
illustration, in 2004, Governor Jeb Bush revised the executive clemency rules to eliminate
administrative delays. This rule change allowed some former felons to apply for restoration
without a hearing. In order to bypass an official hearing, the felon must have been a non-violent
offender with a clean criminal record for five years after their release. Persons convicted of
violent crimes were required to wait 15 years without re-offending to apply for reinstatement of
their civil rights (Porter 2010, p. 9-10).
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Even with these revisions, Florida‘s felon disfranchisement statutes remained one of the
nation‘s strictest. Furthermore, later retractions of previously granted relief were consistent with
a voter suppression approach. An important distinction between historical and contemporary
voter suppression can be made. Historical efforts were much more blatant and sought new and
creative measures to achieve near total disfranchisement of black voters. Contemporary voter
suppression often involved the retraction of previous pro-voting reforms, in addition to the
introduction of subtle new mechanisms.

This development can be likely tied to changing

societal norms and attitudes toward racial discrimination.

Electoral Reforms of 2005
Although the broader trend nationally has been to make voting more convenient;
mobilization and demobilization are constantly interacting or evolving. The American voting
framework is fluid, making description and measurement difficult. Careful process tracing
revealed competition between various forces that influence participation, most notably involving
conflicts over the institutional rules of the game.
This study catalogues a number of laws passed in 2005 that retracted previous pro-voting
reforms. Florida‘s leaders reduced early voting, emphasized voter fraud, and tightened technical
requirements. The most pronounced improvement in Florida elections was the institution of
early voting.

In response to long lines and delays, Florida adopted an extended election

schedule. Local supervisors of elections were empowered to establish early voting periods with
a great deal of discretion. Beginning in 2005, the early voting period begins to recede. State
officials shortened early voting by designating the Sunday of the election as the end date and
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limited daily sessions to eight hours per day, and eight hours per weekend. 62 A legislative writeup, prepared by the Ethics and Elections Committee, describes the first intended effect of HB
1567 as clarifying ―that early voting is a convenience, not a right.‖
Whatever the merits of debating the appropriate length of early voting periods; when a
legislature finds it necessary to clarify to voters that easier access is only a convenience, this
does not bode well for democratization.
Additionally, the legislation established monetary penalties for third party registration
organizations and their members. Individuals, who failed to submit timely registration forms,
including executive officers, were subjected to costly fines and penalties for cases where foul
play was not suspected.63 For cases where foul play was suspected in connection with the
submission of absentee ballots, another reform set forth a third degree felony.64 However, these
rules would be stymied by court challenges and not resolved until 2009. Another round of
similar restrictions followed in 2012.
Consistent with the provisional balloting system established by HAVA, Florida
legislators eliminated the opportunity for voter‘s to verify their identity by signing an affidavit.
Instead, voters without proper idea were required to cast a provisional ballot. Provisional voters
were required to return within three days after the election and present documentary verification
of their eligibility.
In addition to these security enhancing features, other legislation tightened registration
requirements.65 Applications would not be counted unless all boxes were filled out including
those that indicated citizenship and felon status. In previous years, local elections officials
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allowed minor technical mistakes – like unchecked boxes. However this privilege was applied
unevenly across counties.66
This legislation transferred control of the statewide voter registration system from the 67
county supervisors to the Department of State‘s Division of Elections.

Additionally these

reforms altered the rules for poll watcher challenges. The law allowed the franchise rights of any
voter to be challenged up to 30 days before an election. Although the law established a
misdemeanor criminal penalty for frivolous challenges, poll watchers were indemnified for
actions taken in good faith.67

Voter Registration Expansions of 2006
In 2006, the legislature expanded the state‘s ―motor-voter‖ law to include places that sold
hunting, fishing, or trapping licenses. Stores and shops were required to display registration
forms, actively ask customers if they would like to register, and submit completed applications to
the Division of Elections. Not only did this legislation expand access, it did so with a
forcefulness usually reserved for fraud or misconduct. Store owners were required to offer
registration forms or face civil penalties ranging from five hundred to twenty-five hundred
dollars. These same penalties applied to local elections administrators who failed to adequately
supply registration forms to businesses.68
Although supporters of pro-voting reforms do not object to expanding registration to
businesses, this study notes the partisan implications of targeted expansion. In this case it was
assumed that one party gained an advantage from citizens in rural areas having expanded
opportunities to register. As the NVRA, along with its Florida versions, expanded registration to
66
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public assistance agencies – thought to advantage Democrats, this law attempted to balance this
perceived imbalance by expanding access at locations thought to lean towards the Republican
Party. This type of expansion was consistent with a pro-voting approach, but it is important to
look for a broader commitment to democratization. Where that commitment was absent, even
targeted expansions can be consistent with a voter suppression approach. Most importantly, a
quantitative assessment of all states would not reveal these types of imbalances. Only careful
process tracing can identify these relationships.

Felon Disfranchisement Revisions of 2006 and 2007
In 2006 and 2007, state officials lightened the state‘s strict felon disfranchisement
regulations. First, in 2006, county jail officials were tasked with assisting discharged felons with
the restoration process.

Legislation required that county officials provide Restoration of Civil

Rights applications to prisoners with felonies housed in county jails. The law excluded the
Department of Corrections.69
Next, in 2007, the state adopted new rules to automatically restore the voting rights of
non-violent offenders upon completion of their punishment. Signed by Republican Governor
Charlie Christ, the move represented a significant retreat from the state‘s unforgiving felon
disfranchisement statues. Violent offenders were still required to apply to Florida‘s Office of
Executive Clemency for reinstatement (Porter 2010, p. 4).
The lifting of felon disfranchisement laws represented a significant movement toward
democratization. As these restrictions represented the largest segment of excluded adult citizens,
revisions that ease the reinstatement process, or remove the ban altogether, remained a quick way
to expand the franchise. These efforts suggested that the Republican Party elites did not hold
69
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uniform views concerning voter suppression. This study argues that inter-party disagreements
among Republicans on this issue were likely to mirror the historical divide between ideological
and racial conservatism (discussed in literature review p. 20). One way to demarcate this line
might be to employ survey data to measure support for voter suppression measures to identify
differences among conservatives.

Pre-registration of 17 year olds in 2007
Legislation passed in 2007 that allowed for the pre-registration of 17 year olds, and
reversed the prior decision to strictly enforce minor errors on registration applications. This law
ordered that applicants who failed to correctly mark all boxes would be given the option of
providing the information at the polls. The law also lowered some of the civil penalties imposed
on third party registration drives.70

Omnibus Elections Reform of 2008
In 2008, the legislature passed another omnibus legislation containing another wave of
electoral revisions.71 This package lowered the pre-registration age to 16 and removed buyers
club and employee badges from the list of acceptable photo identification.

Finally, the

legislature mandated that voter challenges be issued by a poll watcher from the same county as
the voter.
Expansions of pre-registration and similar measures would count as mobilizing reforms;
however Florida officials would repeal these programs after a few years. The elimination of preregistration is curious, if only because it is hard to imagine how these procedures risked voter
70
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fraud. It seems unlikely that anyone intent on committing voter fraud would go through the
trouble of pre-registering ineligible voters several years in advance.

Military and Overseas Voting Empowerment Act of 2009
For review of MOVE Act of 2009 see Chapter 4.72

Florida’s Military and Overseas Voting Empowerment Act of 2010 and 2011
In response to the federal Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (Move) Act which
expanded the rights of absentee voters, Florida officials adopted their own version in 2010. The
state‘s MOVE law allowed voters to request and receive absentee ballots by mail, or
electronically. It also required that election administrators deliver ballots within 45 days of the
election. The law established an electronic tracking system that enabled voters to monitor the
status of an absentee ballot, similar to what was used with commercial mail carriers. Voters
were able to track receipt of ballot request, an estimated date of ballot delivery, and confirmation
of the final submission.73
Subsequent legislation passed in 2011, allowed military voters in the state to utilize the
federal write in absentee ballot, or FWAB, system.74 Under the federal system, mandated by the
UOCAVA of 1986, military voters may cast a FWAB ballot if they have not received, or
experienced problems with the regular ballot. This legislation provided Florida‘s military voters
with three different forms of absentee ballot; the official state absentee ballot, a backup state
write-in absentee ballot, and the FWAB ballot.
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It is important to note the support of Florida officials for the number of pro-mobilizing
reforms adopted between 2004 and 2011.

From early voting to retractions of felon

disfranchisement laws, Florida‘s GOP led government should receive credit for these reforms.
However, by 2011, state officials would reverse many of these previously granted conveniences.

Omnibus Elections Reform Bill of 2011
In 2011, consistent with a wave of similar voter suppression efforts in other states,
Florida adopted a 128 page bill with significant restrictions and retractions.75 First, the bill
included administrative hurdles like eliminating the option for voters to update their address
information at the polls when moving between Florida counties; and a requirement for strict
signature matching on absentee ballots (Weiser & Norden 2012, p. 3). This provision exempted
voters who moved inside of the county and active military members and their families. All
others were required to cast a provisional ballot.
Second, the elections revision reduced the early voting period from 14 days to eight,
shortened the number of hours that early voting locations could be open, and prohibited early
voting on the Sunday before the election (Weiser & Norden 2011, p. 21). Although the total
number of early voting hours was kept, these revisions specifically banned early voting on
Sunday.
Critics charged that the cancellation of the Sunday session was a direct response to the
effectiveness of the ―Souls to the Polls‖ mobilization efforts employed by the state‘s African
American churches (Levin 2012; Herron and Smith 2012a, p. 346). Researchers argue that
important Democratic-leaning constituencies were likely impacted.

African Americans,

Hispanics, young, and first time voters, were the most likely groups to participate in early voting;
75
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a trend that was even stronger on Sundays. In 2008, African American and Hispanic turnout was
high on the Sunday before the election. That year, despite constituting a small minority of the
total population, African Americans accounted for nearly 40% of all ballots cast during the two
Sunday sessions of early voting in Florida (Herron & Smith 2013a, p. 342).
Any reductions in previously established early voting hours were suspect, but targeted
reductions lend support to charges of racial discrimination. Although the motivation may be to
depress Democratic Party turnout, it is important to explore the logic or thinking process
involved. Ultimately this process developed in the following, or similar, pattern:
1.

Process begins with a desire to depress opposition party voters.

2. Next, elites recognize that African Americans vote overwhelmingly for the
Democratic Party.
3. Then, party leaders adopt measures that impede black voting (for example, the Souls
to the Polls reductions in early voting).
4. Black participation is reduced; and in effect, Democratic Party votes are reduced.

Whatever the intent, this process involved the use of racial markers to construct voter
suppression measures. As proof, this study points to lengthy delays in Florida for the 2012
election. A 2013 report by Republican Florida Secretary of State Ken Detzner described the
cause of these delays as:

However, despite the variety of voting methods in Florida, many voters found themselves
waiting in line for hours to cast a ballot both during the early voting period and on
Election Day. These lines can be attributed, in part, to county supervisors of elections
underestimating the turnout of voters in certain precincts. But most, if not all, counties
experienced longer wait times than in previous elections due to factors including the
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record number of voters, a shortened early voting schedule, inadequate voting locations,
limited voting equipment and a long ballot.76

Along with reductions in early voting, this legislation stiffened the penalties for third
party registration violations. Voter registration drives are employed to mitigate economic and
racial disparities in voting. Racial and ethnic minorities, disabled, and low-income citizens tend
to respond well to registration drives at churches, malls, and other public venues (Weiser &
Norden 2011, p. 20).
Florida displays a lengthy history of high profile conflicts over registration drives. Weiser
and Norden (2011) traced the origins of these disputes to the 2004 controversies surrounding the
community group ACORN. In short, the organization was accused of various misdeeds related
to its ballot initiative and voter registration activities. In 2005 the Florida legislature responded
by passing restrictions on third-party registration groups. New regulations required registration
forms to be submitted within ten-days subject to hefty fines for violations. The law was
challenged in the courts by the League of Women Voters and other groups and ultimately
blocked. Again in 2007, the legislature offered a similar piece of legislation that faced legal
challenges. The matter was settled in 2009 when the Florida Division of Elections adopted a
compromise rule that satisfied both sides (Weiser & Norden 2011, p. 22).
Absent any new allegations of problems with third-party voter registration drives,
Florida‘s legislature took up HB 1355 in 2011 with the stated goal of increasing the difficulty of
voting (Weiser and Norden 2011, p. 23). State Senator, Mike Bennett (R- Bradenton) argued:
We all want everybody to vote. But we want an informed voter. Many people don‘t even
know where and when they‘re supposed to go vote. Voting is a privilege.77 How easy
76
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should it be? […]How much more convenient do you want to make it? […] This is a
hard-fought privilege. This is something people die for. You want to make it convenient?
The guy who died to give you that right, it was not convenient. Why would we make it
any easier? I want ‗em to fight for it. I want ‗em to know what it‘s like. I want them to go
down there, and have to walk across town to go over and vote (qtd. In Pillow 2011).78

This study notes the devolving importance of access to the franchise. First, early voting
was declared a ―convenience‖ and ―not a right‖ by the state legislature in 2005. Next, voting
itself was designated as a ―privilege‖ in 2011. By 2012, long lines and delays provided many
Floridians the opportunity to prove how much they valued the franchise. Many waited up to
seven hours for the privilege to cast their ballots. Unfortunately, as many as an estimated
200,000 other voters were unable to wait and left, presumably, without voting (Powers &
Damron 2013).79 .
HB 1355 placed several burdensome requirements on registration groups. First, these
organizations were required to pre-register with the state before conducting registration drives.
Second, drive organizers, volunteers, and employees were required to sign sworn affidavits
reporting criminal penalties for false registration. Third, registration forms were mandated to be
submitted within 48 hours of the collection of signatures or third party registration groups risked
civil penalties and fines (Weiser and Norden 2011, p. 21). This final ―48-hour‖ provision proved
the most controversial element of the law as it created an imposing technical hurdle for
registration groups.
In response to this law, several independent organizations suspended all registration work
in the state. Rock the Vote ended its activity permanently, while the League of Women Voters
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and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored people suspended all registration
initiatives while appealing the decision in the courts (Herron and Smith 2012b p. 7-8).
HB 1355 was impeded on two fronts. First, several legal challenges delayed the most
burdensome requirements. Second, a handful of Florida counties remained under the VRA‘s
preclearance provision allowing the Department of Justice to challenge the changes. Ultimately,
the legal suits were successful in muting the law. In 2012, a Florida judge overturned the ―48
hour‖ rule which required third party registration groups submit forms within 48 hours or suffer
heavy fines and penalties (Herron and Smith 2012b, p. 8).
Despite the legal victory, HB 1355 was implemented for over a year in most of Florida‘s
counties.

In a study of daily registration reports, researchers found that even this brief

interruption impacted registration patterns (Herring & Smith 2013b). In 2004 and 2008, an
average of around 210,000 new Democrats registered between July 1 of the year before and July
31 the year of the election. In both years, new Democrat registrants outpaced new Republican
registrants. In 2012, Republicans outpaced Democrats ten to one (128,039 to 11,365). In this
case, it appears that restrictions on outside registration had a noticeable impact.80

Reversal of Felony Disfranchisement Reforms of 2011 and 2012
Finally, in 2011, Florida Governor Rick Scott reversed a 2007 decision that made it
easier for former nonviolent offenders to have their rights restored. As a result, all felony
offenders, even nonviolent ones, were subjected to a minimum five year waiting period
upon completion of their sentences. Some offenders must wait seven years before applying.
In order to have their rights restored all felons must apply to the Governor or appeal to the
80
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state legislature to pass special legislation specifically restoring their rights (Bassetti 2012,
p. 175).

Summary
This chapter highlighted the long and complicated web that comprised Florida‘s elections
code.

Reforms like the NVRA, HAVA, and MOVE generally eased restrictions and

standardized election laws. However, process tracing of legislation indicated that lawmakers in
Florida instituted a range of measures suspected of suppressing turnout. State officials restricted
registration drives, eliminated early voting hours, strengthened felon disfranchisement
regulations, purged citizens from registration rolls, and experienced long lines and difficulties at
the polls. Although this study focused on legislative action, a number of additional voter
suppression measures were recorded by scholars including attempts at other levels of
government.
This chapter reports the following findings. First, Florida officials adopted a mixture of
voter suppression and pro-voting measures from 1988 to 2012. However, a broad examination
of these laws suggests that officials implemented targeted efforts to depress African American
participation.

Florida officials have taken the following actions consistent with voter

suppression measures including:
1. Reversed felony disfranchisement reforms.
2. Ended same day registration during the early voting period.
3. Eliminated early voting on Sundays.
4. Reduced the amount of available early voting hours.
5. Purged voters utilizing erroneous lists of former felons and non citizens.
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6. Adopted strict matching requirements for registration forms.
7. Caused long lines at the polls in 2012, partly due to early voting reductions.
8. Suspended pre-registration of 16 and 17 year-olds.
9. Allowed Secretary of State to be appointed by Governor.

Second, the data supports the argument that voter suppression laws displayed a partisan
bias. Despite broad support for the ―democracy canon‖, officials of both parties were willing to
sacrifice this principle for partisan gain. During the legal battles following the contested 2000
presidential race, supporters of Bush and Gore both offered arguments that increased their
chances of winning a recount over the idea that all votes should be counted equally (Hansen
2012, p. 24). However, Republican Party officials proposed and provided support for almost all
of the voter suppression legislation passed into law since 2000.

Additionally, this study

identifies a rise in voter suppression legislation and language beginning in 1998 in Florida and
2013 in North Carolina. These developments closely followed partisan transition. Third, despite
the highly partisan nature of these efforts, this study finds that not all Republican elites supported
voter suppression. Particularly early in the period under study, legislators passed and retracted
voter suppression measures frequently. For example, Florida‘s ―no-excuse‖ absentee balloting
rules and felon disfranchisement regulations have vacillated. Disagreements among Republican
elites likely marked differences between ideological and racial conservatism. On one side sit
ideological conservatives who might be willing to compromise to attract minority voters. On the
other, racial conservatives remain committed, at great potential costs, to anti-democratic policies
that limit the political power of minority voters.
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CHAPTER 6: African American Participation
“Color blindness may be politically correct, but it isn’t politically accurate. […] race is
important largely because of the differences in voting patterns between whites and people
of color […]. And these differences do not merely stem from racial disparities in class.
On average, people of color and whites of the same socio-economic status have vastly
different political preferences” (Overton 2006, p. 69).
Introduction
This chapter explores political participation in North Carolina and Florida from 1988 to
2012. To assess each state‘s level of participation this study compared three measures of voter
turnout and registration.

These data are employed to test competing theories of voter

suppression. Next, state demographic and county level registration data are utilized to rule out
alternative explanations. Finally, I summarize and defend the central findings of this chapter.

Voter Registration and Turnout by Race in North Carolina
Historically, African American turnout in North Carolina fluctuated in response to
several periods of intense demobilization. Pre-Voting Rights Act, the state led the region with
around a 40 percent black registration rate in 1960. By 1980, that increased to 47 percent
(Luebke 1998, p. 144-145). However, North Carolina fell behind all of its southern neighbors as
other states in the region made larger gains throughout the subsequent decades. Luebke (1998)
explained that historical African American participation was stunted due the state‘s moderate
reputation on civil rights, the conservative lean of Tar Heel politics, and the refusal of black and
Democratic politicians to employ populist appeals (Luebke 1998, p. 146-157). Others pointed to
the Tar Heel state‘s blend of conservative progressivism, arguing that elites promoted a
conservative political culture supportive of pro-business internal improvements while opposing
higher participation (Eamon 2008, p. 14).
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To assess the participation patterns of two racial voting blocs (whites and blacks), this
study compares Census turnout and registration rates with a new measure of registration.
Census data reported that African American participation in presidential election years increased
dramatically over time, spiking in recent elections. This line of thinking credited the success of
the Voting Rights Act for historic increases, and the election of the nation‘s first African
American president for more recent spikes in black participation. This data fits well with the
popular narrative of a nation that successfully eliminated racially contrived disfranchisement. In
fact, the Census data indicated that self reported black registration in North Carolina surpassed
that of whites, for the first time outside of the margin of error in 2012. This trend was confirmed
across multiple measures of participation.

Table 6.1 VAP Reported registration by Race in North Carolina in presidential elections 1988-2012
(percent)
White
2012
2008
2004
2000
1996
1992
1988

70.6 (1.9)
73.3 (1.8)
69.4 (2.0)
67.9 (2.1)
70.4 (x)
70.8 (0.9)
65.6 (1.0)

African American
83.7 (3.4)
71.0 (4.5)
70.4 (2.6)
62.9 (4.7)
65.5 (x)
64.0 (2.1)
58.2 (2.5)

Gap
12.7*
-2.3
1.0
-5.0
-4.9
-6.8*
-7.4*

Note: Percentages are for Voting Age Population (VAP).
Source: 1988-2012. Statistical Abstract of the United States (Table 4), Bureau of the Census.
Significant at .10; 90 percent confidence interval. X = missing value. * = Outside the statistical margin of error.

Table 6.1 displays the Census estimated self reported registration rates for black and
white North Carolinians from 1988 to 2012. On this measure, blacks in the state made steady
gains from a seven point deficit in 1988 to nearly a 13 point advantage in 2012. Beginning in
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1996, the difference between self reported black and white registration in North Carolina fell
within the study‘s margin of error.
In addition to a gradual increase in self reported registration, the pace of black
registration spiked in the last three presidential elections. However, only the increase in 2012
withstood closer scrutiny. The apparent upticks in 2004 and 2008 fell within the reported
margins of error, indicating that we cannot be certain of real movement. These concerns
notwithstanding, the data portrays African American registration as growing dramatically during
the time period under review.
In 2012, Census derived data estimated that African American registration in North
Carolina reached historic highs. For that election, nearly 84 percent of blacks in the state
reported registering for the election.

The current study attributes the rise in self reported

registration in the two most current presidential elections to the Obama campaigns. For African
American voters it was likely that the election and reelection of the nation‘s first African
American president produced increased motivation or enthusiasm. Although the gains in 2008
cannot be conclusively confirmed by this data, the general trend supports the view that black
registration has been on the rise in North Carolina.
From 1988 to 2012, white registration rates in North Carolina remained more stable. The
self reported registration rates for white adults ranged between 65 and 73 percent. During this
period, white registration averaged just fewer than 70 percent. The average of black registration
for the same period was nearly 68 percent. In sum, this data signals that black registration in
North Carolina reached parity with whites by 2012. Again, these results must be accepted only
tentatively considering the problems with self reported survey data identified by this study.
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A similar measure of self reported turnout indicates that these gains in registration
resulted in higher black turnout.

Table 6.2 VAP Reported Voted by Race in North Carolina in presidential elections 1988-2012
(percent)
White
2012
2008
2004
2000
1996
1992
1988

60.1 (2.0)
64.6 (2.0)
58.1 (2.1)
55.9 (2.2)
56.4 (x)
62.4 (0.9)
55.2 (1.1)

African American
78.7 (3.8)
67.2 (4.6)
63.1 (4.9)
47.6 (4.8)
48.7 (x)
54.1 (2.2)
46.6 (2.5)

Gap
18.6*
3.6
5.0
-8.3
-7.7
-8.6*
-8.6*

Note: Percentages are for Voting Age Population (VAP).
Source: 1988-2012. Statistical Abstract of the United States (Table 4), Bureau of the Census.
Significant at .10; 90 percent confidence interval. X = missing value. * = Outside the statistical margin of error.

Table 6.2 presents self reported turnout in North Carolina for presidential elections for
the period under study. If Census Bureau self reported turnout data is to be believed, African
American voters in North Carolina turned out at an astonishing rate of nearly 80 percent of the
voting age population for the 2012 election. This suggests that black mobilization was so high as
to outpace white turnout by 18.6 percent.

If accurate, this would be the first time in

contemporary North Carolina presidential elections that the gap in racial voting favored blacks
outside of the statistical margin of error.

This would stand as a significant advancement of

democratization – a minority group banned from political participation as recently as a half
century ago, now participating on par with, or perhaps surpassing, the dominant majority.
However, similar to Census registration estimates, this data indicates that self reported
black turnout actually spiked first in 2004. Between 2000 and 2004, black turnout rose nearly 16
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points on the Census measure. When the margin of error for the two years was considered, self
reported black turnout rose between a minimum of 5.8 and a maximum of 25.2 points.81
If Census self reported registration and turnout data accurately reflected participation, this
significant increase would contradict notions that increased participation was caused by the
candidacy of the first African American president. One might instead look to other causes like
the diffusion of mobilizing electoral reforms, or perhaps black dissatisfaction with the outgoing
Republican administration and its policies.

However, survey data was plagued with over-

reporting and other methodological concerns.
This study assesses an additional metric, official state reported registration rates, to
develop a more accurate reflection of registration across racial groups.

Table 6.3 State Reported registration rates by Race in North Carolina in presidential
elections 1996-2012 (percent)

2012
2008
2004
2000
1996

White

Black

Gap

67%
73.3%
66.6%
67.9%
63.6%

69.4%
67.6%
52.9%
52.7%
50%

+2.4%
-5.7%
-13.7%
-15.2%
-13.6%

Note: Percentages are calculated by merging Census Population estimates (1996, 2000 to 2008, and 2012) with
county registration reports. See appendix A for details.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau; North Carolina State Board of Elections (1996-2012)

Table 6.3 combines county-level Census population estimates with state registration
records from 1996 to 2012. Registration data, reported by the North Carolina Board of Elections
as the official record of the election, confirmed the general trend of rising African American

Confidence interval for 2000 was 47.6 +/- 4.8 = 42.8 – 52.4. In 2004 the confidence interval was 63.1
+/- 4.9 = 58.2 – 68.
81
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registration. However, they also called into question the inflated nature of self reported Census
estimates. In 2012, black voters in North Carolina registered at higher rates than white voters for
the first time in contemporary presidential elections. In that year, blacks out registered whites by
just over two percentage points. Although this was far below the twelve point advantage
estimated by Census reports, it does support the broader movement measured by self reported
survey data.
From 1996 to 2012 the general trends were clear and all three measures of participation
concurred. Black registration in North Carolina climbed steadily over the period, reaching parity
with whites in 2012. As late as 1996, the racial disparity in registration was nearly 14 percent.
In that year, around half of the African American population of North Carolina registered to
vote. By 2012, black registration in the state rose to nearly 72 percent. Moreover, large
increases occurred for the presidential elections in 2008 and 2012.
County level registration data reveals that white registration was much more stable over
the same time frame. Since 1996, white registration in North Carolina ranged from 63 to 73
percent with a mean of 67.6 percent. White registration in North Carolina was also highest in
2008, yet not as dramatic as gains made by blacks in the state. Unlike with black registration
estimates, the Census self reported measures were much more accurate at estimating white
registration. Since 2000, Census estimates of white registration fell within a few points, in some
years estimating them precisely.
To be clear, registration rates do not necessarily indicate higher black turnout.
Registration can be a poor proxy for turnout. Specifically in years where voting groups possess
varying levels of motivation. However, this study proves that Census reports overestimated
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black registration in North Carolina by wide margins (by over ten percent in 2012). Despite
these errors, the general trend of rising black participation was confirmed.
These measures, taken together, may give us reason to temper Census based estimates but
they strongly support the narrative of ascending black participation in North Carolina.

Voter Registration and Turnout by Race in Florida
To evaluate contemporary African American participation in Florida, again this study
explored the same three measures of registration and turnout. Census data revealed modest gains
in self reported registration and turnout in Florida. According to this data, black participation in
Florida increased only slightly in 2008 and 2012. Even with the historic candidacy of the
nation‘s first African American president, self reported black participation remained anemic.
Although black participation levels increased somewhat, these gains were much smaller in
Florida than in North Carolina. In fact, for both years, black Floridians registered and voted less
than their white counterparts by statistically significant margins. This gap, along with the
general stagnancy of black participation in the state, support claims that voter suppression
measures were responsible.
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Table 6.4 VAP Reported registration by Race in Florida in presidential elections 1988-2012
(percent)
White
2012
2008
2004
2000
1996
1992
1988

62.3 (1.3)
64.5 (1.3)
64.7 (1.4)
62.5 (1.4)
63.7 (x)
64.5 (0.8)
64.3 (0.9)

African American Gap
56.3 (3.8)
54.3 (4.0)
52.6 (4.3)
52.7 (4.6)
53.1 (x)
54.7 (2.6)
57.7 (2.8)

-6.0*
-10.2*
-12.1*
-10.2*
-10.6*
-9.8*
-6.6*

Note: Percentages are for Voting Age Population (VAP).
Source: 1988-2012. Statistical Abstract of the United States (Table 4), Bureau of the Census.
Significant at .10; 90 percent confidence interval. X = missing value. * = Outside the statistical margin of error.

Table 6.4 displays self reported registration by race in Florida from 1988 to 2012. On
this measure, black participation in the state only increased enough to regain the six point deficit
that existed in 1988. Although the data does reveal a modest uptick in 2012, self reported black
registration remained stable over the entire period. In fact, there was no statistical difference
between black registration rates in 1988 than in 2012. During this interval, blacks self reported
registering to vote at an average of 54 percent of the voting age population. For whites in
Florida, that rate topped 63 percent. For all years, the racial gap was greater than the statistical
margin of error.
Additionally, black registration in Florida was likely lower than Census estimates
suggested. Again, Current Population Survey data relied on self reported survey responses.
These measures overstated black registration, as they did in North Carolina. These data offer
strong support for the discouraging voter hypothesis. One plausible explanation for lower levels
of black registration in the state might be the presence of voter suppression mechanisms.
Scholars have long argued that burdensome registration policies depress participation. Lower
registration rates were consistent with this view.
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Additionally, the absences of any clear spikes in African American registration in 2008
and 2012 were suspicious. This study assumed these elections produced high levels of interest,
excitement, and motivation for black voters, as occurred in North Carolina. If this Census
reported registration data were confirmed, this would again provide additional evidence that
voter suppression measures mattered and exhibited racial effects.

Table 6.5 VAP Reported Voted by Race in Florida in presidential elections 1988-2012
(percent)
White
2012
2008
2004
2000
1996
1992
1988

55.7 (1.3)
58.3 (1.3)
58.4 (1.4)
53.8 (1.5)
52.7 (x)
57.9 (0.8)
57.1 (0.9)

African American
49.2 (3.8)
50.1 (4.0)
44.5 (4.2)
42.3 (4.6)
40.5 (x)
46.3 (2.6)
40.8 (2.8)

Gap

-6.5*
-8.2*
-13.9*
-11.5*
-12.2*
-11.6*
-16.3*

Note: Percentages are for Voting Age Population (VAP).
Source: 1988-2012. Statistical Abstract of the United States (Table 4), Bureau of the Census.
Significant at .10; 90 percent confidence interval. X = missing value. * = Outside the statistical margin of error.

Table 6.5 lists self reported turnout by race in Florida from 1988 to 2012. This data,
which supports the Census based registration numbers, reveals low levels of self reported black
turnout. From 1988 to 2012, black Floridians reported turning out at consistently lower rates
than whites. In every year, white turnout outpaced black turnout.
Despite this disparity, black participation does appear to have risen in 2008 before
dropping slightly in 2012. Although the difference between estimated voter turnout for African
Americans in those years were within the margins of error, in both years blacks in Florida
reported voting at around 50 percent. Additionally, in the two most recent presidential elections,
the difference between black and white self reported participation fell within single digits.
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Census estimates supported the general narrative of rising black participation in Florida
with smaller (than North Carolina) spikes in 2008 and 2012. However, these estimates were
imprecise and required additional confirmation.
Table 6.6 State Reported registration rates by Race in Florida in presidential elections
1996-2012 (percent)

2012
2008
2004
2000
1996

White

Black

Gap

60.6%*
69.2%
67.6%
63.9%
65.3%

50.5 %
51.7 %
46.5%
39.1%
39.4%

-10.1%
-17.5%
-21.1%
-24.8%
-25.9%

Note: Percentages are calculated by merging Census Population estimates (1996, 2000 to 2008, and 2012) with
county registration reports. See appendix A for details.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau; Florida Division of Elections (1996-2012)
*Due to inconsistencies with data white population of Miami-Dade County is excluded from the 2012 data.

Table 6.6 lists state reported registration in Florida by race from 1996 to 2012. This table
reveals two interesting narratives. First, African American voters made noticeable gains at
narrowing racial differences in participation. In 1996, white Floridians registered over 25 points
higher than blacks in the state. By 2012, that disparity was cut by more than half. However,
black Floridians still trailed whites in registration by ten percent.

Again, estimates for white

registration in 2012 were less reliable due to changes in the way whites and white Hispanics
were counted by the Census in Miami-Dade County between 2008 and 2012.82
Despite these advances, African American registration regressed for the 2012 election.
The 50 percent black registration rate in 2012 was lower than in 2008, lagged far behind North
Carolina‘s black registration of 69.4 percent, and continued to trail considerably behind whites in

82

See Appendix A for a detailed discussion.
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Florida. From 1996 to 2012 the average registration rate for blacks in Florida was just over 58
percent. For whites the mean for the same period was just over 65 percent.
Florida‘s state reported registration indicates that Census estimates were biased, in most
cases over-estimating black registration in Florida. The development of African American
voting in the state presents a glass half filled, half empty dilemma.

On one hand, racial

differences in voting decreased. On the other, significant disparities persisted.

Comparing Registration
An examination of state legislative election reforms from 1988 to 2012 reveals that
Florida officials adopted voter suppression measures more often than those in North Carolina.
Both states instituted a range of reforms to make voting easier including early voting, expanded
registration periods, rule standardization, and voter education. Despite these efforts, Florida
leaders adopted a number of voter suppression policies that were absent or weakened in North
Carolina. From felon disenfranchisement statutes to retractions of the early voting period,
Florida officials repeatedly passed legislation thought to suppress turnout.

How did these

measures impact African American participation?
Although the Census data presented larger gains, this study compares state reported
registration rates between Florida and North Carolina from 1996 to 2012 for a more conservative
estimate.
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Table 6.7 State Reported African American Registration in Florida and North Carolina
presidential elections 1996-2012 (percent)
Florida
2012
2008
2004
2000
1996

50.5%
51.7%
46.5%
39.1%
39.4%

North Carolina
69.4%
67.6%
52.9%
52.7%
50%

Gap
19.8%
16.5%
11.8%
13.3%
9.8%

Note: Percentages are calculated by merging Census Population estimates using ―one-race‖ only data for (1996,
2000 to 2008, and 2012) with county registration reports. See appendix A for details.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau; North Carolina State Board of Elections (1996-2012); Florida Division of Elections
(1996-2012).

Table 6.7 displays state reported registration rates for African Americans in Florida and
North Carolina from 1996 to 2012. The differences between the registration rates of African
Americans across the two cases were sizeable. Black voters registered to vote at much higher
rates in North Carolina out pacing black Floridians by nearly 20 percent in 2012. Moreover, the
gap between the two states grew. In fact, North Carolina‘s black registration rate of 50 percent
in 1996 was higher than any reported by Florida between 1996 and 2004. Beginning in 2008, the
gap in black registration between the states rose dramatically. In that year, differences between
black registrations increased from 11 percent in 2004 to 16 percent in 2008. For the 2008 and
2012 elections, black Floridians registered at just 52 and 50 percent. Significantly lower than
black registration in North Carolina for the same years.
Increases in black registration were much more pronounced in North Carolina for the
Obama election and reelection campaigns. In 2008, state reported black registration in North
Carolina was nearly 68 percent and in 2012 it rose to almost 70 percent. Although blacks in
Florida registered at their highest rates in 2008 and 2012, these increases amounted to only a few
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points difference from 2004. Compare that to North Carolina where black registration increased
by 15 points between 2004 and 2008, and by another two percent in 2012.
This registration data supports several clear conclusions.

First, African American

registration was much higher in North Carolina than Florida. Second, black participation was up
in both states for the 2008 and 2012 elections. However, blacks in North Carolina made more
significant increases. Third, the disparity across states grew over the time period under study. In
sum, black political participation in Florida appears suppressed when compared to the dynamic
gains made in North Carolina.

Voter Suppression Hypotheses
What can participation rates tell us about the effectiveness of voter suppression? When
assessed in conjunction with the leading voter suppression hypotheses, this data can help to
eliminate or bolster the assumptions and predictions associated with competing frameworks.
This current project‘s hypotheses were assessed in light of the qualitative and quantitative data
presented.
Hypothesis 1: Discouraging Voter Hypothesis. The standard model of voter suppression
concluded that voter suppression measures were either misguided or intended to impede the
participation of targeted groups. In the absence of significant voter fraud, efforts to tighten the
voting process burdened legitimate voters depressing turnout (Piven et al 2009, p. 202; Bassetti
2012; Overton 2006, p. 148).
Differences observed between African American participation in North Carolina and
Florida were consistent with voter suppression having a negative impact. On all three measures,
blacks in North Carolina participated at higher levels than those in Florida. From 1996 to 2012,
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the gap in state reported black registration between the states grew eight percent. By 2012,
blacks in North Carolina registered almost 20 percent higher than their counterparts in Florida.
If extraneous casual variables can be ruled out, these differences lend strong support to
the argument that voter suppression impacted the participation of African American voters.
Hypothesis 2:

Ensuring Integrity Hypothesis.

A small set of voter suppression

proponents argued that these laws actually help promote turnout (Lott 2006, p. 11). This
approach assumes that voter suppression laws increased the safeness and integrity of elections.
Subsequently, as citizens acquire more confidence in clean elections, participation increases.
The data however does not support this interpretation. With increased voter suppression
mechanisms in place in the state, this hypothesis predicted that Florida would display higher
participation. Contrary to this prediction, in the two most recent presidential election years, both
whites and blacks participated at lower levels in Florida than their counterparts in North
Carolina. If voter suppression laws promoted integrity and turnout, we would expect Florida to
display cleaner elections and higher levels of participation. The former is a subjective judgment,
but recent elections in Florida were rife with controversy. The latter was contradicted by all
three measures of participation presented in this study.
Additionally, the gap between black registration across Florida and North Carolina for
2012 was nearly 20 percent. The same for whites across states was only six percent. This data
provides additional evidence of racial effects. Despite a highly motivated and mobilized African
American community, blacks in Florida failed to eliminate the racial gap in participation.
The ensuring integrity hypothesis was further weakened by its primary justification.
Proponents of this hypothesis often assumed the existence of significant occurrences of voter
fraud in contemporary American elections (Fund 2008, p. 196; Lott 2006, p. 11). The current
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study relied on the established literature to rule out this argument (Minnite 2010, p. 57; Piven et
al 2009, p. 202; Hasen 2012, p. 6). Minnite (2010) concluded that voter fraud was rare and that
allegations of fraud were strategically employed to justify voter suppression laws (Minnite 2010,
p. 153). This study accepts the conclusion that voter fraud was not wide spread in Florida and
North Carolina from 1988 to 2012.
Further, Lott‘s (2006) formulation is refuted by the evidence presented in this study.
Most notably, Lott hypothesized that if voter fraud were rampant; then voter suppression
measures would produce lower, but more accurate, turnout (Lott 2006, p. 4). Both racial groups
in Florida displayed increasing levels of turnout from 1988 to 2008. However, blacks continued
to trail behind whites in the state. From 1996 to 2008, whites in Florida registered on par with
their counterparts in North Carolina. The same cannot be said for blacks in Florida. By 2012 the
difference in black registration across states was stark.
Hypothesis 3: Minimal Effects. Berinsky (2005) contended that the impact of voter
suppression laws were likely minimal and limited by several factors.

Most importantly,

contemporary laws targeted citizens who were the least likely to vote and presented only minor
hurdles to participation (Berinsky 2005, p. 482).

Additionally, many of these efforts were

frustrated by legal and political opposition.
The minimal effects model cannot be conclusively ruled out.

Due the complex

interaction between the broader push for pro-voting reforms and targeted demobilization, the
precise effects of voter suppression were difficult to establish. It is likely that the effects were
contingent upon local circumstances. In some elections the impact may be minimal; in others it
may be crucial.
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However, sizeable differences in African American participation across states suggest
that the effect of voter suppression was substantial during the 2008 and 2012 elections. If
nothing else, the dramatic gains in black participation in North Carolina proved that racial
disparities in voting could be overcome with the right combination of conditions.

These

conditions would combine high levels of interest, motivation, and excitement with minimal
institutional barriers to participation like voter suppression.
Hypothesis 4: Voter Suppression Backlash Hypothesis. This hypothesis predicted that
minority voters would respond to voter suppression laws with increased turnout.
The current study identified two plausible mechanisms by which this might occur. The
first assumed that backlash effects were localized. Under this model, blacks in Florida should
participate at higher rates due to the motivating force of offensive voter suppression measures.
The data does not support this interpretation. Blacks in Florida participated at higher levels for
the 2008 and 2012 elections than previous elections, but these gains were dwarfed by much
larger increases by blacks in North Carolina. Although the racial disparity in participation has
decreased, black Floridians still lagged behind whites by a significant difference.
The second possibility for backlash assumed that push back will be more intense in states
without voter suppression regimes.

Localized backlash may be offset by actual voter

suppression mechanisms resulting in a wash. Further, African Americans in states without voter
suppression regimes may face optimal conditions for mobilization. Avery (1989) predicted that
the perfect combination for increased turnout involved high mobilization, low demobilization,
and a motivated electorate.

African American voters in non-voter suppressive states have

motivation and an uninhibited pathway to express their discontent.
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Since participation data was largely silent on intent, assessing the precise role of backlash
was difficult for the current study. However the data does not support localized backlash. If
black participation in Florida increased in direct response to voter suppression, the effect was not
large enough to offset racial disparities. Further, higher rates of participation in North Carolina
were consistent with black voters having heightened motivation but this study could not
substantiate any specific non-localized backlash effects. On this matter, this study can only
speculate that backlash contributed to historically high black participation in North Carolina.
Although differences in African American participation between the two states were
clear, this study acknowledges the need to evaluate alternative explanations.

Assessing Alternative Explanations
Researchers have long investigated demographic changes as causal factors in shaping
partisan realignment. Scholars disagree on how diversification has altered southern politics. For
example, Prysby (2008) argued that ―race is clearly the most important demographic factor
influencing voting in North Carolina‖ (Prysby 2008, p. 67). While Luebke (1998) was skeptical
that demographic changes would bring about dramatic short term changes in Tar Heel politics.
He argued that, ―For the foreseeable future the additional coloring and diversity‖ [of the state]
―will have little effect on politics. Only as they become citizens and their children turn 18 are
Latinos and Asians likely to impact politics‖ (Luebke 1998, p. 133).
Building on V.O. Key‘s (1949) original analysis of the southern states, researchers
developed a number of demographic and socio-economic variables thought to influence
participation.

These included population growth, nativity, race, urbanization, income, and

education. To rule out alternative causes, this study compares these measures across cases. For
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this purpose, I employ the literature which provides demographic profiles of each southern U.S.
state for recent years (MacManus 2012, Chp. 3).

Growth and Migration
Both Florida and North Carolina have experienced massive growth since 1950. Along
with western states, those in the southern U.S. have doubled the population growth rates of other
regions (MacManus 2012, 50).

Figure 6.1 Population size by southern state 1950 – 2030.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (McManus 2012, 50).

Figure 6.1 displays total population estimates and projections for each southern state
from 1950 to 2030. Florida ranked second to only Texas as the fastest growing state in the
region, and Census population estimates projected the trend to continue. From 1950 to 2000,
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Florida climbed from 20th in population to 4th in the nation (Woodard 2006, p. 64). By 2030,
Florida‘s population is expected to reach close to 30 million residents (McManus 2012, p. 51).
Although North Carolina‘s population growth lagged behind the region‘s leaders, the
state grew at a steady rate. By 2030, North Carolina is expected to boast a population of 13
million residents. This would place the state in the second tier of the region‘s most populated
states competing with Georgia and Virginia.

Figure 6.2 Population growth rate by southern state 1950 – 2030.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau. (McManus 2012, p. 51).

Figure 6.2 reveals the population growth rate and projections for southern states from
1950 to 2030. Although Florida has historically experienced the fastest overall growth and inmigration of new residents, the state has leveled out in recent years. Florida remained the fastest
growing state in the region, but North Carolina and other competitors were not far behind.
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In sum, Florida‘s population grew larger and faster than almost all states in the region,
with the exception of the region‘s population leader Texas. Although not as populated, North
Carolina shared similar general demographic profiles. The Tar Heel state also grew; enough so
to compete with other second tier states in the region.
The current study identified no indications that suggested either the total population or
growth rates likely depressed the political participation of African Americans in Florida
differently than those in North Carolina.

Size of African American Population
Two direct outcomes of population growth were racial and ethnic diversity. Both cases
displayed high levels of growth and diversification.

Diversification may impact political

participation in several ways. First, immigration can alter the balance of native to foreign born
residents. This was true for residents born outside of the country, the state, or the region.
Second, the process could disrupt the racial status quo. This included the traditional black/white
racial paradigm, but also the addition of Hispanics and other ethnic groups.

Finally,

diversification alters the composition of the electorate.
One significant historical difference between the two cases has been the size of each
state‘s African American population. Historically, the size of Florida‘s black population was
smaller compared to other states in the region while North Carolina‘s has been larger. Some
argued that Florida politics were different because a smaller black population limited racial
politics. Although politics in the state were not without racial discord, politicians avoided race
baiting as often, or intensely, as those in other Deep South states (Woodard 2006, p. 259).
Despite these historical traditions, growth and diversification have disrupted these trends.
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Much of Florida‘s growth was due to a massive influx of new minority voters. From
1990 to 2005, the African American population increased from 13.8 percent to 15 percent of the
state (Colburn 2007, p. 5). This reversed the long trend of black outward migration. In 2004,
Broward County attracted more new black residents than any other county in the nation (Colburn
2007, p. 5). The new arrivals included Hispanic and Caribbean immigrants, but also many
African Americans. Colburn (2007) cited Florida‘s favorable business climate and the success of
the state‘s minority small business owners for creating a welcoming climate for the newcomers
(p. 5).
Although not as diverse as Florida, North Carolina exhibited a sizeable African American
population hovering around 22 percent, compared to 13 percent nationally. Was it possible that
North Carolina‘s black community displayed higher levels of participation because of its size?
As the adage goes, perhaps strength in numbers promoted political participation.

136

Figure 6.3 Percentage black population by southern state, 1950 – 2012.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial and American Community Surveys; DemographicsNow.com
(McManus 2012, p. 62).

Figure 6.3 displays the percentage black population by southern state from 1950 to 2012.
The size of North Carolina‘s black community cannot be discounted as a factor in promoting
black participation. To test the impact of community size, this study compares participation
across states by county. If the relative size of the minority community were a critical difference,
we would expect African Americans who resided in counties with higher black populations to
display higher levels of participation.
To further assess these questions, this study employs the state reported county-level
registration data compiled by this study.
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Table 6.8 State Reported African American Registration in Florida and North Carolina by
Percentage County African American in 2012
Florida
% County Black

Black Registration

North Carolina
% County Black
Black Registration

0-10% (n=25)
11-19% (n=30 )
+20% (n=12)

43.8%
50%
52.6%

0-10% (n=36)
11-19% (n=18)
+20% (n=46

65.2%
67.7%
70%

Note: Percentages are calculated by merging Census Population estimates (2012) with county registration reports.
See appendix A for details.
Source: U.S. Census Estimates; North Carolina State Board of Elections (2012); Florida Division of Elections
(2012).

Table 6.8 reveals state reported registration for African Americans by the size of a
county‘s black population for the 2012 election. A general trend can be identified. The size of
the black population was positively correlated with black registration rates. In counties where
African Americans comprised over ten percent of the total population (for this study only
counting two racial groups), African Americans registered at higher rates than in counties with
less blacks. However, this effect was more pronounced in Florida. These findings suggest that
the size of a relevant minority population merits further consideration as a factor that can
promote participation.

Size of Hispanic Population
Another potential difference between cases was the size of each state‘s Hispanic
population. Although Florida has fewer African American citizens, the state boasted the second
highest concentration of Hispanics in the South, trailing only Texas. North Carolina‘s Hispanic
population was smaller, but has grown too. By 2004, Hispanics grew to six percent of North
Carolina‘s total population, placing it fourth in the region (Cooper and Knotts 2008, p. 4). In
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1990, there were approximately 77,000 Hispanics in North Carolina. By 2006, that number had
exploded to 600,000 and continued to climb (Christensen 2008, p. 307).

Figure 6.4 Percentage Hispanic population by southern state, 1980 – 2012.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial and American Community Surveys (McManus 2012, 59).

Figure 6.4 reveals the percentage Hispanic population by southern state from 1980 to
2012. This data confirms that Latinos comprised nearly a quarter of Florida‘s population.
Although this study cannot fully assess the role of the Hispanic community, this data suggests
that the ethnic and racial composition of the state may be another fruitful avenue for future
research. Perhaps the addition of a third ethnic group in Florida altered the political dynamic
depressing African American participation in some way. It would also be of worth to explore the
role of the Hispanic population and its relationship with voter suppression laws. Ultimately, the
backlash might best be measured by including all targeted groups and their responses. Although
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this study focused on African American participation, the literature and evidence suggested that
Hispanic voters were, and are, targets of voter suppression also.

Nativity
Another factor that may depress turnout in Florida might be the high percentage of
foreign born residents. This category includes all residents born outside of the United States.
Florida boasts the highest percentage of foreign-born residents of any state in the nation. By
2005 that number climbed to 18 percent of the state‘s total population (McManus 2012, p. 57).
This could depress turnout as foreign born residents must often overcome social and language
barriers to participation.

Figure 6.5 Percentage foreign-born by state 1950 – 2005.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial and American Community Surveys (McManus 2012, p. 57).
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Figure 6.5 displays the percentage of foreign born residents by southern state from 1950
to 2005. Florida and Texas stand out for their exceptionally higher than the national average
percentages of foreign born residents.
However, North Carolina features its own sizeable share of foreign born residents.
Beginning in 1990, the percentage of foreign born North Carolinians grew. In that year, less
than two percent of North Carolina‘s citizens were born outside of the U.S. By 2005, that
number climbed to over six percent. These numbers suggest that both states became more
diverse with each passing year. Although the percentage of foreign-born residents in a state
might depress overall turnout, how this process impacted African American political
participation is unclear. Florida boasts a sizeable community of Caribbean blacks, but these
populations do not account for the large differences in participation between blacks and whites in
the state.
Another factor associated with demographic growth was the percentage of residents born
native to the state.
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Figure 6.6 Percentage state natives, 1950 – 2006.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial and American Community Surveys; DemographicsNow.com
(McManus 2012, p. 65).

Figure 6.6 displays the percentage of native-born residents of each southern state.
Despite the influx of foreign born residents, Florida led the region in the percentage of its
residents born in the state. From 2002 to 2006, over 60 percent of the state‘s residents were
natives and conversely the state featured the smallest percentage of migrants from outside of the
South (McManus 2012, p. 65).
Traditional voting theory suggests that foreign born and non-native residents may lack
the social bonds, history, and tradition, conducive to political participation (Verba et al 1995, p.
454-455). However, North Carolina‘s population included only 30 percent of its citizens born in
the state. If local attachments to home and community inspired participation, then participation
in Florida should outpace the same in North Carolina where less of its citizens were born there.
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Age
Florida holds a reputation for attracting retirees. By 2012, nearly 18 percent of the
population were 65 years of age or older. Since the 1950‘s Americans migrated to the state
during their retirement years to enjoy the weather and relaxed lifestyle. These migration patterns
continued into the contemporary era. From 1995 to 2000, seniors flocked to Florida making it
the strongest ―senior magnet‖ state scoring a net migration rate of 56.9 (McManus 2012, p. 63).
The net migration rate measures how many senior (older than sixty-five years of age) citizens
migrated into the state for every 1,000 older individuals already residing there (McManus 2012,
p. 74).
The standard model of participation suggests that political participation increases with
age.

Senior citizens and retirees possess the time, resources, and interests that promote

participation and these citizens tend to turn out at higher rates than other age cohorts. In the last
fifty years, a number of interest groups like the American Association for Retired Persons
(AARP) helped America‘s seniors congeal into a coherent and influential voting bloc (Popkin
1994, p. 30). However, elderly Americans were attracted to other states in the region and North
Carolina was no exception. From 1995 to 2005, North Carolina‘s net migration rate of 22.1
trailed only South Carolina and the regions leader, Florida. By 2012, residents 65 years and
older accounted for nearly 14 percent of the state (McManus 2012, p. 62).
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Figure 6.7 Percentage sixty-five and older by state, 1950 – 2012.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial and American Community Surveys; DemographicsNow.com
(McManus 2012, p. 63).

Figure 6.7 displays the percentage of state residents sixty-five and older from 1950 to
2012. Although seniors comprised a larger share of Florida‘s electorate, this finding is difficult
to pair with lower levels of participation. Seniors tend to display higher levels of participation
with the effect declining in the latest years of life. Additionally, North Carolina‘s percentage of
seniors of around 15 percent of the population was not too far removed from Florida‘s 18
percent.

Urbanization
Another area of concern was urbanization. This measure of urbanization reports the
percentage of citizens that live in urban, and not rural, communities. The U.S. Census defines
urban areas as cities or suburbs with a population of 100,000 or more (U.S. Census 2014). The
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South, as a region, recently experienced heavy urbanization. Although most states in the region
began urbanization as early as the 1950‘s, this process developed unevenly across states. Long
passed were the days where most southern citizens resided in rural areas with agrarian
economies. Now, most southerners live in the urban inner cities or the surrounding suburbs.
The same was true for both cases. However, only Florida and Texas exhibited urban population
counts above the national average (McManus 2012, p. 54-55).

Figure 6.8 Percentage urban by state, 1950 – 2000.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (McManus 2012, p. 54).

Figure 6.8 displays the percentage of the total population that resided in urban areas for
southern states from 1950 to 2000. Florida experienced the highest rate of urbanization in the
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region. Nearly 90 percent of the state resided in urban areas. Scholars stressed the importance
of county level politics and competition in Florida‘s urban centers. Florida was a large state
geographically, but high urbanization allowed political actors to gain state wide attention by
focusing on urban markets and their surrounding suburbs (Woodard 2006, 74).
North Carolina did not quite follow Florida‘s lead when it comes to urbanization. In fact,
North Carolina‘s rate of urbanization trails behind the national average at 60 percent. Despite
this difference, it was unclear as to how urbanization effects participation. On one hand,
urbanization can promote political participation by improving access to polling locations,
increasing media attention, and fostering an active political debate. On the other hand, the
process could depress participation by weakening social bonds that promote participation. The
former was likely the more influential.

Education and SES
Finally, this study examined educational and socioeconomic measures to see if the two
states were comparable. On education and income, Florida and North Carolina displayed similar
profiles and trends. In 2012, both states could boast that around 28 percent of their adult citizens
were college graduates.

These scores were just below the national average of 30 percent

(McManus 2012, p. 71).
Additionally, Florida and North Carolina scored very similar on economic measures. For
median family income and income per capita, both states scored just below the national averages.
For 2012, the median family income for both cases was around 54,000 dollars (McManus 2012,
p. 70). These close similarities across SES measures suggest that differences in participation
across states were not caused be these factors.
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Summary
The measures of participation examined, including turnout and registration data,
indicated that African American participation in Florida lagged behind gains made in North
Carolina. Blacks in North Carolina participated at higher levels, and displayed noticeably higher
increases for the 2008 and 2012 elections. This study contends that voter suppression efforts
were, in part, responsible for these differences.

An assessment of alternative explanations

provided mixed results. Although Florida and North Carolina shared similar demographic and
growth profiles, all potential differences could not be eliminated. For example, the relative size
of North Carolina‘s black population and Florida‘s Hispanic population could not be discounted.
These factors remain areas of interest for future research.
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CHAPTER 7: Conclusions and Recommendations
Introduction
The purpose of this project was to examine voter suppression laws and their impact on
African American participation. To do so, this study compared two state voting systems, Florida
and North Carolina. The current study builds on the theoretical framework introduced by
Carmine and Stimson (1989), which emphasized the linkage between racial and partisan politics.
More specifically, this dissertation process traced election system reforms and their impact on
black registration and turnout. New data sources were employed to assess the plausibility of
several competing theories of voter suppression. This study found that state leaders in both
cases, Florida and North Carolina, instituted many reforms intended to make voting easier. In
line with federal legislation, election officials adopted programs like early voting, one-stop
voting, no-excuse absentee balloting, and registration at public offices. Despite this progress, this
study identified selective efforts to target groups for demobilization and voter suppression. In
one case, officials adopted a broad range of pro-voting reforms while avoiding intensive voter
suppression measures. In the other, state leaders developed a much tougher voter suppression
regime. This study finds that the political development and levels of black participation in the
two cases were consistent with voter suppression laws having a depressive effect.
This kind of investigation of targeted demobilization is important due to the recent
proliferation of voter suppression laws. The issue carries scientific and theoretical importance,
but also practical significance. The changing demographics of American society will no doubt
alter our politics by disrupting old alignments. If the construct described by Carmines and
Stimson (1989) proves correct, specifically the merger of racial and ideological issues; then the
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diversification of the American electorate may prove decisive in determining how battles over
voting rights, and other public policy debates, are resolved.

Main Findings
Careful process analysis across cases resulted in several important findings. The primary
findings supported hypothesis 1 and rejected hypotheses 2.

This study‘s results were

inconclusive on hypotheses 3 and 4. Although not all of the hypotheses could be ruled out, the
data collected provided insights into all four of the competing frameworks evaluated.
H1, the discouraging voter hypothesis, argued that voter suppression measures negatively
impacted African American participation (Piven et al 2009, p. 202; Bassetti 2012, p. 174;
Overton 2006, p. 148).

Process analysis revealed stark differences in the level of voter

suppression across the cases. In Florida, state officials engaged in a concerted effort to depress
the turnout of Democratic-leaning voters. These efforts included, but were not exclusive to,
African American voters.

Further, this study found that these efforts were successful at

depressing black participation, as measured using registration and turnout data.

African

American participation in Florida lagged behind that of whites in the state, and also behind
African Americans in North Carolina, across multiple measures.
H2, the ensuring integrity hypothesis, predicted that heightened elections security and
voter suppression laws would promote confidence and induce higher participation (Lott 2006, p.
4). According to the assumptions of this model, Florida elections should have displayed higher
levels of participation. This study‘s data denotes otherwise on two counts. First, in the past two
elections, overall participation in Florida lagged behind that in North Carolina. Both black and
white Floridians participated less than their counterparts in North Carolina. Additionally, the
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racial disparity in voting proved more persistent in Florida. Second, the absence of equitable
increases across states in 2008 and 2012 challenges the importance of motivation. In Florida,
high levels of excitement for these two presidential contests among African American voters
only produced small increases in participation.
H3, the minimal effects hypothesis, posited that voter suppression was ineffectual mainly
because voters were likely to overcome all but the strictest of voter suppression mechanisms
(Berinsky 2005, p. 482). Although this hypothesis cannot be completely ruled out, the data
strongly indicated that the impact of voter suppression varies.

Large differences in black

participation across states confirm that something depressed black participation in Florida. As
this study cannot eliminate every potentially spurious relationship, I reserve a final judgment on
the minimal effects model. Nonetheless, the evidence was consistent with voter suppression
having a sizeable impact on black participation in 2012.
H4, or the backlash hypothesis, questioned whether voter suppression laws inspired
enough push back to mitigate their effectiveness. The current study was unable to reach a
decisive conclusion on the scope of backlash. However, I was able to identify two pathways by
which backlash might occur. The first, localized backlash was not supported by the evidence.
Although black participation in Florida was up in 2008 and 2012, these increases were minor
compared to North Carolina.

This means that either counter demobilization efforts were

ineffective, or that backlash and voter suppression cancelled each other out. The second avenue
for backlash involved push back across state lines. The current study was unable to isolate interstate backlash effects. Yet, the data did not preclude it. One possible explanation for the high
rates of black participation in North Carolina may be that higher participation was a response to
voter suppression in other states. Publicized voter suppression efforts may trigger the winning
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combination of motivation and access. African Americans in states that lack aggressive voter
suppression regimes may be motivated by media accounts and civil rights protests. Without
legal and administrative barriers to suppress them, it makes sense that these voters would turn
out in higher numbers. However, without more specific data measuring voter intent this finding
is only speculative.
Although the evidence only fully supported the first hypothesis, the analysis produced
several interesting ancillary findings. First, voting frameworks were subtle. Various protections
against racial disfranchisement prevented the most egregious voter suppression laws. Therefore,
contemporary voter suppression operated at the margins making it challenging to separate antidemocratic targeting from legitimate partisan conflict.

Despite this difficulty, officials in

Florida pursued much harsher voter suppression policies than those in North Carolina.
Beginning in 1998, Florida‘s legislature adopted several reforms suspected of depressing black
participation.
As a result, black participation was much higher in North Carolina than in Florida. This
finding was consistent across multiple measures. This study confirms that racial disparities in
participation can be mitigated with the right combination of motivation and mobilization. In
North Carolina, with a sizeable African American community with a strong tradition of civil
rights activism; mobilization and participation were high.

Turnout in the 2008 and 2012

elections show that when politics matter to voters, even those with a history of low turnout can
be inspired to the polls. This is consistent with prior studies that found that African Americans
have historically displayed extremely high turnout when motivated and mobilized. During
Reconstruction, African American turnout was nearly 90% in some areas (Goldfield 1997, p.
121). However, African American participation rates reached dramatic lows under less favorable
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institutional conditions. For example, in 1964 black registration in Mississippi was reportedly
less than seven percent (Parker 1990, p. 23).
The standard explanation for political participation suggests that massive growth and outof-state immigration produces an electorate disconnected from local politics, more loyal to their
hometown allegiances. This was not supported in North Carolina where growth and turnout
were high. Other factors indicate that Florida should display higher turnout including high
profile partisan conflicts, the large numbers of senior voters, and close competition in
presidential elections. Despite these competing claims, this study finds that Florida and North
Carolina experienced similar demographic trends.
Finally, an analysis of partisan transition confirms the linkage between realignment and
targeted demobilization. This study identifies a rise in voter suppression measures occurring in
both states following GOP takeovers of each state‘s government. Partisan transition occurred
first in Florida in 1998, and then later in 2013 for North Carolina. In both cases, the newly
seated Republican majorities adopted several voter suppression measures. However, the data in
Florida from 1988 to 2012 indicated that Republican elite support for voter suppression was not
monolithic. For example, the wavering implementation of ―no-excuse‖ absentee balloting rules
signified differences among officials over specific measures.

This study speculates that

differences among Republicans on this issue likely mirror differences between ideological and
racial conservatism discussed in the literature review.

Limitations of Study
Like all research methods and designs, this study has its strengths and limitations.
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The primary weakness of this study was the danger inherent in drawing broad
conclusions from a limited number of cases. Although detailed process analysis can mitigate
some of these risks, I accept that comparisons of participation data were less reliable than
comparisons of actual state laws. In the case of the former, it was difficult to eliminate all
potential sources of spuriousness. For the latter, process analysis allowed for a comprehensive
comparison of each state‘s political development.

To improve upon the current study,

researchers could expand this type of detailed process analysis to other states.
A second limitation, inherent to any form of historical analysis, was that this study
suffered the risk of over-generalizing or omitting important points. Examining an extended time
period requires that some elements be glossed over. This study undoubtedly covers some
important materials too briskly, while perhaps omitting others altogether. In order to mitigate
this problem, this study relied on established works on Florida and North Carolina state politics.
This study attempted to strike a balance between rich description and scientific parsimony.
A third limitation involved the reliability of data sources. State reported registration,
Census population, registration, and turnout data were all vulnerable to error. Despite these
concerns, these data sources remain the best available way to measure participation. Although
exact estimates were imprecise, general trends in participation were much more reliable and
consistent when evaluated across multiple measures.

Recommendations for Future Research
The findings presented in this study offer several interesting avenues for future research.
A good first step would be to increase the sample size to include a broader range of states. This
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would allow for more in depth process analysis and comparison. Additionally, it would enable a
fuller explication of the variables that influence the effectiveness of voter suppression.
A second area exposed by this study was the role of backlash. Future research should
examine more closely the potential for localized and non-localized push back against these laws.
Various surveys methods could be employed to deeply probe black citizen attitudes and opinions
toward voter suppression laws and their reaction to them. Another approach might be to conduct
qualitative analysis of civil rights and pro-voting protest groups to explicate the strategies used to
counteract demobilization.
Third, researchers could identify additional alternative causes for the discrepancies in
African American participation across states. This study discussed the leading demographic and
SES variables suggested by the literature, but an expansion of this portion would strengthen the
current findings. For example, two potential variables stood out. The size of the African
American and Hispanic populations may impact the role each of these communities plays in state
politics.

Additional research is needed to more fully explain how these factors influence

minority, and overall, levels of political participation.
Fourth, the current study emphasized legislative action and electoral reforms. Additional
work is needed to investigate voter suppression measures that originate from the executive and
judicial branches of government. The battle over voting rights was so dynamic precisely because
elections laws were influenced by many different actors.
Finally, the most important prediction generated by this study concerns black
participation in North Carolina. The state‘s partisan transition, followed by the passage of voter
suppression legislation in 2013, provides an excellent opportunity to test this study‘s findings. In
North Carolina, newly enacted voter suppression measures should allow for a strong test of the
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impact of demobilization versus efforts to counter their effects. High African American turnout
in North Carolina creates great risk, but perhaps also reward, for those seeking to erect barriers
based on race.

If North Carolina‘s recent voter suppression laws stand, then the next

presidential election in 2016 should provide researchers an excellent opportunity to further
evaluate the voter suppression hypotheses discussed in this study.
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APPENDIX A: STATE REPORTED REGISTRATION DATA PROCEDURES
State reported registration – this measure is calculated by combining official voter registration
data from North Carolina‘s State Board of Elections and Florida‘s Division of Elections, with
U.S. Census population estimates for presidential elections from 1996 to 2012. ―One-race‖
Census data, collected at the county level, is combined with county level registration reports to
estimate registration rates for black and white Voting-Age-Persons in each of the two state‘s
counties. To do so, county level population estimates for black and white voters are divided by
the number of registered voters of each race to calculate racial registration rates. This study then
totals registration by race for the state using the total registration reported by each county.

Important Terms
Terms
Total Population (TP)
White Population (WP)
Black Population (BP)
% Black in County
White Registration (WR)
Black Registration (BR)
White Rate by county (WR%)
Black Rate by county (BR%)
Total Registration Rates by
County

Definition/Procedure
Total population of all citizens of the county.
Census population estimate for ―white (one race)‖
respondents.
Census population estimate for ―black (one race)‖
respondents.
BP / TP (by race)
State reported total number of white (non Hispanic/Other)
registrants.
State reported total number of black (non Hispanic/Other)
registrants.
WR / WP
BR / BP
Total reported registration all races.

Additional Notes:
1. This study uses U.S. Census County Population Estimates for ―5 Race Alone and One Group
with Two or More Race Groups‖. Response categories used include White (one race) and Black
or African American (one race).
2. State reported registration data collection and reporting procedures changed in 2008. For
1996, 2000, and 2004 – reports recorded whites, blacks, and ―other‖. Beginning in 2008, the
option to answer Hispanic was added. However, the ―other‖ and ―Hispanic‖ categories are
consistent across the switch, meaning that the size of the ―other‖ community was very similar to
the ―Hispanic‖ data for the next election year. To test this, I visually examined midterm election
years. However, this study still prescribes caution when making comparisons across the switch.
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Due to these and other inconsistencies across Census reports, Hispanics are excluded from this
analysis.
2. VAP – Voting Age Population – Census total population estimates include all adults 18 years
of age. The VAP estimate includes non-citizens but excludes citizens overseas, military
members deployed overseas, and institutionalized citizens like those in nursing homes, in prison
or other settings. An alternative measures VEP, or Voting Eligible Population excludes felons, a
point of focus for the current study.
Census Bureau turnout and registration data employ VAP data.
To remain consistent across measures, this study employs the VAP measure. This study
calculates white and black registration rates as a measure of the total number of whites and
blacks estimated to live in each county.
3. For 2012, white-alone respondent population data for Miami-Dade County are omitted from
the analysis. The Census reported data for that year was over 2 million whites. Due to this
discrepancy this data value is counted as a missing value. The difference is likely due to a
change in the way whites and white-Hispanics are counted in the county.
4. County-level population estimates and registration data tables for years 1996 to 2004
available upon request.
5. State reported registration data derived from the Florida Division of Elections and North
Carolina Board of Elections. The following reporting dates were used:
Florida
1996 – October 7, 1996; 2000 – October 10, 2000; 2004 – October 4, 2004; 2008 – October 6,
2008; 2012 - October 9, 2008.
North Carolina
1996 – April 1, 1996; 2000 – April 1, 2000; 2004 – May 1, 2004; 2008 – December 27, 2008;
2012 - December 29, 2012

157

APPENDIX B: MAP OF FLORIDA; POPULATION BY COUNTY/MAJOR CITIES
STATE OF FLORIDA; POPULATION AND REGISTRATION BY COUNTY AND
RACE
Tallahassee

Jacksonville

Pensacola

Orlando

Tampa

Miami

Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 2010 Census Redistricting Data Summary. www.census.gov.
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Florida, 2008 – Racial Population and Registration by County

19.9%

Total
Reg.
154,706

White
Reg.
108,163

Black
Reg.
25,346

White
Rate
65.5%

Black
Rate
52.7%

3691

14.1%

14,172

12,315

1,345

56.7%

36.4%

134450

19874

12.1%

110,739

94,582

9,817

70.3%

49.4%

29,012

21651

6255

21.6%

15,732

13,094

2,101

60.5%

33.6%

Brevard

536,521

432036

55214

10.3%

351,488

296,386

26,946

68.6%

48.8%

Broward

1,751,234

842529

436597

24.9%

1,008,656

579,315

207,451

68.8%

47.5%

Calhoun

13,617

10625

2172

16.0%

8,622

7,516

797

70.7%

36.7%

Charlotte

150,060

130739

9055

6.0%

118,837

106,711

4,407

81.6%

48.7%

Citrus

141,416

128468

4941

3.5%

102,742

94,960

2,142

73.9%

43.4%

Clay

184,727

147419

18914

10.2%

120,656

99,894

9,634

67.8%

50.9%

Collier

315,258

214392

17138

5.4%

203,075

174,600

6,148

81.4%

35.9%

Columbia

69,092

53368

12213

17.7%

38,272

31,087

5,415

58.3%

44.3%

DeSoto

33,991

18069

3997

11.8%

15,613

12,674

1,644

70.1%

41.1%

Dixie

14,957

13034

1438

9.6%

10,775

10,164

422

78.0%

29.3%

Duval

850,962

515279

253825

29.8%

536,588

337,241

147,704

65.4%

58.2%

Escambia

302,939

212925

69728

23.0%

195,193

144,962

36,894

68.1%

52.9%

Flagler

91,247

72001

10005

11.0%

60,079

47,856

5,456

66.5%

54.5%

Franklin

11,202

9014

1848

16.5%

7,722

7,036

587

78.1%

31.8%

Gadsden

47,560

17051

26034

54.7%

30,128

11,916

16,651

69.9%

64.0%

Gilchrist

17,191

15312

1212

7.1%

10,721

10,082

266

65.8%

21.9%

Glades

11,175

7406

1311

11.7%

6,584

5,550

420

74.9%

32.0%

Gulf

15,667

11603

3363

21.5%

9,123

7,915

1,002

68.2%

29.8%

Hamilton

14,348

7910

5082

35.4%

7,688

5,148

2,333

65.1%

45.9%

Hardee

28,888

13855

2520

8.7%

11,802

8,808

804

63.6%

31.9%

Hendry

39,453

14967

5130

13.0%

16,936

10,700

2,533

71.5%

49.4%

County

Total Pop.

White

Black

% Black

Alachua

241,364

165179

48069

Baker

26,164

21712

Bay

163,946

Bradford

159
Hernando

171,689

144621

9518

5.5%

123,013

107,238

4,678

74.2%

49.1%

Highlands

100,011

72859

9228

9.2%

66,092

54,081

4,915

74.2%

53.3%

Hillsborough

1,180,784

686561

189670

16.1%

701,464

462,417

105,718

67.4%

55.7%

Holmes

19,328

17158

1420

7.3%

11,513

11,029

216

64.3%

15.2%

Indian River

132,315

105527

11866

9.0%

90,053

78,442

5,554

74.3%

46.8%

Jackson

49,656

34038

13407

27.0%

28,128

20,658

6,407

60.7%

47.8%

Jefferson

14,547

8964

5007

34.4%

10,310

6,756

3,311

75.4%

66.1%

Lafayette

8,013

5631

1358

16.9%

4,469

4,149

238

73.7%

17.5%

Lake

307,243

241243

28392

9.2%

188,702

156,694

14,361

65.0%

50.6%

Lee

593,136

436209

45635

7.7%

320,512

271,865

15,375

62.3%

33.7%

Leon

264,063

162550

83154

31.5%

174,544

110,728

47,597

68.1%

57.2%

Levy

39,460

32641

4314

10.9%

25,924

22,379

2,139

68.6%

49.6%

Liberty

7,957

5880

1477

18.6%

4,304

3,826

394

65.1%

26.7%

Madison

18,895

10617

7308

38.7%

12,278

7,453

4,274

70.2%

58.5%

Manatee

315,766

240894

27967

8.9%

206,211

177,757

13,290

73.8%

47.5%

Marion

329,628

254509

38928

11.8%

214,722

176,633

20,571

69.4%

52.8%

Martin

138,660

113797

8233

5.9%

101,155

92,506

3,646

81.3%

44.3%

Miami-Dade

2,398,245

437344

430570

18.0%

1,243,315

279,291

253,218

63.9%

58.8%

Monroe

72,243

53843

3695

5.1%

50,136

42,796

1,740

79.5%

47.1%

Nassau

69,835

61294

5886

8.4%

47,501

42,129

2,898

68.7%

49.2%

Okaloosa

179,693

145042

18847

10.5%

129,373

109,468

9,876

75.5%

52.4%

Okeechobee

40,359

26997

3464

8.6%

18,859

16,033

942

59.4%

27.2%

Orange

1,072,801

548058

212486

19.8%

604,243

328,026

104,486

59.9%

49.2%

Osceola

263,676

120566

25746

9.8%

136,544

68,601

10,765

56.9%

41.8%

Palm Beach

1,265,293

810545

201731

15.9%

831,423

628,870

97,095

77.6%

48.1%

Pasco

471,028

390456

21527

4.6%

294,431

255,597

9,647

65.5%

44.8%

Pinellas

910,260

724076

95545

10.5%

643,423

538,750

52,337

74.4%

54.8%

160
Polk

580,594

395406

82396

14.2%

332,015

247,945

40,660

62.7%

49.3%

Putnam

73,459

54582

12295

16.7%

46,432

36,837

6,569

67.5%

53.4%

Santa Rosa

150,053

131131

9118

6.1%

107,253

97,206

3,942

74.1%

43.2%

Sarasota

372,057

322898

17928

4.8%

260,618

235,321

8,726

72.9%

48.7%

Seminole

410,854

286917

45977

11.2%

259,336

188,808

24,082

65.8%

52.4%

St. Johns

181,540

157427

11993

6.6%

131,744

118,367

5,991

75.2%

50.0%

St. Lucie

265,108

172357

47073

17.8%

157,676

115,551

23,896

67.0%

50.8%

Sumter

74,721

59065

8828

11.8%

59,913

54,503

3,033

92.3%

34.4%

Suwannee

39,802

31578

4641

11.7%

24,791

21,323

2,402

67.5%

51.8%

Taylor

21,546

15849

4897

22.7%

13,088

10,748

1,898

67.8%

38.8%

Union

15,141

10667

3734

24.7%

7,273

6,314

793

59.2%

21.2%

Volusia

498,036

385582

51754

10.4%

326,854

263,705

27,850

68.4%

53.8%

Wakulla

31,089

25694

4213

13.6%

18,565

16,493

1,719

64.2%

40.8%

Walton

53,837

46854

4149

7.7%

36,847

33,827

1,430

72.2%

34.5%

Washington

23,928

18958

3724

15.6%

15,938

13,624

1,738

71.9%

46.7%

Sources: U.S. Census, State and County Resident Population Estimates by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic
Origin: (Vintage 2008); Florida Division of Elections (2008). Registration data reported on October 6,

2008.
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20.3%

Total
Reg.
164,912

White
Reg.
113,224

Black
Reg.
27,647

White
Rate
63.2%

Black
Rate
54.1%

3,617

13.4%

14,006

12,242

1,287

53.7%

35.6%

142,501

19,161

11.1%

112,915

95,393

10,122

66.9%

52.8%

27,049

21,118

5,259

19.4%

15,491

12,884

2,087

61.0%

39.7%

Brevard

547,307

461,103

57,500

10.5%

380,469

314,187

31,416

68.1%

54.6%

Broward

1,815,137

1,199,522

506,874

27.9%

1,140,454

596,526

255,035

49.7%

50.3%

Calhoun

14,723

12,105

2,013

13.7%

8,278

7,204

769

59.5%

38.2%

Charlotte

162,449

147,493

9,917

6.1%

115,050

102,725

4,726

69.6%

47.7%

Citrus

139,360

130,446

4,204

3.0%

98,639

90,551

2,230

69.4%

53.0%

Clay

194,345

161,639

20,137

10.4%

132,585

107,408

11,812

66.4%

58.7%

Collier

332,427

299,082

23,527

7.1%

180,560

152,483

6,398

51.0%

27.2%

Columbia

67,966

53,053

12,527

18.4%

35,539

28,755

5,064

54.2%

40.4%

DeSoto

34,712

28,958

4,688

13.5%

16,376

12,944

1,782

44.7%

38.0%

Dixie

16,126

14,339

1,431

8.9%

10,229

9,535

457

66.5%

31.9%

Duval

879,602

550,055

262,849

29.9%

557,282

342,358

155,371

62.2%

59.1%

Escambia

302,715

212,263

69,289

22.9%

198,275

144,386

38,958

68.0%

56.2%

Flagler

98,359

82,569

11,321

11.5%

69,597

55,015

6,617

66.6%

58.4%

Franklin

11,686

9,709

1,650

14.1%

7,174

6,537

535

67.3%

32.4%

Gadsden

46,528

19,761

25,668

55.2%

29,625

11,295

16,786

57.2%

65.4%

Gilchrist

16,815

15,460

950

5.6%

11,121

10,506

252

68.0%

26.5%

Glades

13,107

10,480

1,729

13.2%

6,668

5,509

445

52.6%

25.7%

Gulf

15,718

12,289

3,004

19.1%

9,030

7,862

951

64.0%

31.7%

Hamilton

14,708

9,177

5,049

34.3%

7,963

5,349

2,369

58.3%

46.9%

Hardee

27,514

24,392

2,063

7.5%

12,312

8,916

819

36.6%

39.7%

Hendry

37,447

30,694

5,100

13.6%

17,264

10,215

2,588

33.3%

50.7%

County

Total Pop.

White

Black

% Black

Alachua

251,417

179,166

51,115

Baker

27,086

22,782

Bay

171,903

Bradford

162
Hernando

173,422

157,862

9,582

5.5%

123,346

105,612

4,981

66.9%

52.0%

Highlands

98,128

84,430

9,997

10.2%

62,076

49,474

4,945

58.6%

49.5%

Hillsborough

1,277,746

968,749

221,976

17.4%

747,587

471,993

116,471

48.7%

52.5%

Holmes

19,804

17,829

1,277

6.4%

11,560

11,028

232

61.9%

18.2%

Indian River

140,567

123,120

12,984

9.2%

93,569

80,100

6,123

65.1%

47.2%

Jackson

48,968

34,176

13,274

27.1%

29,003

21,302

6,610

62.3%

49.8%

Jefferson

14,256

8,789

5,108

35.8%

9,517

6,283

3,037

71.5%

59.5%

Lafayette

8,804

7,255

1,363

15.5%

4,568

4,204

243

57.9%

17.8%

Lake

303,186

257,614

31,736

10.5%

201,652

163,397

16,182

63.4%

51.0%

Lee

645,293

563,553

57,810

9.0%

388,947

320,885

21,327

56.9%

36.9%

Leon

283,769

179,657

88,587

31.2%

190,574

118,756

53,274

66.1%

60.1%

Levy

40,025

34,928

3,895

9.7%

25,053

21,611

2,077

61.9%

53.3%

Liberty

8,276

6,432

1,573

19.0%

4,410

3,899

409

60.6%

26.0%

Madison

18,907

11,060

7,419

39.2%

12,001

7,267

4,189

65.7%

56.5%

Manatee

333,895

289,246

31,212

9.3%

209,468

177,831

14,084

61.5%

45.1%

Marion

335,125

278,967

43,691

13.0%

223,478

180,385

22,110

64.7%

50.6%

Martin

148,817

134,808

8,613

5.8%

101,835

92,011

3,753

68.3%

43.6%

Miami-Dade

2,591,035

*

496,932

19.2%

1,313,850

267,403

250,071

*

50.3%

Monroe

74,809

67,467

4,759

6.4%

51,524

43,229

1,798

64.1%

37.8%

Nassau

74,629

67,470

4,939

6.6%

51,607

45,989

3,016

68.2%

61.1%

Okaloosa

190,083

156,460

18,678

9.8%

128,865

107,569

10,276

68.8%

55.0%

Okeechobee

39,467

34,417

3,569

9.0%

19,185

15,977

953

46.4%

26.7%

Orange

1,202,234

838,791

262,499

21.8%

690,645

356,486

121,710

42.5%

46.4%

Osceola

287,416

231,282

37,298

13.0%

163,384

72,754

14,005

31.5%

37.5%

Palm Beach

1,356,545

1,042,888

246,973

18.2%

870,186

623,711

113,606

59.8%

46.0%

Pasco

470,391

423,963

24,545

5.2%

310,322

262,763

11,999

62.0%

48.9%

Pinellas

921,319

770,466

99,137

10.8%

626,348

515,072

53,828

66.9%

54.3%
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Polk

616,158

493,063

95,980

15.6%

351,119

252,336

45,688

51.2%

47.6%

Putnam

73,263

58,871

12,227

16.7%

43,581

34,584

6,262

58.7%

51.2%

Santa Rosa

158,512

138,715

10,273

6.5%

116,941

104,973

4,720

75.7%

45.9%

Sarasota

386,147

354,649

19,243

5.0%

277,672

247,989

9,871

69.9%

51.3%

Seminole

430,838

350,875

50,770

11.8%

277,376

194,720

27,489

55.5%

54.1%

St. Johns

202,188

181,736

11,594

5.7%

152,849

135,987

6,938

74.8%

59.8%

St. Lucie

283,866

215,071

56,369

19.9%

175,554

123,214

28,859

57.3%

51.2%

Sumter

101,620

90,377

9,156

9.0%

73,946

68,098

3,130

75.3%

34.2%

Suwannee

43,656

36,600

5,850

13.4%

25,043

21,425

2,491

58.5%

42.6%

Taylor

22,744

17,244

4,767

21.0%

12,585

10,423

1,734

60.4%

36.4%

Union

15,212

11,452

3,455

22.7%

7,313

6,325

801

55.2%

23.2%

Volusia

496,950

422,296

54,706

11.0%

332,556

264,232

29,545

62.6%

54.0%

Wakulla

30,818

25,339

4,545

14.7%

18,501

16,278

1,749

64.2%

38.5%

Walton

57,582

51,576

3,451

6.0%

38,368

35,293

1,366

68.4%

39.6%

Washington

24,892

19,999

3,896

15.7%

14,668

12,566

1,594

62.8%

40.9%

Sources: U.S. Census, State and County Resident Population Estimates by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic
Origin: (Vintage 2012); Florida Division of Elections (2012). Registration data reported on October 9,
2012.
*Miami-Dade white population and registration data for 2012 excluded (see appendix A for a detailed
explanation.)
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APPENDIX C: MAP OF NORTH CAROLINA; POPULATION
BY COUNTY/MAJOR CITIES STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA;
POPULATION AND REGISTRATION BY COUNTY AND RACE
MAP
Greensboro
WinstonSalem

Raleigh

Charlotte

Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 2010 Census Redistricting Data Summary. www.census.gov.
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North Carolina, 2008 – Racial Population and Registration by County

19.0%

Total
Reg.
89,954

White
Reg.
68,708

Black
Reg.
17,829

White
Rate
67.6%

Black
Rate
63.5%

2353

6.4%

24,489

22,997

1,115

70.4%

47.4%

9771

179

1.6%

7,296

7,090

79

72.6%

44.1%

25,162

12348

12144

48.3%

16,573

8,380

7,873

67.9%

64.8%

Ashe

25,702

24427

258

1.0%

20,500

20,151

107

82.5%

41.5%

Avery

17,884

16163

944

5.3%

12,701

12,404

70

76.7%

7.4%

Beaufort

46,035

31287

12626

27.4%

32,154

23,025

8,528

73.6%

67.5%

Bertie

19,337

7302

11681

60.4%

14,426

5,428

8,605

74.3%

73.7%

Bladen

32,312

18154

11581

35.8%

22,352

13,332

8,277

73.4%

71.5%

Brunswick

103,160

85673

12628

12.2%

75,923

66,213

7,868

77.3%

62.3%

Buncombe

229,047

199267

17405

7.6%

176,290

158,256

10,451

79.4%

60.0%

Burke

89,361

75345

6205

6.9%

57,264

52,229

3,473

69.3%

56.0%

Cabarrus

168,740

125408

25899

15.3%

110,129

89,003

16,234

71.0%

62.7%

Caldwell

80,059

71852

4545

5.7%

53,748

49,818

2,831

69.3%

62.3%

Camden

9,682

7890

1559

16.1%

7,213

5,909

1,142

74.9%

73.3%

Carteret

63,195

56240

4849

7.7%

47,718

44,044

2,556

78.3%

52.7%

Caswell

23,248

14678

7981

34.3%

15,414

9,488

5,669

64.6%

71.0%

Catawba

157,079

124763

13740

8.7%

104,743

91,947

8,920

73.7%

64.9%

Chatham

63,077

45447

8548

13.6%

42,520

34,446

6,296

75.8%

73.7%

Cherokee

26,568

25233

576

2.2%

20,886

20,340

207

80.6%

35.9%

Chowan

14,565

9035

5223

35.9%

10,625

7,053

3,350

78.1%

64.1%

Clay

10,389

10012

138

1.3%

8,512

8,384

26

83.7%

18.8%

Cleveland

99,015

75431

20829

21.0%

61,776

47,455

13,017

62.9%

62.5%

Columbus

54,212

34005

16715

30.8%

39,052

25,404

12,075

74.7%

72.2%

Craven

96,892

68681

23283

24.0%

68,750

50,375

15,732

73.3%

67.6%

County

Total Pop.

White

Black

% Black

Alamance

148,053

101661

28068

Alexander

36,537

32652

Alleghany

10,951

Anson

166
Cumberland

312,696

166314

116663

37.3%

211,611

107,647

82,814

64.7%

71.0%

Currituck

24,183

21653

1888

7.8%

16,635

15,117

1,036

69.8%

54.9%

Dare

33,584

31008

1192

3.5%

27,115

25,930

530

83.6%

44.5%

Davidson

158,166

131764

15271

9.7%

101,517

90,155

9,236

68.4%

60.5%

Davie

40,971

35300

2954

7.2%

26,864

24,573

1,806

69.6%

61.1%

Duplin

53,362

27993

13800

25.9%

28,964

18,930

9,134

67.6%

66.2%

Durham

262,715

121341

98031

37.3%

192,482

102,050

74,436

84.1%

75.9%

Edgecombe

52,682

20585

29845

56.7%

38,882

15,076

23,126

73.2%

77.5%

Forsyth

343,028

213151

88068

25.7%

224,041

153,843

60,988

72.2%

69.3%

Franklin

58,927

38402

15792

26.8%

36,508

25,064

10,327

65.3%

65.4%

Gaston

206,679

161780

30971

15.0%

128,848

106,061

18,844

65.6%

60.8%

Gates

11,708

7434

4064

34.7%

8,171

5,073

2,848

68.2%

70.1%

Graham

7,825

7046

60

0.8%

6,598

6,226

1

88.4%

1.7%

Granville

57,044

33999

18993

33.3%

33,788

21,353

11,377

62.8%

59.9%

Greene

20,677

9766

8345

40.4%

11,027

6,603

4,222

67.6%

50.6%

Guilford

472,216

276519

150128

31.8%

354,477

225,078

113,156

81.4%

75.4%

Halifax

54,983

22465

29745

54.1%

37,879

16,157

19,731

71.9%

66.3%

Harnett

112,030

75606

25370

22.6%

62,844

45,561

14,186

60.3%

55.9%

Haywood

56,590

54103

935

1.7%

42,683

41,641

413

77.0%

44.2%

Henderson

102,367

89052

3713

3.6%

77,276

72,965

2,018

81.9%

54.3%

Hertford

23,224

8172

14291

61.5%

15,457

5,757

9,323

70.4%

65.2%

Hoke

43,409

19542

14850

34.2%

25,626

12,078

10,083

61.8%

67.9%

Hyde

5,181

3172

1856

35.8%

3,708

2,635

1,022

83.1%

55.1%

Iredell

155,359

124732

19545

12.6%

101,832

85,976

12,107

68.9%

61.9%

Jackson

36,739

31068

950

2.6%

27,494

24,489

504

78.8%

53.1%

Johnston

163,428

118012

25907

15.9%

101,523

82,099

15,872

69.6%

61.3%

Jones

10,113

6304

3381

33.4%

7,313

4,605

2,581

73.0%

76.3%
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Lee

59,091

36872

11858

20.1%

32,910

24,653

6,870

66.9%

57.9%

Lenoir

56,826

30605

23259

40.9%

38,041

21,650

15,669

70.7%

67.4%

Lincoln

74,746

63157

4959

6.6%

50,036

46,039

2,801

72.9%

56.5%

Macon

33,005

31053

652

2.0%

25,331

24,671

190

79.4%

29.1%

Madison

20,432

19628

294

1.4%

16,500

16,004

131

81.5%

44.6%

Martin

23,398

12204

10306

44.0%

18,267

9,974

8,034

81.7%

78.0%

McDowell

43,843

39507

1828

4.2%

29,573

28,148

957

71.2%

52.4%

Mecklenburg

890,515

494771

265034

29.8%

627,997

393,615

186,925

79.6%

70.5%

Mitchell

15,784

15036

113

0.7%

11,933

11,787

19

78.4%

16.8%

Montgomery

27,358

17100

5389

19.7%

16,941

12,711

3,709

74.3%

68.8%

Moore

85,608

67139

12566

14.7%

60,651

51,256

7,961

76.3%

63.4%

Nash

93,674

53447

34956

37.3%

65,848

40,739

23,267

76.2%

66.6%

New
Hanover

192,538

152867

30663

15.9%

147,009

121,996

19,337

79.8%

63.1%

Northampton

20,487

8256

11918

58.2%

15,362

6,248

8,842

75.7%

74.2%

Onslow

165,938

121807

29601

17.8%

86,967

64,412

16,298

52.9%

55.1%

Orange

126,532

94029

17356

13.7%

104,179

82,786

12,675

88.0%

73.0%

Pamlico

12,502

9325

2882

23.1%

9,813

7,607

1,981

81.6%

68.7%

Pasquotank

41,111

23704

16004

38.9%

28,613

16,771

10,669

70.8%

66.7%

Pender

51,314

38599

9827

19.2%

34,122

26,708

6,456

69.2%

65.7%

Perquimans

12,856

9421

3275

25.5%

9,469

7,040

2,262

74.7%

69.1%

Person

37,438

25621

10558

28.2%

25,014

17,608

6,771

68.7%

64.1%

Pitt

156,081

94243

52821

33.8%

108,414

68,955

35,325

73.2%

66.9%

Polk

19,074

17167

1077

5.6%

15,201

14,191

739

82.7%

68.6%

Randolph

141,186

116249

8642

6.1%

86,116

78,781

5,040

67.8%

58.3%

Richmond

46,005

28549

14415

31.3%

30,145

19,734

9,525

69.1%

66.1%

Robeson

129,123

38228

31458

24.4%

72,403

24,983

20,615

65.4%

65.5%
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Rockingham

92,282

69126

17889

19.4%

60,012

46,940

11,883

67.9%

66.4%

Rowan

139,225

106774

22081

15.9%

91,426

74,034

15,020

69.3%

68.0%

Rutherford

63,424

54601

7197

11.3%

43,055

37,825

4,345

69.3%

60.4%

Sampson

63,927

34335

17928

28.0%

37,008

23,474

11,736

68.4%

65.5%

Scotland

36,508

18290

14029

38.4%

23,234

12,626

8,703

69.0%

62.0%

Stanly

59,614

49442

7128

12.0%

39,303

34,590

3,907

70.0%

54.8%

Stokes

46,171

42663

2284

4.9%

30,822

28,870

1,432

67.7%

62.7%

Surry

72,468

62196

3043

4.2%

46,039

43,269

1,930

69.6%

63.4%

Swain

13,512

9528

189

1.4%

9,930

8,026

63

84.2%

33.3%

Transylvania

30,187

28035

1596

5.3%

23,577

22,260

869

79.4%

54.4%

Tyrrell

4,087

2086

1715

42.0%

2,662

1,689

913

81.0%

53.2%

Union

193,255

147040

23933

12.4%

121,384

101,840

14,374

69.3%

60.1%

Vance

42,891

18723

21128

49.3%

29,805

14,041

15,046

75.0%

71.2%

Wake

866,410

571284

179402

20.7%

595,713

431,187

120,774

75.5%

67.3%

Warren

19,388

7434

10510

54.2%

14,639

5,791

7,957

77.9%

75.7%

Washington

12,946

5962

6524

50.4%

9,079

4,461

4,459

74.8%

68.3%

Watauga

45,196

42832

1036

2.3%

43,232

41,053

696

95.8%

67.2%

Wayne

113,671

67424

37329

32.8%

69,170

43,044

22,877

63.8%

61.3%

Wilkes

66,655

59608

2967

4.5%

42,356

40,125

1,682

67.3%

56.7%

Wilson

77,527

39692

30459

39.3%

53,148

30,126

21,499

75.9%

70.6%

Yadkin

37,954

32992

1376

3.6%

23,447

22,280

733

67.5%

53.3%

Yancey

18,503

17246

218

1.2%

14508

14,251

107

82.6%

49.1%

Sources: U.S. Census, State and County Resident Population Estimates by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic
Origin: (Vintage 200); North Carolina State Board of Elections (2008). Registration reported December

27, 2008.
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19.2%

Total
Reg.
94,627

White
Reg.
69,421

Black
Reg.
19,183

White
Rate
59.3%

Black
Rate
64.8%

2,088

5.7%

24,487

22,875

1,087

67.8%

52.1%

10,510

174

1.6%

7,387

7,129

79

67.8%

45.4%

26,351

12,689

12,809

48.6%

17,592

8,021

7,870

63.2%

61.4%

Ashe

27,097

26,392

234

0.9%

19,031

18,644

103

70.6%

44.0%

Avery

17,635

16,566

753

4.3%

12,074

11,679

101

70.5%

13.4%

Beaufort

47,507

34,054

12,176

25.6%

33,230

23,629

8,758

69.4%

71.9%

Bertie

20,653

7,416

12,781

61.9%

15,001

5,369

8,988

72.4%

70.3%

Bladen

34,915

21,140

12,231

35.0%

23,135

13,467

8,719

63.7%

71.3%

Brunswick

112,257

95,772

12,889

11.5%

83,626

72,259

8,745

75.4%

67.8%

Buncombe

244,490

219,464

16,011

6.5%

180,008

159,267

10,896

72.6%

68.1%

Burke

90,505

78,436

6,163

6.8%

58,867

53,153

3,588

67.8%

58.2%

Cabarrus

184,498

145,416

29,872

16.2%

120,453

93,922

19,262

64.6%

64.5%

Caldwell

81,930

75,577

4,209

5.1%

54,763

50,390

2,964

66.7%

70.4%

Camden

10,090

8,317

1,321

13.1%

7,531

6,137

1,165

73.8%

88.2%

Carteret

67,632

60,816

4,285

6.3%

51,333

46,772

2,782

76.9%

64.9%

Caswell

23,217

14,846

7,841

33.8%

15,599

9,585

5,611

64.6%

71.6%

Catawba

154,339

131,690

13,443

8.7%

104,823

90,099

9,578

68.4%

71.2%

Chatham

65,976

54,300

8,930

13.5%

45,521

36,457

6,266

67.1%

70.2%

Cherokee

26,992

25,406

376

1.4%

22,238

21,552

235

84.8%

62.5%

Chowan

14,772

9,354

5,072

34.3%

10,850

7,145

3,443

76.4%

67.9%

Clay

10,618

10,305

104

1.0%

9,124

8,907

36

86.4%

34.6%

Cleveland

97,474

74,719

20,205

20.7%

63,889

48,123

14,022

64.4%

69.4%

Columbus

57,638

36,878

17,642

30.6%

38,115

24,261

12,088

65.8%

68.5%

Craven

104,770

75,837

23,164

22.1%

72,110

51,755

16,630

68.2%

71.8%

County

Total Pop.

White

Black

% Black

Alamance

153,920

117,096

29,607

Alexander

36,853

33,763

Alleghany

10,927

Anson

170
Cumberland

324,049

174,166

121,332

37.4%

217,027

102,826

88,918

59.0%

73.3%

Currituck

24,077

21,896

1,434

6.0%

17,822

16,233

1,006

74.1%

70.2%

Dare

34,573

32,628

977

2.8%

28,459

27,060

578

82.9%

59.2%

Davidson

163,260

142,714

14,854

9.1%

105,619

92,759

9,872

65.0%

66.5%

Davie

41,433

37,533

2,693

6.5%

28,427

25,732

1,939

68.6%

72.0%

Duplin

60,033

42,336

15,594

26.0%

30,273

19,254

9,581

45.5%

61.4%

Durham

279,641

148,241

108,441

38.8%

213,490

108,165

82,915

73.0%

76.5%

Edgecombe

55,954

22,609

32,251

57.6%

40,079

14,907

24,370

65.9%

75.6%

Forsyth

358,137

243,373

96,953

27.1%

247,469

165,131

68,737

67.9%

70.9%

Franklin

61,475

42,900

16,623

27.0%

40,502

27,519

11,264

64.1%

67.8%

Gaston

208,049

168,029

32,671

15.7%

136,283

108,249

21,817

64.4%

66.8%

Gates

11,869

7,581

3,967

33.4%

8,622

5,303

2,993

70.0%

75.4%

Graham

8,700

7,883

25

0.3%

6,663

6,227

2

79.0%

8.0%

Granville

60,436

38,649

19,955

33.0%

37,026

22,994

12,437

59.5%

62.3%

Greene

21,429

12,641

7,953

37.1%

11,242

6,606

4,318

52.3%

54.3%

Guilford

500,879

296,944

167,959

33.5%

363,419

216,855

124,317

73.0%

74.0%

Halifax

54,006

22,109

28,716

53.2%

38,711

15,472

20,902

70.0%

72.8%

Harnett

122,135

88,547

26,257

21.5%

69,357

48,535

16,204

54.8%

61.7%

Haywood

58,908

56,984

716

1.2%

41,735

40,557

418

71.2%

58.4%

Henderson

108,266

100,969

3,513

3.2%

79,479

74,123

2,270

73.4%

64.6%

Hertford

24,438

8,830

14,809

60.6%

15,398

5,302

9,612

60.0%

64.9%

Hoke

50,536

25,470

17,301

34.2%

29,536

13,571

11,534

53.3%

66.7%

Hyde

5,859

3,895

1,836

31.3%

3,645

2,635

935

67.7%

50.9%

Iredell

162,708

135,523

19,949

12.3%

110,609

92,162

13,544

68.0%

67.9%

Jackson

40,448

34,631

823

2.0%

26,695

22,716

504

65.6%

61.2%

Johnston

174,938

141,463

27,519

15.7%

108,431

84,943

17,530

60.0%

63.7%

Jones

10,275

6,699

3,280

31.9%

7,590

4,780

2,630

71.4%

80.2%
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Lee

59,715

45,049

12,127

20.3%

35,041

25,261

7,701

56.1%

63.5%

Lenoir

59,227

33,492

24,233

40.9%

39,242

21,554

16,745

64.4%

69.1%

Lincoln

79,313

72,855

4,649

5.9%

51,624

46,906

3,034

64.4%

65.3%

Macon

44,998

32,498

563

1.3%

24,943

24,133

155

74.3%

27.5%

Madison

33,869

20,012

289

0.9%

16,707

16,019

160

80.0%

55.4%

Martin

20,742

13,044

10,467

50.5%

18,139

9,725

8,075

74.6%

77.1%

McDowell

23,961

41,897

1,808

7.5%

28,099

26,777

851

63.9%

47.1%

Mecklenburg

969,031

582,550

307,802

31.8%

680,253

401,889

217,921

69.0%

70.8%

Mitchell

15,368

14,903

83

0.5%

11,802

11,595

23

77.8%

27.7%

Montgomery

27,668

21,391

5,270

19.0%

16,740

12,314

3,719

57.6%

70.6%

Moore

90,302

74,773

12,127

13.4%

64,420

53,878

8,416

72.1%

69.4%

Nash

95,708

55,468

36,796

38.4%

68,318

39,910

25,938

72.0%

70.5%

New
Hanover

209,234

170,334

30,593

14.6%

160,201

129,722

22,104

76.2%

72.3%

Northampton

21,428

8,547

12,492

58.3%

15,544

6,026

9,167

70.5%

73.4%

Onslow

183,263

140,385

29,764

16.2%

92,109

66,375

17,511

47.3%

58.8%

Orange

137,941

106,717

16,780

12.2%

111,239

86,000

13,527

80.6%

80.6%

Pamlico

13,074

10,099

2,655

20.3%

9,330

7,209

1,850

71.4%

69.7%

Pasquotank

40,591

23,593

15,423

38.0%

28,336

15,768

11,196

66.8%

72.6%

Pender

54,195

42,830

9,605

17.7%

36,555

28,552

6,736

66.7%

70.1%

Perquimans

13,563

9,887

3,375

24.9%

10,054

7,432

2,412

75.2%

71.5%

Person

39,268

27,619

10,638

27.1%

26,425

18,357

7,280

66.5%

68.4%

Pitt

172,554

105,563

59,765

34.6%

117,064

71,018

40,288

67.3%

67.4%

Polk

20,271

18,891

912

4.5%

15,197

14,105

732

74.7%

80.3%

Randolph

142,466

128,670

8,673

6.1%

91,725

82,825

5,694

64.4%

65.7%

Richmond

46,627

29,278

14,523

31.1%

31,261

19,763

10,280

67.5%

70.8%

Robeson

135,496

44,414

33,527

24.7%

76,102

24,527

22,170

55.2%

66.1%
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Rockingham

92,720

72,557

17,609

19.0%

61,069

46,895

12,339

64.6%

70.1%

Rowan

138,180

111,216

22,669

16.4%

94,432

75,078

16,218

67.5%

71.5%

Rutherford

67,323

58,875

6,752

10.0%

44,137

38,222

4,668

64.9%

69.1%

Sampson

63,949

42,959

17,443

27.3%

38,143

23,554

12,212

54.8%

70.0%

Scotland

36,094

16,888

14,026

38.9%

23,328

11,769

9,258

69.7%

66.0%

Stanly

60,576

51,579

6,760

11.2%

40,638

35,063

4,385

68.0%

64.9%

Stokes

46,783

43,952

1,974

4.2%

31,134

29,110

1,376

66.2%

69.7%

Surry

73,561

68,891

2,969

4.0%

45,000

41,944

1,855

60.9%

62.5%

Swain

14,141

9,396

143

1.0%

10,254

8,111

108

86.3%

75.5%

Transylvania

32,849

30,732

1,310

4.0%

24,429

22,755

970

74.0%

74.0%

Tyrrell

4,338

2,525

1,632

37.6%

2,580

1,647

858

65.2%

52.6%

Union

208,520

174,519

25,171

12.1%

137,260

112,775

17,002

64.6%

67.5%

Vance

45,132

21,110

22,852

50.6%

30,857

13,913

15,977

65.9%

69.9%

Wake

952,151

662,907

203,809

21.4%

636,874

437,428

130,937

66.0%

64.2%

Warren

20,576

8,311

10,742

52.2%

13,834

5,477

7,360

65.9%

68.5%

Washington

12,736

6,095

6,333

49.7%

9,215

4,369

4,658

71.7%

73.6%

Watauga

51,871

49,483

923

1.8%

42,630

40,045

757

80.9%

82.0%

Wayne

124,246

79,284

39,823

32.1%

75,298

44,961

25,747

56.7%

64.7%

Wilkes

69,306

64,878

3,027

4.4%

42,639

40,141

1,705

61.9%

56.3%

Wilson

81,867

47,087

32,435

39.6%

56,421

30,615

23,483

65.0%

72.4%

Yadkin

38,084

36,033

1,294

3.4%

24,233

22,828

774

63.4%

59.8%

Yancey

17,630

17,078

183

1.0%

14,239

13,904

93

81.4%

50.8%

Sources: U.S. Census, State and County Resident Population Estimates by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic
Origin: (Vintage 2012); North Carolina State Board of Elections (2012). Registration reported

December 29, 2012.
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APPENDIX D: TABLE OF FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
REFORMS FOR NORTH CAROLINA 1988 TO 2012.
Year

Name of Legislation

Legislative
Chamber and
Bill No.

1991

Election Law Reform
Act

House Bill
586

1993

National Voter
Registration Act, or
NVRA; or ―MotorVoter‖

Federal

1993

North Carolina Voter
Registration Rewrite Act

House Bill
1776

1993

Kids Voting Project

Senate Bill
684

1995

Voter Testimony Act

Senate Bill
1162

1995

Limit Relatives on
Election Board Act

House Bill
277

1997

Voter I.D. Act

House Bill
736

1999

Election Law Changes
Act

House Bill
1074

1999

One Stop Voting Sites

Senate Bill

Description
1. Prohibited voter intimidation and
misleading voter suppression
mailings.
2. Updated criminal penalties for voter
and elections fraud.
3. Required polls open until 7:30 p.m.;
and extend to 9:30 if needed.
4. Limited the power of partisan poll
watchers.
5. Allowed college students to vote in
state.
6. Instituted ―one-stop‖ voting.
1. Expanded registration to state
government offices.
2. Prohibited voter purges for non
activity.
1. Prohibited officials from favoring
candidates or parties,
2. Expanded registration to state
offices,
3. Established a statewide registrar.
1. Waived electioneering rules for
youth voter education program.
1. Prohibited ineligible voters from
testifying at election hearings.
2. Proscribed for the reversal of
elections in cases of voter or
elections fraud.
1. Banned family members of
candidates from serving on boards of
elections.
1. Proposed photo-identification voting
requirement (returned to committee).
1. Penalized election administrators
who alter voter records.
2. Required voter registration drives to
submit forms within five days.
3. Prohibited payment for the collection
of registration forms.
1. Expanded ―one-stop‖ voting
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Act of

568

2000

Election Board Conduct
Act

Senate Bill
1290

2001

Elections Law Revision
Commission

House Bill 31
House Bill 34

2001

Election Changes Act

House Bill
831

2001

Elections Law Revision
Commission

Senate Bill 17
Senate Bill 14

2001

Ballot Instructions in
Spanish Act

House Bill
1041

2001

Data by Precinct Act

2001

Clarify Incumbents
Residency Act

2001

Early Voting Act; Voter
Registration by Fax Act;
Annual Absentee Ballot
Request Act

House Bill
977
House Bill
1186
House Bill
1195

2001

Children in Voting
Enclosures Act

House Bill
980

2001

Election Changes Act

House Bill
831

2002

Federal Help American
Vote Act, or HAVA

Federal

House Bill
1046
House Bill
1126

program.
1. Banned board of elections members
from making public statements in
support of candidates or referenda,
and prohibited them from soliciting
political contributions.
1. Banned butterfly ballots and punch
card machines, and reformed vote
certification procedures.
1. Established four-week training
program for elections administrators.
2. Provided for procedures to remove
elections supervisors.
1. Rewrote rules for ballot design,
counting, and challenges. Mandated
that election results be withheld by
the press until the polls close.
1. Mandated Spanish-language ballots
in counties with over a six percent
Hispanic population.
1. Allowed military voters to make one
yearly request for absentee ballots.
1. Enabled state representatives to vote
in their home district.
1. Permitted registration by fax.
2. Extended once yearly request policy
to disabled voters.
3. Established ―no-excuse‖ absentee
ballots.
4. Allowed voters to vote by mail
without showing cause.
1. Allowed minors to enter the polling
booth with parents.
1. Shortened early voting period from
22 to 19 days.
2. Expanded early voting to Saturdays.
1. Mandated statewide registration lists.
2. Established polling machine
standards.
3. Adopted the provisional balloting
system.
4. Required photo identification for
first time voters.
5. Detailed processes for voter
challenges.
6. Standardized rules for absentee

175

2003

Establish Election Fund
to Implement HAVA Act

House Bill
549

2003

Help America Vote
Compliance Act

House Bill
842

1.

1.
1.

2003

H.S. Students as Poll
Workers Act

House Bill
1120

2.

1.
2.
2005

Election Administration
Amendments Act

House Bill
1115
3.

1.
2005

Reconfirming
Provisional Voting Act

Senate Bill
133

2005

Public Confidence in
Elections Act

Senate Bill
223

2005
2007
2007
2007
2009

Orange County Super
Precinct Act or ―One
Stop‖ Voting Act
Election Administration
Amendments Act

2.
1.
2.
1.

Senate Bill 98
House Bill
1743

1.
1.

Registration and Voting
at One-Stop Sites Act

House Bill 91

Candidate Felony
Disclosure Act
Election Administration
Amendments Act

Senate Bill
1218
House Bill
908

1.
1.
1.

2009

Federal Military and
Overseas Empowerment
Act or MOVE Act

2.
Federal

3.
4.

ballots.
Provided special elections fund to
implement main provisions of
HAVA.
Mandated that all North Carolina
elections comply with HAVA.
Expanded pre-registration to 17 year
olds.
Allowed high school students to
serve as assistants to elections
administrators.
Adopted a forgiving provisional
balloting policy.
Allowed citizens who move to a new
county to re-establish residency via
personal affirmation.
Extended the provisional balloting
period up to two weeks after the
election.
Established committee to study the
issue of ballots cast out of precinct.
Required that provisional ballots be
counted fairly.
Mandated paper receipts.
Required regular testing of voting
machines including the source code.
Established a ―One-Stop‖ super
center pilot program in Orange
County.
Allowed former felons to vote upon
completion of their sentences.
Required that voters be able to
access ―One Stop‖ voting in their
home county.
Required political candidates to
disclose past felony convictions.
Lowered pre-registration to 16 and
17 year olds.
Removed notarization requirements
for registration.
Required electronic registration and
ballots.
Extends the re-registration
requirement to every two elections.
Mandated that states provide
absentee ballots 45 days before the
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election.
5. Allowed military ballots to mail
without postage.
6. Established voter education and
outreach.
2011

2013

North Carolina Uniform
Military and Overseas
Voters Act

Voter Information and
Verification Act or
VIVA

House Bill
514

1. Adopted the main provisions of
MOVE.

House Bill
589

1. Instituted a photo-identification
requirement for voting.
2. Reduced the early voting period.
3. Eliminated pre-registration for 16
and 17 year olds.
4. Ended same day registration during
early voting.
5. Terminated early voting on Sundays

Sources: North Carolina General Assembly; Election Reform Legislation Database, National Conference
of State Legislatures.
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APPENDIX E: TABLE OF FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
REFORMS FOR FLORIDA 1988 TO 2012.
Legislative
Chamber and Bill
No.

Year

Name of Legislation

1993

National Voter
Registration Act of
1993, or NVRA, or
―Motor-Voter‖

Federal

1995

Florida Voter
Registration Act or
FVRA

Florida Constitution,
Chapter 97

1996

No Excuse Absentee
Balloting

Senate Bill 270,
Senate Staff
Analysis.

1998

Florida Omnibus
Elections Reform Act

Senate Bill 1402

1998

Florida Constitution
Revision Commission

2001

Florida Elections
Reform Act

Senate Bill 1118

Description
1. Expanded registration to state
government offices.
2. Prohibited voter purges for non
activity.
1. Expanded registration to
government offices including
those included in the NVRA.
2. Expanded registration to
libraries, senior living centers,
and military recruitment
offices.
3. Mandated in-home registration
services for offices that serve
citizens in their homes.
1. Waived ―show cause‖
requirement for absentee ballot
establishing ―no excuse‖
absentee ballots.
1. Instituted a photo-identification
requirement for voting.
2. Required first time absentee
voters to appear in person first
before mailing future ballots.
3. Mandated records matching.
4. Increased penalties for election
and voter fraud.
5. Reversed ―no excuse‖ absentee
ballots again requiring citizens
to ―show cause.‖
1. Allowed the Governor to
appoint the Secretary of State.
1. Banned punch card voting
machines.
2. Mandated the use of a
provisional ballot in the case of
inaccurate records.
3. Required that voters who are
waiting in line at the close of
the polls be permitted to vote.
4. Strengthened elections and
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An Act Relating to
Elections

Senate Bill 618

2002

An Act Relating to
Violations of Elections
Code

Senate Bill 172

2002

An Act Relating to
Voter Registration

House Bill 493

2002

Federal Help American
Vote Act, or HAVA

Federal

2003

An Act Relating to
Elections

2004

An Act Relating to
Absentee Ballots

Senate Bill 2566

2005

An Act Relating to
Elections

House Bill 1567

2002

House Bill 1861
House Bill 7A
House Bill 29B

voter fraud penalties.
1. Allowed for late registration at
Supervisor of Elections office.
2. Required voter registration
drives to submit forms within
five days.
3. Prohibited payment for the
collection of registration forms.
1. Strengthened elections and
voter fraud to include
conspiracy and cover ups.
1. Clarified the rules for voter
purges allowed the removal of
citizens who move and those
with felony convictions.
1. Mandated statewide
registration lists.
2. Established polling machine
standards.
3. Adopted the provisional
balloting system.
4. Required photo identification
for first time voters.
5. Detailed processes for voter
challenges.
1. Mandated state compliance
with HAVA.
2. Adopted provisional ballots.
3. Required access for disabled
voters.
4. Modified the statewide registry
to comply with HAVA.
1. Established 15 day early voting
period.
1. Prohibits electioneering within
100 feet of a polling location.
2. Allows the ballots of voters
who have died to be counted if
submitted before death.
3. Revised the section of the
Voters Bill of Rights that
granted citizens the option of
proving identity via personal
affirmation.
4. Allows for voter eligibility
challenges but provides
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5.

6.

1.

2.

2005

An Act Relating to
Elections

House Bill 1589

3.
4.

5.

1.

2005

An Act Relating to
Voting and Public
Records

2.
House Bill 1591
3.

1.
2006

An Act Relating to
Voter Registration

2006

An Act Relating to
Restoration of Civil
Rights

House Bill 125
1.
House Bill 55
1.

2007

An Act Relating to
Elections

House Bill 537

2.

penalties for abuse.
Prohibits recounts in cases
where the margin of victory
renders a recount obsolete.
Shortened the early voting
period and limited daily
session hours.
Empowered the Secretary of
State to sanction local elections
administrators for noncompliance.
Required voters who submit
ballots by mail to present photo
identification the first time they
vote by mail.
Voters who move between
counties must re-register.
Eliminated entertainment ID
cards as acceptable forms of
photo ID.
Required that each polling
location have a polling
machine for citizens with
disabilities.
Exempted victims of domestic
abuse from public information
requests.
Protected sensitive personal
information from public
information requests.
Required that all boxes be
filled out on voter registration
forms.
Expanded ―motor-voter‘
provisions to including
businesses that sell hunting,
fishing and trapping licenses.
Charged county jail officials
with assisting discharged
felons with voting restoration
process.
Allowed for pre-registration of
17 year olds.
Enabled citizens to correct
minor registration errors at the
polls.
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2008

Omnibus Elections
Reform of 2008

Federal Military and
2009 Overseas Empowerment
Act or MOVE Act

Florida Military and
2010 Overseas Empowerment
Act

Senate Bill 866

Federal

House Bill 131

2011

Federal Write in
Absentee Ballot Act

House Bill 227

2011

An Act Relating to
Elections

House Bill 1355

3. Lowered the civil penalties for
independent voter registration
groups.
1. Lowered pre-registration to 16.
2. Removed buyers club I.D.
from list of acceptable photo
I.D.
3. Mandated that challenges be
issued from poll watcher who
resides in same county as
voter.
1. Removed notarization
requirements for registration.
2. Required electronic registration
and ballots.
3. Extends the re-registration
requirement to every two
elections.
4. Mandated that states provide
absentee ballots 45 days before
the election.
5. Allowed military ballots to
mail without postage.
6. Established voter education
and outreach.
1. Established electronic tracking
for absentee ballots.
2. Adopted the main provisions of
MOVE.
1. Allowed absentee voters to use
the FWAB balloting system.
1. Eliminated the option of
updating registration at the polls
when voters move between
counties.
2. Shortened the maximum hours
that polling locations may be open
during early voting.
3. Banned early voting on the
Sunday before the election.
4. Reduced the early voting period
from 14 to 8 days.
5. Placed tough restrictions and
penalties on independent voter
registration groups.
Required registration forms to be
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submitted with 48 hours.
Sources: Florida Senate Website Archive; Election Reform Legislation Database, National Conference
of State Legislatures; Election Law Changes 2005. Brevard County Supervisor of Elections.
<http://www.cityofcocoabeach.com/citylife/election>. (Accessed June 2, 2014).

182

REFERENCES
Abramowitz, Alan I. ―Issue Evolution Reconsidered: Racial Attitudes and Partisanship in the
U.S. Electorate.‖ American Journal of Political Science 38 (1994): 1-24.

Alexander, Michelle. The New Jim Crow. New York: The New Press, 2010.

Alvarez, R. Michael, Delia Bailey and Jonathon Katz. ―The Effect of Voter Identification Laws
on Turnout.‖ California Institute of Technology, 2008. (Accessed January 1, 2014)

Avery, Michael. The Demobilization of American Voters. New York: Greenwood Press, 1989.

Barreto, M. A., S.A. Nuño, and G. Sanchez.

―The Disproportionate Impact of Voter-ID

Requirements on the Electorate—New Evidence from Indiana.‖ PS: Political Science &
Politics 42 (2009): 111-116.

Barreto, M. A., S.A. Nuño, and G. Sanchez. ―The Disproportionate Impact of Indiana Voter-ID
Requirements on the Electorate.‖ Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity and
Race (2007): Nov. 8.

Bassetti, Victoria. Electoral Dysfunction. New York: The New Press, 2012.

Bennett, Andrew. ―Process Tracing and Causal Inference.‖ In Brady and Collier, ed. Rethinking
Social Inquiry. New York: Littlefield Publishers, 2010.

183

Benton, Edwin J. Ed. Government and Politics in Florida. Gainesville: University Press of
Florida Press, 2008.

Berinsky, Adam.

―The Perverse Consequences of Electoral Reform in the United States.‖

American Politics Research (2005), October: 471-491.

Black, Earl and Merle Black.

The Rise of Southern Republicans.

Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 2002.

Brady, Henry and David Collier. Ed.

Rethinking Social Inquiry.

New York: Littlefield

Publishers, 2010.

Brady, Henry; David Collier and Jason Seawright.

―Refocusing the Discussion of

Methodology.‖ In Brady, Henry and David Collier. Ed. Rethinking Social Inquiry. New
York: Littlefield Publishers, 2010.

Brady, Henry.

―Data-set Observations versus Causal-Process Observations: The 2000 U.S.

Presidential Election.‖ In Brady and Collier. Rethinking Social Inquiry. New York:
Littlefield Publishers, 2010.

Bullock III, Charles and Mark J, Rozell. The New Politics of the Old South. New York:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2010.

184

Burnham, Walter Dean. The Turnout Problem. In Elections American Style, ed. A. James
Reichley. Washington: Brookings, 1987.

______. Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics. New York: Norton, 1970.

Carmines, Edward and James Stimson.

Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of

American Politics. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989.

Christensen, Bob. The Paradox of Tar Heel Politics. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2008.

―Citizens Without Proof: A Survey of Americans‘ Possession of Documentary Proof of
Citizenship and Photo Identification.‖ Brennan Center for Justice. NYU School of Law.
2006. (Accessed April 3, 2013).

Cohen, Andrew. ―No One in America Should Have to Wait 7 Hours to Vote.‖ The Atlantic:
Nov. 5, 2012. (Date accessed July 1, 2014).

Colburn, David.

From Yellow Dog Democrats to Red State Republicans.

Gainesville:

University Press of Florida, 1997.

Collier, David. ―Understanding Process Tracing.‖ PS: Political Science 44, No. 4 (2011): 823830.

185

Cooper, Christopher and H. Gibbs Knotts. The New Politics of North Carolina. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2008.

Craig, Stephen and Roger Austin. ―Elections and Partisan Change in Florida.‖ In Benton,
Edwin J. Ed. Government and Politics in Florida. Gainesville: University Press of
Florida Press, 2008.

Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Grofman Ed. Quiet Revolution in the South. New Jersey:
Princeton Press, 1994.

Davidson, Chandler; Tanya Dunlap, Gale Kenny, and Benjamin Wise. ―Republican Ballot
Security Programs: Vote Protection or Minority Vote Suppression – or both?‖ Center for
Voting Rights and Protection, Sept. (2004).

Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row, 1957.

DuBois, W.E.B. The Souls of Black Folk. New York: Bantam Books, 1903.

Eamon, Thomas. ―The Seeds of Modern North Carolina Politics.‖ In Cooper, Christopher and
H. Gibbs Knotts. The New Politics of North Carolina. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2008.

186

Edsall, Thomas and Mary Edsall. Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on
American Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992.

―Election 2012: Voting Laws Roundup.‖ Brennan Center for Justice. NYU School of Law.
2012. (Accessed June 3, 2013).

Election Law Changes 2005. Brevard County Supervisor of Elections. State of Florida. 2005.
http://www.cityofcocoabeach.com/citylife/election (Accessed June 2, 2014).

Election Reform Legislation Database. 2001 – 2010. National Conference of State Legislatures.
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/2001-2010-database-of-election-reformlegislation, (accessed July 1, 2014).

Erikson, Robert and Lorraine Minnite. ―Modeling Problems in the Voter Identification – Voter
Turnout Debate.‖ Elections Law Journal 8 (2009): 85-101.

Fauntroy, Michael. Republicans and the Black Vote. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2007.

Fleer, Jack. North Carolina Government and Politics. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1994.

187

Florida Senate Website Archive.

State of Florida, 1998-2012. Legislation Search.

http://archive.flsenate.gov/session/index.cfm?Mode=Bills&Submenu=1&BI_Mode=Vie
wBillInfo&Billnum=2566&Year=2004. (Accessed June 4, 2014).

Fund, John. Stealing Elections. New York: Encounter Books, 2008.

George, Alexander and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social
Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005.

Gerken, Heather K. The Democracy Index: Why Our Election System is Failing and How to Fix
It. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009.

Gerring, John.

Case Study Research: Principles and Practices.

New York: Cambridge

University Press, 2007.

Goldfield, Michael. The Color of Politics. New York: The New Press, 1997.

______. ―Worker Insurgency, Radical Organization, and New Deal Labor Legislation.‖ The
American Political Science Review 83:4. (1989): 1257-1282.

Goldstone, Jack. ―Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulation in the Study
of Revolutions.‖

In Mahoney, James and Dietrich Rueschemeyer.

Comparative

188

Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press,
2003.

Gray, Virginia and Russell L. Hanson Ed. Politics in the American States: A Comparative
Analysis. Los Angeles: CQ Press, 2008.

Grofman, Bernard; Lisa Handley and Richard Niemi. Minority Representation and the Quest for
Voting Equality. New York: Cambridge Press, 1992.

Hall, Peter. ―Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics.‖ In Mahoney,
James and Dietrich Rueschemeyer.

Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social

Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Hasen, Richard. The Voting Wars. Yale Press, New Haven, 2012.

Helms, Jesse. ―Hands‖. Political Advertisement. Jesse Helms Campaign: Youtube.com, 1990.
(Accessed Jan. 1, 2014).

Hero, Rodney E., and Caroline J. Tolbert. ―Racial/Ethnic Diversity Interpretation of Politics and
Policy in the State of the U.S.‖ American Journal of Political Science 40 (1996):851-71.

Herron, Michael C. and Daniel A. Smith. Souls to the Polls: Early Voting in Florida in the
Shadow of House Bill 1355. Elections Law Journal 11-3 (2012a): 331-347.

189

______. ―House Bill 1355 and Voter Registration in Florida‖. Prepared for presentation at the
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, (2012b).

Hershey, Marjorie Randon. ―What We Know about Voter-ID Laws, Registration, and Turnout.‖
PS Political Science & Politics 42 (2009): 87-91.

Hill, Kevin and Dario Moreno. ―Politics and Ethnic Change in Florida.‖ In Benton, Edwin J.
Ed. Government and Politics in Florida. Gainesville: University Press of Florida Press,
2008.

Hood, M.V. and Charles Bullock. ―Worth a Thousand Words?: An Analysis of Georgia‘s Voter
Identification Statute.‖ American Politics Research 36 (2008):555-579.

Jacobs, Alan. ―Policymaking as Political Constraint: Institutional Development in the U.S.
Social Security Program.‖

In Mahoney, James and Kathleen Thelen.

Explaining

Institutional Change. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Jacobson, Gary C..

―Congress: Partisanship and Polarization.‖

In Nelson, Michael.

Elections of 2012. Los Angeles: Sage, 2014.

Key, V. O., Jr. Southern Politics in State and Nation. New York: Knopf, 1949.

The

190

______. ―A Theory of Critical Elections.‖ Journal of Politics 17 (1955): 3-18.

______. ―Secular Realignment and the Party System.‖ Journal of Politics 21 (1959): 198-210.

______. A Primer of Statistics for Political Scientists. New York: Crowell, 1966.‖

Keyssar, Alexander. The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United
States. New York: Basic Books, 2000.

______. ―Voter Suppression Returns.‖ Harvard Magazine. July-August (2012).

King, G; R. O. Keohane, and S. Verba. Designing Social Inquiry – Scientific Inference in
Qualitative Research. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Knack, Stephen. "Does 'Motor Voter' Work? Evidence from State-level Data." Journal of
Politics 57 (1995):796-811.

Kousser, J. Morgan.

The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the

Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1974.

______.

Colorblind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the Undoing of the Second

Reconstruction. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999.

191

Levin, Jordan. ―Thousands heed call of ‗Souls to the Polls‘ in Miami‖, Miami Herald: Sept. 29,
2012.

http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/10/28/3071748/thousands-heed-call-of-souls-

to.html. (Accessed June 1, 2013).

Lieberson, Stanley. ―Small N‘s and Big Conclusions: An Examination of the Reasoning in
Comparative Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases.‖ Social Forces No. 70. (1991):
307-320

Link, William. North Carolina: Change and Tradition in a Southern State. Illinois: Harlan
Davidson Inc, 2009.

Lippke, Richard. ―The Disenfranchisement of Felons.‖ Law and Philosophy (2001) 20: 553580.

Lopez, Mark Hugo.

Dissecting the 2008 Electorate: Most Diverse in U.S. History. Pew

Research Center, April 30, 2009. http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1209/racial-ethnic-voterspresidential-election. (Accessed April 5, 2014)

Lott, John R. ―Evidence of Voter Fraud and the Impact that Regulations to Reduce Fraud have
on Voter Participation Rates.‖ Department of Economics at SUNY. August 18, 2006.
(Accessed June 4, 2013).

192

Lowery, David and Holly Brasher. Organized Interests and American Government. Boston:
Mcgraw-Hill, 2004.

Lublin, David. The Republican South. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Lublin, David; Thomas L. Brunell, Bernard Grofman, and Lisa Handley. 2009. ―Has the Voting
Rights Act Outlived Its Usefulness: In a Word, ‗No‘.‖ Legislative Studies Quarterly
34(4):525-554

Luebke, Paul. Tar Heel Politics 2000. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.

Mack, LaKerri.

―The Georgia Voter Identification Requirement: Is it a Form of Voter

Disenfranchisement.‖ Doctoral dissertation. Auburn University, Alabama. 2012.

Mahoney, James.

―Strategies Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal

Analysis.‖ American Journal of Sociology 104-4 (1999): 1154-1196.

Mahoney, James. ―Strategies of Causal Inference in Small-N Analysis.‖ Sociological Methods
and Research 28-4 (2000): 387-424.

Mahoney, James and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social
Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

193

Mahoney, James and Kathleen Thelen. Explaining Institutional Change. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2009.

Manza, Jeff and Christopher Uggen. Locked Out. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Manza, Jeff; Clem Brooks and Christopher Uggen.

―Public Attitudes Toward Felon

Disfranchisement in the United States.‖ Public Opinion Quarterly 68 (2004): 276-87

Mauer, Marc. ―Felon Disenfranchisement: A Policy Whose Time Has Passed?‖ Human Rights.
American Bar Association 31 (2004): 16-17.

McDonald, Michael P. Presidential Voter Turnout Rates, 1948-2012. United States Elections
Project. (Accessed Oct. 1, 2012.)

McManus, Susan. A. ―The South‘s Changing Demographics.‖ In The Oxford Handbook of
Southern Politics. Edited by Bullock, Charles S. and Mark J. Rozell. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012.

Miles, Thomas. Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout. The Journal of Legal Studies 33
(2004): 85-129.

194

Milyo, Jeffrey. ―The Effects of Photographic Identification on Voter Turnout in Indiana: A
County-Level Analysis.‖ Institute of Public Policy Report: University of Missouri,
2007.

Minnite, Lorraine. The Myth of Voter Fraud. New York: Cornell University Press, 2010.

Morehouse, Sarah M., and Malcolm E. Jewell. ―States as Laboratories: A Reprise.‖ Annual
Review of Political Science 7 (2004):177-203.

Morgan, Edmund S. American Slavery, American Freedom: The ordeal of colonial
Virginia. New York: Norton, 1975.

Mycoff, Jason, Michael Wagner and David Wilson. ―The Effect of Voter Identification Laws on
Aggregate and Individual Level Turnout‖.

Presented at American Political Science

Association, Annual Meeting: Chicago, 2007

Nardulli, Peter F. ―The Concept of a Critical Realignment, Electoral Behavior, and Political
Change.‖ American Political Science Review 89-1 (1995): 10-22.

―North Carolina Election Law Changes – 2013.‖ Public Policy Institute of Western Carolina
University. N.C. Session Law 2013 – 381. House Bill 589.

(Accessed June 1, 2014).

195

North Carolina General Assembly.

1998-2012. Legislation Search.

http://www.ncleg.net.

(Accessed June 4, 2014).

Overton, Spencer. Stealing Democracy: The New Politics of Voter Suppression. New York:
Norton, 2006.

Parker, Frank. Black Votes Count: Political Empowerment in Mississippi after 1965. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990.

Phillips, Kevin P. Post-Conservative America. New York: Vintage Books, 1983.

Pillow, Travis. ―A novel argument for Florida elections bill: Why should voting be easy?‖ The
Florida Independent.

May 05, 2011. http://floridaindependent.com/29192/a-novel-

argument-for-florida-elections-bill-why-should-voting-be-easy. (Accessed June 3, 2014).

Piven, Frances Fox and Richard A. Cloward. Why Americans Don't Vote. New York: Pantheon,
1989.

______. 2000. Why Americans Still Don't Vote: And Why Politicians Want It That Way.
Boston: Beacon.
Piven, Frances Fox; Lorraine Minnite and Margaret Groarke. Keeping Down the Black Vote.
New York: The New Press, 2009.

196

Popkin, Samuel. The Reasoning Voter. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994.

Porter, Nicole. Expanding the Vote: State Felony Disenfranchisement Reform, 1997-2010.
Washington,

D.C.:

The

Sentencing

Project,

2010.

Retrieved

from

http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/vr_ExpandingtheVoteFin
alAddendum.pdf. (Accessed May 1, 2013).

Powers, Scott and David Damron. ―Analysis: 201,000 in Florida didn't vote because of long
lines.‖ Orlando Sentinel. Jan. 23, 2013.

Prysby, Charles. ―The Reshaping of the Political Party System in North Carolina.‖ In Cooper,
Christopher and H. Gibbs Knotts. The New Politics of North Carolina. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2008.

Prysby, Charles. ―North Carolina: Tar Heel Politics in the Twenty-first Century.‖ In Bullock
III, Charles and Mark J, Rozell. The New Politics of the Old South. New York: Rowman
and Littlefield Publishers, 2010.

Raskin, Jamin. ―Lawful Disenfranchisement: America‘s Structural Democracy Deficit.‖ Human
Rights American Bar Association 32 (2005). (Accessed May 2, 2013).

Rosenfeld, Steven. County My Vote. California: Alternet Books, 2008.

197

Rueschemeyer, Dietrich. ―Can One or a Few Cases Yield Theoretical Gains?‖ In Mahoney,
James and Dietrich Rueschemeyer.

Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social

Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Rueschemeyer, Dietrich and John D. Stephens 1997. ―Comparing Historical Sequences – A
Powerful Tool for Casual Analysis.‖ Comparative Social Research 16. (1997): 55-72

The Sentencing Project. ―Felony disenfranchisement laws in the United States.‖ Washington,
D.C.:

The

Sentencing

Project,

2014.

Retrieved

from

http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_bs_fdlawsinus_Nov2012.pdf. (Accessed
July 13, 2014).

Scicchitano, Michael J. and Richard K. Scher. ―Florida: Political Change, 1950-2008.‖ In
Bullock III, Charles and Mark J, Rozell. The New Politics of the Old South. New York:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2010.

Sheingate, Adam.

―Rethinking Rules: Creativity and Constraint in the U.S. House of

Representatives.‖ In Mahoney, James and Kathleen Thelen. Explaining Institutional
Change. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Skocpol, Theda.

―Doubly Engages Social Science.‖

In Mahoney, James and Dietrich

Rueschemeyer. Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2003.

198

Sundquist, James.

The Dynamics of the Party System.

Washington D.C.; The Brookings

Institution, 1983.

Uggen, Christopher and Jeff Manza. ―Democratic Contraction? The Political Consequences of
Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States.‖

American Sociological Review 67

(2002):777-803.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1988-2014. Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 440,
Voting and Registration in the Election of November. U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C.,

Van Evera, Stephen. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1997.

Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L. and Brady, H. E. Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in
American Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995.

Vercelotti, Timothy and David Anderson. ―Protecting the Franchise, or Restricting It? The
Effects of Voter Identification on Turnout.‖

Paper presented at American Political

Science Association Annual Meeting, Philadelphia. 2006.

199

Walton Jr., Hanes.

―The Disfranchisement of the African American Voter in the 2000

Presidential Election: The Silence of the Winner and Loser.‖ The Black Scholar 31-2.
(2001): p. 21-24.

Walton Jr., Hanes and Robert C. Smith. American Politics and the African American Quest for
Freedom. Boston: Longman, 2012.

Wang, Andrea Tova. The Politics of Voter Suppression. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012.

Weiser, Wendy and Lawrence Norden. Voting Law Changes in 2012. Brennan Center for
Justice. New York University School of Law, 2012. (Accesses Feb. 5, 2013)

Wilson, David C.; Paul Brewer and Phoebe Theodora Rosenbluth. ―Racial Imagery and Support
for Voter ID Laws.‖ Race and Social Problems 6:4 (2014): 365-371.

Woodard, J. David. The New Southern Politics. Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2006.

200
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THE IMPACT OF VOTER SUPPRESSION LAWS ON AFRICAN AMERICAN
PARTICIPATION IN FLORIDA AND NORTH CAROLINA FROM 1988 TO 2012
by
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Major: Political Science
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy

A rich body of research presents conflicting accounts describing how contemporary voter
suppression laws impact political participation. This study process traces the political
development of North Carolina and Florida from 1988 to 2012 to assess four competing
explanations of this process. This study compares three measures of participation that strongly
support the discouraging voter hypothesis, which finds that voter suppression laws depressed
black participation.
This study finds that state officials in Florida adopted a much stricter voter suppression
regime than those in North Carolina for the period under study. As a result, the two states
developed differing levels of democratization. In North Carolina, longstanding racial disparities
in participation were mitigated by 2012. However, during this same period, black participation
in Florida was suppressed. Despite high levels of African American mobilization for recent
elections, this study finds that voter suppression negatively impacted participation.
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